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Increased participation of non-governmental organizations (NGOs) in 
international lawmaking is hardly questioned in scholarship. NGOs use different 
means to affect international lawmaking, including acting as complainants and 
providing legal advice to the petitioners. However, in what particular way do NGOs 
influence international lawmaking? The dissertation answers this question by 
examining how NGOs utilize the procedural instrument of amicus curiae intervention 
before international tribunals. 
The dissertation shows that amicus curiae interventions by NGOs have become 
commonplace in international adjudication. In general, amicus curiae participation 
procedure serves as a legitimacy-enhancing mechanism for international tribunals. 
Scholars agree that in order to maintain legitimacy the international tribunals must 
stay cognizant of the values and preferences of stakeholders. Amicus intervention 
procedure is one of the mechanisms through which tribunals gather information about 
the values and attitudes of constituencies and communities subject to their lawmaking. 
Moreover, NGOs as amicus interveners act as “global law entrepreneurs”: they 
provide the tribunals with information as well as continuously support international 
lawmaking and advocate for its expansion. 
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Chapter I: Introduction 
In 1999 the President of the International Court of Justice in the case of The 
Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons expressed his discontent with the 
fact that the International Association of Lawyers against Nuclear Arms (IALANA) 
and other groups brought strong pressure to bear on the UN General Assembly and the 
World Health Organization in order to convince them to bring a request for an 
advisory opinion to the International Court of Justice. He expressed his hope that 
“[. . .] governments and inter-governmental institutions [would] still retain sufficient 
independence of decision to resist the powerful pressure groups which besiege them 
today with the support of mass communication media.”1 
The words of the Chief Justice of the World Court emphasized the significant 
role that non-governmental organizations (NGOs) have been playing in relation to the 
creation and development of international law. Currently, it is undisputable that NGOs 
play a prominent role in international law-relevant fields, from treaty-making to rule 
implementation, from support to courts to aiding delivery.2 International public-
interest organizations and their domestic counterparts often contribute to the shaping 
of international law through various legal means. They may take part in proceedings in 
different capacities—initiate a case, act as a court-appointed expert, appear as a 
witness, and submit amicus curiae briefs.3 
In particular, NGOs have been an indispensable component in the functioning 
of the international human rights regime from the outset, and continue to be. Their 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 The Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, dissenting opinion of Judge 
Guillaume, para 2 at 67. 1999 ICJ Rep. 
2 Christine Bakker and Luisa Vierucci, Introduction: A Normative or Pragmatic Definition of NGOs? in 
NGOS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW: EFFICIENCY IN FLEXIBILITY? (PIERRE-MARIE DUPUY ED. 2008). 
3 Dinah Shelton, The Participation of Non-Governmental Organizations in International Judicial 
Proceedings, 88 A.J.I.L. 612  (1994).  
 
	  2 
contributions are especially important in relation to fact-finding, reporting, standard-
setting, and the overall promotion, implementation, and enforcement of human rights 
norms. As commentators have indicated, the state of human rights regimes in the 
world would not be as it is without the spur and inventiveness of NGOs.4 
The history of NGOs stretches back more than 200 years, starting with 
associations established at the end of the eighteenth century in the United States, 
France, and the United Kingdom to bring an end to the slave trade. For instance, Anti-
Slavery International was established in the UK in 1839 as the Anti-Slavery Society.5 
However, the significance of NGOs appears to have reached new heights after the 
1990s.6 They are among the basic conditions of existence and sources of power of all 
systems of human rights protection, both within individual States and at the 
international level.7 
Moreover, never before has the number of NGOs been so great. Some devote 
their work to broad issues such as racial discrimination, development, or 
environmental protection, while others tackle more specific matters such as child 
soldiers, sexual exploitation of children, eradication of nuclear weapons, and prisoners 
of conscience.8 For example, there are approximately ten to twenty thousand NGOs in 
Haiti alone, a country with a population of nine million.9 Moreover, there are an 
estimated 5,000 world congresses annually for the 50,000 NGOs operating at a global 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 Steve .Charnovitz, Two Centuries of Participation: NGOs and International Governance, 18 MICH. J. 
INT’L. L. 183, 268-70 (1997).  
5 Menno T. Kamminga, The Evolving Status of NGOs under International Law: A Threat to the Inter-
State System? STATE, SOVEREIGNTY, AND INTERNATIONAL GOVERNANCE (GERARD KREIJEN ET AL EDS. 
2002).  
6 Id.  
7 Marek Antoni Nowicki, NGOs before the European Commission and the Court of Human Rights, 14 
NETH. QUART. HUM. RIGHTS. 291 (1996).  
8 PAUL GORDON LAUREN, THE EVOLUTION OF INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS: VISIONS SEEN 277 
(2003).  
9 PETER HALLWARD, DAMMING THE FLOOD: HAITI, ARISTIDE, AND THE POLITICS OF CONTAINMENT 177 
(2007). 
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level.10 The growth in the number of NGOs with an international mandate is 
evidenced by the fact that number of NGOs with a consultative status at the UN 
increased from several in 1945 to 3,413 today.11 
In this dissertation I aim to carefully examine international lawmaking activity 
of NGOs, by analyzing the means they use to influence the development of 
international law. The central question of this dissertation, therefore, is this: What 
methods do NGOs use to influence the development of international law? In order to 
answer this question, I examine NGOs’ participation within one specific procedural 
institution in international tribunals, namely that of amicus curiae interventions. A 
close study of how NGOs develop and use amicus curiae intervention procedures 
internationally allows us to draw conclusions about how NGOs identify, engage, and 
use specific mechanisms to influence the development of international law by courts. 
By looking at the NGOs’ use of the specific procedural institution of amicus curiae 
intervention, I suggest conclusions about NGOs’ strategies to influence the 
development of international law in general. 
1. Definitions 
Although scholars from different disciplinary approaches have studied NGOs’ 
work, there hasn’t been a universal agreement on the definition of an NGO or on the 
criteria for assessing the degree of required integrity, transparency, or independence of 
NGOs. In this part I elaborate on the main approaches to the definition and put forth 
the definition that will be used throughout this dissertation. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10 JOHN KEANE, GLOBAL CIVIL SOCIETY?, 5 (2003).  
11 Consultative Status with ECOSOC and Other Accreditations, NGO Branch, United Nations 
Department of Economic and Social Affairs, available at 
http://esango.un.org/civilsociety/displayConsultativeStatusSearch.do?method=search&sessionCheck=fa
lse, accessed on 20 September 2010.  
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International and regional regimes, institutions, and bodies maintain their own 
definitions of NGOs, which often diverge and contradict one another. Scholars are 
hardly to blame here because, as with other recently widely explored phenomena, such 
as terrorism, international law does not offer an authoritative definition of “a non-
governmental organization.” Therefore, much confusion surrounds the subject.12 
Similarly, scholarly debate and research on NGOs proceeds without an agreement 
about the specific definition of an NGO.13 
The following difference in the understandings of the term by the United 
Nations and the Council of Europe exemplifies this problem. The term “non-
governmental organization” was first mentioned in an international treaty in Article 71 
of the United Nations Charter, which reads, “The Economic and Social Council may 
make suitable arrangements for consultation with non-governmental organizations 
which are concerned with matters within its competence.”15 The Charter did not, 
however, define “non-governmental organization.” The UN Economic and Social 
Council (ECOSOC) adopted a definition in 1950, which established that for the 
purpose of consultative arrangements with the Council, NGO meant “[. . .] any 
international organization which is not created by intergovernmental agreement.”16 
The definition was further elaborated in 1996, providing that “[. . .] any such 
organization that is not established by a governmental entity or intergovernmental 
agreement shall be considered a non-governmental organization for the purpose of 
these arrangements, including organizations that accept members designated by 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
12 Menno T. Kamminga, The Evolving Status of NGOs under International Law: A Threat to the Inter-
State System? STATE, SOVEREIGNTY, AND INTERNATIONAL GOVERNANCE 95 (GERARD KREIJEN ET AL 
EDS. 2002).  
13 See Anthony Lester, Amici Curiae: Third Party Intervention Before the ECHR, in PROTECTING 
HUMAN RIGHTS: THE EUROPEAN DIMENSION 341 (FRANZ MATCHER AND HERBERT PETZOLD 
EDS. 1988); John Razzaque, Changing Role of Friends of the Court in the International Courts and 
Tribunals, 1 NON-STATE ACTORS AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 169 (2002).  
15 Art. 71, UN Charter. 
16 Review of Consultative Agreements with Non-governmental Organizations, , 27 February 1950, 
E/RES/288(x), para 8. 
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governmental authorities, provided that such membership does not interfere with the 
free expression of views of the organization.”17 There were other conditions added as 
well, such as that the aims of an NGO must be in conformity with the spirit, purposes, 
and principles of the UN Charter.18 The definition does not, therefore, include 
possession of a non-profit or public interest aim as a requirement. 
The only international treaty aimed at facilitating transnational recognition of 
the legal personality of NGOs, the 1986 European Convention on the Recognition of 
the Legal Personality of International Non-Governmental Organizations, enumerates 
certain conditions that associations, foundations, and other private institutions should 
meet to be recognized as “non-governmental.”19 Contrary to the above-cited 1996 UN 
ECOSOC resolution, it establishes the requirement of a “non-profit-making aim of an 
international utility.”20 
There is no established consensus on the definition of NGOs among scholars.21 
For example, a frequently quoted article in the Encyclopedia of Public International 
Law suggests that the concept of NGOs may encompass multinational corporations 
and even national liberation movements.22 Menno Kamminga, on the other hand, 
insists on distinguishing between NGOs and national liberation movements, armed 
opposition groups, and political parties. NGOs do not aspire to overthrow 
governments, and while they do seek policy changes they do not aim to acquire State 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
17 Consultative Relationship Between the United Nations and Non-Governmental Organizations, 25 
July 1996, E/RES/1996/31, para 2.  
18 Id. 
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20 Id. Art. 1.  
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FLEXIBILITY? 13 (2008).  
22 HH-K Rechenberg, Non-Governmental Organizations, in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL 
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power by themselves.23 Others have written about the necessity of distinguishing 
between NGOs and criminal organizations.24 For Daniel Thürer, NGOs (a) are not 
established by a government, or by an intergovernmental agreement; (b) are typically 
private institutions, associations, foundations, federations, or other organizations 
founded on the basis and under the regime of private law of a state; and (c) have 
concerns, purposes, and objects which are, in contrast to the origins of NGOs, of a 
public nature.25 These criteria would allow for criminal organizations, and sometimes 
for political parties, to be qualified as NGOs, as they do not exclude groups which 
operate via violent means or have violent aims. The debate also concerns other 
questions related to the nature of the activities of NGOs, their membership, and other 
features.26 
The implications of this disagreement of a definition are manifold. First, as the 
boundaries of the state and civil society have been reconfigured, it is becoming 
increasingly difficult to discern which entities maintain a connection to the state, and 
which are independent from it. This question is important not only from a legal point 
of view, but also from the point of view of the independence of NGOs and the state’s 
ability to control them. This ambiguity has led to the fiercest attacks and debates.27 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
23 Menno T. Kamminga, The Evolving Status of NGOs under International Law: A Threat to the Inter-
State System? STATE, SOVEREIGNTY, AND INTERNATIONAL GOVERNANCE 96 (GERARD KREIJEN ET AL 
EDS. 2002). 
24 Alex P. Schmid, Non-State Actors: Organized Crime, Human Rights NGOs, and the United Nations, 
in THE LEGITIMACY OF THE UNITED NATIONS: TOWARDS AN ENHANCED LEGAL STATUS OF NON-STATE 
ACTORS 125 (VAN BOVEN ET AL. EDS.1997).  
25 Daniel Thürer, The Emergence of Non-Governmental Organizations and Transnational Enterprises, 
in NON-STATE ACTORS AS NEW SUBJECTS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW: FROM THE TRADITIONAL STATE 
ORDER TOWARDS THE LAW OF THE GLOBAL COMMUNITY, PROCEEDINGS OF AN INTERNATIONAL 
SYMPOSIUM OF THE KIEL WALTHER-SCHÜCKING-INSTITUTE OF INTERNATIONAL LAW, March 25-28, 
1998 (RAINER HOFMANN AND NILS GEISSLER EDS, 1999).  
26 PIERRE-MARIE DUPUY & LUISA VIERUCCI ED., NGOS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW: EFFICIENCY IN 
FLEXIBILITY? (2008) 
27 See, e.g., Latin America Scholars Urge Human Rights Watch to Speak up on Honduras Coupe, 
available at http://www.huffingtonpost.com/robert-naiman/latin-america-scholars-ur_b_265282.html, 
accessed on 12 December 2010 (arguing that Human Rights Watch’s ‘reporting on Latin America is 
often heavily influenced by the agendas of official Washington.’); Robert Bernstein, Rights Watchdog, 
Lost in the Mideast, New York Times, Oct. 19, 2009 available at 
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Therefore, it is reasonable to expect that attempts to draw clear lines between the state 
and non-state, governmental and non-governmental actors will necessarily involve 
certain difficulties. 
Second, a lack of mutually agreed-upon criteria for defining NGOs across 
different international and regional rulemaking bodies contributes to the lack of clarity 
in the sophisticated web of relationships between these inter-governmental and non-
governmental bodies. Lack of clarity in turn affects issues of accountability. An 
organization perceived as non-governmental which is engaged in transnational 
advocacy work might include government representatives as founders or members of 
its highest decision-making bodies, or might receive substantial amounts of funding 
from governments. Furthermore, an organization acting as an NGO in one regional 
system might be refused recognition as such in another, due to differences in the 
criteria for identifying NGOs. 
Third, a lack of agreement on common criteria between international bodies 
and scholars creates a kind of analytical cacophony that eliminates the possibility of a 
meaningful debate. Scholars across different disciplines refer to NGOs 
interchangeably with advocacy organizations, activists, human rights groups, interest 
groups, civil society, and non-state actors. Inability to reach agreement on defining 
NGOs undermines prospects of a serious cross-disciplinary exchange. This has 
important scientific consequences as well. Despite the abundance of research on NGO 
participation in international lawmaking, it is hard to come to a definitive agreement 
on research conclusions if the criteria for considering an entity to be non-
governmental are not clarified in the first place. 
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In this dissertation I adopt a narrower definition. Drawing on Daniel Thürer’s 
definition, for the purposes of this research, those entities are considered NGOs which 
(a) are not established by government or governmental entities, (b) are established 
under private law of a state, (c) aim at furthering the good of those beyond their 
members and/or founders, and (d) do not utilize violent means and do not participate 
in competition for political office. 
Therefore, this definition excludes political parties and corporations from 
being considered NGOs. 
2. Methodology 
In order to answer the research question, I undertake a series of steps. First, on 
a general level, I put forth a comparative study of NGO participation in two 
international tribunals: the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) and the 
International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea (ITLOS). Based on the methodology of 
paired comparison,28 I compare and contrast the participation of NGOs as amici in 
these two international tribunals. Specifically, Tarrow highlights the use of using 
similar systems design to uncover key independent variables. 
The European Court of Human Rights is one of the oldest international courts 
that has jurisdiction over claims presented by states as well as claims submitted by 
individuals. Currently, the Court’s ever-increasing caseload amounts to hundreds of 
thousands of cases. Forty-seven European countries are subject to the Court’s 
jurisdiction. ITLOS, on the other hand, is a body endowed with the specific mandate 
to adjudicate disputes arising out of the application and interpretation of the United 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
28 Sidney Tarrow, The Strategy of Paired Comparison: Toward a Theory of Practice, 43 COMP. POL. 
STUD. 230 (2010). 
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National Convention on the Law of the Sea. Although the Tribunal has existed since 
1996, it has dealt with only 19 cases so far. 
Second, in order to understand specifically the modalities of NGO participation 
as amici, I examine NGO appearances before the ECtHR as claimants as well. This 
comparison of NGO dynamics within the structure of one Court, in the capacity of 
both applicants and amici, allows discerning characteristics that are specific to 
participation as amicus curiae. 
Third, I offer a micro historic study of the internationalization of amicus curiae 
procedure from the UK, pointing out the processes that led to the international 
adoption of this English legal institution. 
The analysis is based on secondary materials, as well as the study of primary 
sources such as briefs submitted by amici. The archival material referred to in the 
dissertation is drawn from archival work at the European Court of Human Rights in 
Strasbourg. I am also thankful to the Archives of the European Court, as well as 
specific individuals, such as Daniel Simons of Greenpeace, for providing additional 
materials indicated in the dissertation. The cases indicated here were acquired through 
the publicly accessible search system for the Court. The system assigns rankings 
depending on the significance of the case to the development of the Court’s human 
rights principles. It is also possible to find the Court’s case law by the Article of the 
Convention on which the applicant relies. Therefore, I searched for cases in which 
applicants alleged a violation of Article 1 of Protocol 1 of the Convention and which 
the system ranked as highly significant in terms of their contribution to the 
development of relevant international principles. 
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3. Contribution to Scholarship 
The proliferation of non-state actors and the increased roles they play in 
international relations urges scholars to reconsider their views about the making of 
international law.29 The issue of NGO participation in international relations has been 
addressed from a number of angles. Nevertheless, the scholarship is characterized by a 
series of gaps, which in this dissertation I aim to fill. 
First, most international relations scholars have focused on examining the 
political or advocacy strategies employed by NGOs to advance their aims. Moreover, 
the scholarship on legal opportunity structure has emphasized disproportionately the 
structures that generate action by public-interest groups, downplaying the activity and 
role of NGOs themselves in creating these structures. 
Second, legal scholarship has paid much more attention to the 
conceptualization of international dispute-resolution from the perspective of tribunals, 
overlooking the need to study closely the activity of litigants, although it is precisely 
this activity that fuels the tribunals’ work.  Moreover, the scholars examining the 
legitimacy of international tribunals agree that the international adjudicatory bodies 
enhance their own legitimacy by having in mind the preferences of stakeholders and 
public. However, the role of amicus curiae in providing the courts with this valuable 
information has been overlooked. Third, in cases when the objectives and strategies of 
litigants are reflected upon, scholarship has concentrated on the parties to litigation, 
while the impact and role of amici interveners has not been covered. On the other 
hand, a number of legal commentators have studied amici interventions internationally 
and have agreed on their relative influence. Nevertheless, they stop short of theorizing 
on the amici’s strategies and their influence. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
29 ANTHONY AREND, LEGAL RULES AND INTERNATIONAL SOCIETY 8-9 (1999).  
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Fourth, comparative law studies on legal transplants has put forth important 
insights on the movement of legal institutions and the role of private actors in this 
process, yet the main unit of study for comparative law scholarship remains the 
transnational as opposed to international movement of legal ideas. However, the 
insights from the literature have been beneficial in analyzing the internationalization 
of amicus curiae procedure from Britain. 
Last but not least, the International Legal Process school, which has offered a 
grand theory of how international law is made and developed and has studied the role 
of NGOs in the process, falls short of case studies specifically and systematically 
examining NGO activity across international tribunals. Chapter II, on Theoretical 
Frameworks, elaborates on each of these schools of thought. 
This dissertation addresses these lacunae in scholarship. It posits that amicus 
curiae interventions serve as governance mechanisms with which international 
tribunals gather information about the public’s preferences. In general, amicus curiae 
are legitimacy enhancing i.e. by drawing information about the views and values of its 
constituencies through amicus curiae submissions, international tribunals enhance 
their sociological legitimacy. Furthermore, amicus curiae interventions by NGOs are 
distinct because they perform two roles. First, they inform the courts of the  
organizations’ and the public’s views on particular controversial issues. Second, 
NGOs support the development of international law by continuously advocating for 
more international law-making.  
4. Roadmap 
The dissertation proceeds as follows. Chapter II overviews scholarship on 
NGO participation in international law-making. Here I lay out and discuss three 
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specific strands of scholarship, insights of which are pertinent to the issue in question. 
First, I put forth applicable concepts and theories from international relations 
scholarship. Second, I map ideas from comparative law as far as they touch upon the 
transnational diffusion of legal institutions and the role of NGOs in the process. Third, 
I elaborate on legal literature on this subject, explaining how the international legal 
process school’s suggestions are particularly applicable to the issues under 
consideration here. 
Chapter III shows that amicus curiae interventions are becoming increasingly 
commonplace in major international tribunals. It illustrates from a chronological 
perspective how international courts have been moving toward admission of amicus 
briefs by NGOs. 
Chapter IV concentrates on examining the role of NGOs within the ECtHR. 
Section 1 explains the general structure of the Court. Section 2 puts forward a study of 
NGO participation as claimants before the Court and how the Court has dealt with the 
issue of delineating the boundary between “governmental” and “non-governmental 
organizations.” It shows that opportunities to act as claimants increase for NGOs as 
the Court is moving towards expanding the test of admissibility for non-governmental 
organizations and allowing more entities to claim a non-governmental status.  
Chapter V focuses on the procedural institution of amicus curiae interventions, 
explaining the domestic legal origins of the amicus curiae institution.  
Chapter VI showcases the history of the procedure’s internationalization from 
the UK to the Court.  
Chapter VII shows how NGOs engage with the Court in the capacity of amicus 
curiae by looking at the Court’s case load in relation to the right to property. Among 
other things, it highlights the difference between NGO and state amicus claimants, by 
showing that although NGOs always intervene in cases in support of the applicant’s 
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position, they do not possess a specific connection to the case. States, on the other 
hand, when using the amicus curiae procedure, always have a “transnational link” to 
the legal issue in question. Section 5 summarizes the findings within the chapter and 
puts forth the main conclusions. 
Chapter VIII analyzes NGO participation within ITLOS. Section 1 explains the 
basic structure of the Tribunal, underscoring the questions related to the standing of 
NGOs. Section 2 specifically examines the most recent precedent that made the Court 
confront the issue of admissibility of NGO amicus curiae petitions. Section 3 
concludes by highlighting the implications of the Tribunal’s approach to NGOs, 
especially in light of broader trends of NGO amicus participation in international 
tribunals. 
Chapter IX puts forth the conclusions that can be drawn from the study. It 
underscores the study’s contribution to the scholarship on the role of NGOs in 
international lawmaking, specifically to the legal process school’s approach to the role 
of non-state actors in international law. The chapter also showcases the issues that can 
be explored in further research in this area. 
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Chapter II: Theoretical Framework 
A number of commentators has conceptualized the transnational lawmaking 
activity of NGOs as their participation in the international legal process. For instance,  
the New Haven School of International Law30  arose out of dissatisfaction with 
conventional explanations of the emergence of international law and aimed at offering 
new ways to conceptualize the process of making international law.31 The New Haven 
School was launched as a response to Cold War realism, which, according to one of 
the proponents of the School, “underestimates the role of rules and of the legal 
processes in general, and over-emphasizes the importance of naked power.”32 
However, neither does the school understand international law as static, created and 
implemented through states.33 
As one commentator points out, “Private parties, non-governmental 
organizations (NGOs), and/or mid-level technocrats coalesce around shared, on- the 
ground experiences and perceived ‘self-interests,’ ‘codify’ norms that at ones reflect 
and condition group practices. Over time, these informal rules embed, often 
unintentionally, in a more formal legal system and thereof become ‘law.’”34 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
30 See, in general, Myres McDougal, International Law, Power, and Policy: A Contemporary 
Conception, 82 Requel Des Cours 136, 157 (1953); Myres McDougal, Harold D. Lasswell & W. 
Michael Reisman, The World Constitutive Process of Authoritative Decision, 19 J. LEGAL EDUC. 253 
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Nevertheless, scholarship has so far overlooked the processes which relate to or result 
from the NGO uses of the amicus curiae procedure in international tribunals. 
1. International Relations Scholarship 
There is ample scholarship documenting involvement of NGOs in the creation 
of specific international legal regimes. The international activist campaign for a ban on 
nuclear testing and the international campaign to ban landmines resulting in the 
Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty and the International Treaty to Ban Landmines are 
two textbook examples of the effective mobilization of NGOs in the wake of 
vehement opposition by states.36 Naturally, international relations scholarship 
concentrates on studying the political strategies that have been employed by NGOs 
and activists. 
Sidney Tarrow provides a typology of forms of interaction of domestic and 
transnational non-state actors. By analyzing two main variables—sites of interaction 
(domestic and transnational) and number of actors involved—Tarrow discerns four 
types of processes that result from the interaction in the domestic and international 
spheres: internationalization, externalization, transnationalization of collective action, 
and formation of insider–outsider coalitions.37 
He examines the gender-equality litigation before the European Court of 
Justice, where British women’s rights activists have leveraged the Court to voice their 
grievances.38 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
36 See Kenneth Anderson, The Ottawa Convention Banning Landmines: the Role of International Non-
governmental Organizations and the Idea of International Civil Society, 11 E.J.I.L. 91 (2000).  
37 Sidney Tarrow, Outsiders Inside and Insiders Outside: Linking Transnational and Domestic Action 
for Human Rights, 11 HUM RGTS. REV. 180 (2010).  
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Tarrow suggests that international tribunals, among whom he specifically 
mentions the International Court of Justice and the European Court of Human Rights, 
“can serve as a kind of coral reef to attract social actors whose weakness at home leads 
them to look for a venue in which their rights may be recognized.”39 He discerns the 
process of “externalization,” a form of interaction of domestic and transnational 
actors. Tarrow defines “externalization” as a process by which domestic actors mount 
resistance to a government that was not responsive to their demands through “a 
process of international access to put forward their claims. “40 According to Tarrow, 
externalization is a difficult process, in which the actors distance themselves from 
domestic resources, utilizing which they are capable. Therefore, “externalization” is a 
process which occurs rarely and in “spurts.”41 
As a result, Tarrow puts forth three positive aspects brought about by the 
interactions: (a) translation of international norms and practices domestically, (b) 
experience that local actors draw from working with their foreign allies and at 
international institutions, and 3) a possibility to develop transnational coalitions, or 
nascent social movements.42 
Furthermore, while determining the dynamics of legalization of transnational 
dispute resolution, Keohane, Moravcsik, and Slaughter attribute a key role to access. 
Transnational dispute resolution, according to them, removes the ability of states to 
perform gate-keeping functions and, by providing incentives to domestic actors to 
mobilize, and to increase the legitimacy of their claims, gives it a capacity for 
“endogenous expansion.” Their analysis, however, is highly centered on courts 
themselves. According to them, a steady flow of cases in transnational litigation 
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41 Id at 177.  
42 Id at 181.  
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allows the court to become an actor on the legal and political stage, raising its profile 
to the extent that the potential litigants become aware of its existence. This in turn 
contributes to increased flow of case law. Therefore, the court gains political capital 
from a growing number of cases “by demonstrably performing a needed function.”43 
This type of analysis, however, downplays the character, motivation, multiplicity of 
strategies, and tactics employed by litigants as well as those entities that choose to take 
part in the proceedings as amici curiae. Given that it falls precisely upon claimants to 
start the machinery of court jurisdiction, more empirical study of the pool of litigants 
is warranted. 
In this vein, as it was emphasized, even with regard to the EU legal system, the 
most studied of all transnational litigation processes,44 we know “surprisingly little 
about the behavior and organization of litigators of EC law, and nothing from a 
comparative perspective.”45 
Second, discussion of the Courts’ interest in expansion and minor attention to 
the role of litigants discounts the role of third-party interveners in shaping and 
expanding the influence of international courts. Because amici interventions in 
international courts continuously increase,46 assessment of their role in the process of 
legalization is needed even more. 
One area where one could look for help in understanding the relationship 
between NGOs and international courts in general is the literature on Transnational 
Advocacy Movements. This literature, however, suffers from its own shortcomings. 
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Interest groups sometimes externalize their claims, that is, transform them into 
universalistic terms that would appeal to international allies.47 Externalization of 
domestic contention is not a new phenomenon; domestic actors frustrated at their 
inability to gain redress from their own governments have long sought support of 
external allies.48 Keck and Sikkink developed a model about externalization of their 
claims by networks of non-governmental groups in their seminal work Activists 
beyond Borders called “the boomerang pattern.”49 According to Keck and Sikkink, 
“when channels between state and its domestic actors are blocked, the boomerang 
pattern of influence characteristic of transnational actors may occur: domestic NGOs 
bypass their state and directly search out international allies to try to bring pressure on 
their states from outside. This is most obviously the case in human rights 
campaigns.”50 However, Keck and Sikkink’s work has been justifiably criticized for 
looking only at forms of pressure that involved what they themselves called 
“information politics.” Their book left unspecified other pathways of externalization, 
including the use of institutionalized access.51 Indeed, not only do the authors ignore 
international legal dispute-resolution institutions as venues for possible use by non-
state actors for holding governments accountable, they also allege that the centrality of 
the US courts in politics as a venue for representation of diffuse interests is unique to 
the US and is not available in most European democracies. By this unique-to-US 
character, they explain the large number of US advocacy organizations that specialize 
in litigation. Furthermore, they allege that “the existence of legal mechanisms does not 
necessarily make them feasible instruments.52 
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The problems with this assertion are the following: on the one hand, it could be 
argued that lack of consideration by the authors of the use of international dispute-
resolution institutions by NGOs is due to the fact that the practice has proliferated only 
recently in parallel with the proliferation of such institutions. Therefore, the authors 
could not have taken into account a practice that did not exist at the time of 
publication of their manuscript, in 1998. This argument, however, would discount 
well-known instances in which NGOs have successfully leveraged international courts 
to bring about legal decisions on important international issues. One such instance is 
the considerable pressure that a coalition of organizations led by the International 
Association of Lawyers against Nuclear Arms brought to bear on the International 
Court of Justice to bring about the advisory opinion on the Legality of the Threat or 
Use of Nuclear Weapons in 1996.53As expressed by Judge Guillaume: “These 
associations worked very intensively to secure their adoption of resolutions referring 
the question to the Court and to induce States hostile to nuclear weapons to appear 
before the Court. Indeed, the Court and the Judges received thousands of letters 
inspired by these groups, appealing both to the Members’ conscience and to the public 
conscience.”54 
Furthermore, the authors did not elaborate on the relationship of NGOs vis-à-
vis international dispute-resolution mechanisms because their case studies on human 
rights advocacy networks are confined to Latin America, where the Inter-American 
regional system of human rights protection “stands in stark contrast to its European 
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counterpart, lacking as it does, historical, political, economic, and sociological forces 
that have been propelled a united Europe to the forefront of the world politics.”55 
Besides, in defining the components of transnational human rights advocacy 
networks, Keck and Sikkink include “parts of intergovernmental organizations, at both 
international and regional levels.” Although they do not specify the category further, 
while discussing the development of human rights advocacy campaigns in Argentina 
and Mexico they mention the activities of the Inter-American Commission of Human 
Rights, established in 1959, which was reorganized and strengthened when the 
American Convention for Human Rights entered into force.56 This suggests that the 
authors consider the Commission to be part of the advocacy network rather than an 
independent, quasi-juridical institution, even though its right to examine individual 
complaints on human rights violations was formalized in 1965 and its institutional 
structure is superficially similar to and its normative provisions are, in most respects, 
very similar to those of its European counterpart.57 Notably, according to some 
scholars the Commission has been operating also as a court of first instance, handling 
over 12,500 cases since its creation.58 The fact that authors consider the Commission 
to be part of the human rights advocacy network makes it impossible for the authors to 
evaluate the role of network members in expanding the legalization of the 
Commission. 
Moreover, Keck and Sikkink’s reasoning alleges that the sole form of NGO 
participation before courts is litigation, which again ignores other forms of NGO 
participation, including third-party interventions. The abundance of literature on 
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amicus curiae interventions by advocacy organizations before US and international 
courts proves that this mode of intervention at least deserves consideration. Keck and 
Sikkink therefore omitted from their analysis the whole area of relations between 
international advocacy networks and international dispute-resolution institutions. It is 
this gap that I try to remedy by mapping those relations in the area of the European 
Court of Human Rights. 
Sydney Tarrow partially remedied these deficiencies by focusing on a case 
study of the gender-equality campaign in the European Court of Justice (ECJ). Tarrow 
describes the pay-equity litigation before the ECJ which was started by a Belgian 
stewardess, Gabrielle Defrenne, and her lawyer in 1976. Judgment in the case of 
Defrenne was followed by a series of equal-pay cases, a majority of which adjusted 
women’s pay scales upward. The key decision came in 1982, when the Court found 
that the UK was in violation of the Equal Pay Directive.59 Tarrow’s study, however, 
does not go deep enough to track the specifics of the dynamic of pay-equity litigation 
by NGOs or research main trends (increased or decreased use of litigation), and, most 
importantly, does not provide a comparison with NGO litigation efforts regarding 
other issues. 
The volume The Legalization of Human Rights60 provides an important 
opportunity for scholars to reflect on the trend of legalization of human rights from the 
perspective of different disciplines; however, most of the contributors provide a 
normative view of legalization rather than an empirical study of the dynamics of 
legalization. 
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Another area of scholarship, which could be helpful in understanding the 
influence of non-state actors’ litigation efforts, is research on the impact of courts as 
instruments for social change and legal mobilization. 
While there have been many attempts to explain judicial impact, two of the 
most prevalent approaches in US literature are the “top-down “approach, which 
provides that structural factors influence whether a specific judicial decision will turn 
out to be beneficial to the claimant, and the “dispute-centered” approach, which argues 
that the explanatory power of specific features of concrete disputes influences specific 
outcomes for rights claimants.61 
In his “bottom-up” analysis of the use of legal action by pay-equity reform 
activists in the United States, McCann concludes that “legal action greatly enhanced 
the opportunities for effective political organizing around the pay equity issue.”62 By 
analyzing the cases when activists used pay-equity reform litigation to create new 
allies and invigorate movement participants, McCann argues that “court decisions and 
legal norms are not self-generating forces of defiant action. Rather, they constitute 
only potential resources that may or may not be mobilized in practical action.”63 
However, there is no uniform opinion on the positive effects of litigation on social 
movements or the impact of court judgments adopted after such litigation. Among 
major opponents of McCann’s findings is Gerald Rosenberg, who in his study of the 
influence of US Supreme Court judgments argues that “what is radical is the belief 
that litigation can produce significant social reform, that rights triumph over 
politics.”64 
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Nevertheless, this scholarly debate is interesting from the point of view of 
understanding the use of legal means by non-state actors to advance their political 
aims. For our purposes, though, the literature has a major deficiency, which I will 
attempt to remedy, at least in part—that being that the discussion is confined to the 
case studies within the United States of America and that while some of its theories 
could be tested in the context of international dispute-resolution institutions, they are 
still marked by the peculiarities characteristic to the judiciary in the US, with its 
specific socio-political, cultural, and legal denominators. 
The same is true of other scholarship that has the ambition of taking the 
concept of legal mobilization to an international level. For example, in his 2004 study, 
Troy Riddell applies “factor-oriented” and “dispute-centered” theories developed 
within the US to study the impact of legal mobilization and judicial decisions on 
Official Minority-Language Education Policy in the Canadian provinces outside 
Quebec. He concludes that the Canadian experience supports both a bottom-up 
approach, in that judicial decisions and constitutional rights can have constitutive 
effects for furthering policy change, and the contention of the top-down model, that 
certain factors, like the positive Supreme Court decision, have been important 
contributors to policy change. He then suggests the analysis of judicial impacts to be 
situated in an institutional framework where political and social environment around 
the institutions would also be considered. Institutionally centered analysis, Riddell 
argues, could take the US-centered study of judicial impact to become more 
comparative, as the different characters of institutions in the US and elsewhere might 
lead to different results of legal mobilization.65 
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In a similar pattern, for example in the compilation of essays Law and 
Globalization from Below: Towards a Cosmopolitan Legality, all the contributors 
examine use of law by social movements in specific national contexts.66 
Furthermore, Tamara Kay provided a very useful definition of Legal 
Transnationalism. Nevertheless, her work is focused only on the development of the 
transnational labor movement in one regional context, in the context of the North 
American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA). Moreover, she studied the movement-
building impact of a legal instrument that was inherently designed to foster 
transnational legal mobilization.67 
Tamara Kay defines Legal Transnationalism as “processes by which 
transnational laws and legal mechanisms facilitate social movement building at the 
transnational level.” She identified three important dimensions of legal 
transnationalism: (1) formation of collective identity and interests (constitutive 
effects), (2) facilitation of collective action (mobilizing effects), and (3) adjudication 
and enforcement (redress effects).68 However, I consider it important to differentiate 
between Public Interest Law Transnationalism and legal transnationalism in general. 
Public Interest Law Transnationalism denotes a reciprocal relationship between 
transnational legal instruments and transnational NGO networks which facilitate and 
engage in public interest litigation69 as opposed to transnational litigation in general. 
Although several works have mentioned the emergence of Transnational Legal 
Mobilization in Europe, little is actually known about the various modes through 
which public interest organizations take part in legal mobilization or about their 
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litigation methods in a capacity other than that of complainant. For example, 
Cummings and Trubek indicate that the admission of the Central and Eastern 
European Countries to the Council of Europe with the simultaneous requirement of 
ratifying the European Convention of Human Rights has drawn public interest 
activists to the European Court as a sympathetic venue for litigation and has 
stimulated domestic impact litigation.70 
Furthermore, in their studies of international tribunals, most scholars continue 
to analyze international courts as a dynamic between a triad i.e. two adversary parties 
and the judge, in the courtroom. Representatives of all major schools of thought share 
on this subject the same fundamental premise about the triadic structure of 
international tribunals. 
Terrence Hopmann conceptualizes international dispute-resolution 
mechanisms as third parties intervening in resolving the conflict between two 
parties.71 He observes, “[I]nternational courts, such as the International Court of 
Justice . . . are often introduced to arbitrate disputes. In this instance, the arbitrator 
listens to the arguments of the two sides and then renders a decision that is binding on 
the parties.”72 Similarly, Anne-Marie Slaughter and Laurence Helfer, in theorizing on 
the effectiveness of international tribunals, also focus on the relationship between the 
Court and litigants.73 They elaborate that the power of the Court to compel litigants to 
appear before the Court and to enforce rendered judgments is a special characteristic 
of courts.74 
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In a similar vein, Martin Shapiro and Alec Stone Sweet understand the process 
of judicial governance as a triadic relationship between the parties to the conflict and 
the judge.75 The growing reach and influence of international dispute-resolution 
tribunals has been explained by the theory of judicialization. The “judicialization of 
dispute resolution” is the process through which a Triadic Dispute Resolution (TDR) 
mechanism appears, stabilizes, and develops authority over the normative structure 
governing exchange in a given community.76 TDR performs governmental functions: 
to generate normative guidance about how one ought to behave, to stabilize one’s 
expectations about the behavior of others, and to impinge on ex ante distributions of 
values and resources. Stated simply, the social function of TDR (governance) is to 
regulate behavior and to maintain social cohesion as circumstances change. Courts are 
the paradigmatic form of the compulsory Triadic Dispute Resolution.77 
In their article on legalized international dispute-resolution, Robert Keohane, 
Andrew Moravscik, and Anne-Marie Slaughter discuss interstate and transnational 
dispute-resolution.78 The authors maintain an underlying assumption that international 
dispute-resolution functions as a triad. For instance, they state, “[D]elegation means 
that disputes must be framed as ‘cases’ between two or more parties, at least one of 
which, the defendant, will be a state or an individual acting on behalf of a state.”79 In 
their article on the independence of international courts, Eric Posner and John Yoo 
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understand tribunals as triads.80 Karen Alter conceptualizes international tribunals as 
triads as well.81 
The view of international judicial decision-making as a triad obscures 
important dynamics between the participants in the judicial process. Judicial processes 
internationally no longer involve just a relationship between the parties to the 
litigation and the Court. In many cases, individuals, NGOs, international 
organizations, and states take part in litigation as amicus curiae and present their 
arguments. The Court engages with their submissions and in some cases expressly 
draws on them to substantiate its reasoning. Scholarship has yet to properly theorize 
on the role and the influence of amici in international judicial decision-making. 
Furthermore, in general, scholars agree that a growing caseload is an important 
factor in guaranteeing an international tribunal’s effectiveness. Slaughter and Helfer 
consider a growing caseload to be an important factor contributing to the effectiveness 
of a supranational tribunal.82 Courts that build a sufficiently high-profile caseload at 
the outset, they argue, attract a steady stream of cases.83 They provide that this factor, 
“at least initially,” is within the control of member states, which can assist or hamper 
this endeavor with the material and financial resources and the degree of complexity 
that they impose regarding the Court’s procedures and operations.84 The authors 
extrapolate these principles from the experience of the European Court of Justice and 
the ECHR. In the case of the European Court of Human Rights, whose caseload, as 
indicated by the authors, has grown considerably, the authors indicate many factors 
that can contribute to such growth, including the growing number of member states of 
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the Convention, ECHR’s comfortable working conditions, and its location, as well as 
the relative responsiveness of the rules of procedure of the Court to the need of 
effective decision-making; all factors that can be influenced by states’ decisions to 
allocate resources to the Court.85 
Slaughter and Helfer argue that as a matter of practical decision-making the 
judges of the ECJ and the ECHR do not pander to powerful states that appear before 
them but regularly decide high-profile cases and contentious cases according to the 
rule of law, frequently employing prudential doctrines to control their docket and 
advance their jurisprudence incrementally.86 
Posner and Yoo suggest that the effectiveness of the Tribunal could be 
measured through usage.87 Approaching the question of international dispute-
resolution from the perspective of rational choice analysis, Andrew Guzman makes it 
plausible for an international tribunal to acquire an agenda of its own, distinct from 
any legitimate authority delegated to it by states, and to use its authority to pursue this 
agenda. As an example of such behavior, the author refers to the United National 
Human Rights Committee.88 The idea of a runaway tribunal is, of course, a concern 
for states; hence, they strive to implement certain safeguards when tribunals are 
formed. Guzman mentions specifically mentions an enlargement of the tribunals’ 
power and jurisdiction as possible priorities for strategic tribunals.89 
While discussing the ECtHR’s sister Court, the European Court of Justice, 
Anne-Marie Slaughter and Mattli emphasize that “a refinement of our analysis at the 
subnational level must start with private litigants. Without individual litigants, there 
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would be no cases presented to national courts and thus no basis for legal integration. 
The various identities, motivations and strategies of litigants inevitably influenced the 
nature and pace of integration.”90 
2. Comparative Law Approach 
Amicus curiae procedure was internationalized from England to the European 
Court of Human Rights. The Court was the first international tribunal to allow amicus 
participation by individuals and organizations. Comparative law scholarship on legal 
transplants studies the diffusion of legal institutions across states. Although this 
dissertation is concerned with the movement of legal institutions from the nation-state 
to an international organization, some of the concepts and ideas from legal transplants 
scholarship are still pertinent.  For instance, as discussed below, legal transplants 
scholarship discusses the role of private actors in the transplantation of legal 
institutions. It also highlights the reasons why legal institutions are adopted.  
The expression “legal transplant” signifies “the moving of a rule or a system of 
law from one country to another or from one people to another.”91 Legal transplants 
have been traced back to the Code of Hammurabi in the 17th century BC.92 The 
concept of legal transplants was advanced and popularized by Alan Watson.93 In the 
1990s, legal transplants had become the main object of study of comparative law 
scholarship.94 
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The legal transplants literature has been classified in a number of ways. 
Maximo Langer delineates two main schools of thought on legal transplants. 
One school explores “the common issues, processes, and incentives” that drive the 
process of the transferring of rules.95 The other school of thought emphasizes the 
geographic horizontal dimension of legal transplants and studies the processes of legal 
transplants from central to peripheral countries.96 
John Gillespie points out the contributions that the legal evolutionary theory, 
legal autonomy theories, sociological scholarship on Law and Globalization, and 
systems theories have made to the scholarship on legal transplants. He suggests a 
discourse analysis as a methodology for studying legal transfers.97 
Ugo Mattei describes the contributions to the legal transplants scholarship 
from the common law and civil law perspectives.98 In a different piece, Mattei 
critiques the taxonomy of scholarship on legal transplants. According to Mattei, 
scholarship on transplants traditionally distinguishes between two patterns. The first 
pattern focuses on  “[l]aw as dominance without hegemony.” This scholarship focuses 
on the spread of legal institutions as parts of coercive apparatus without domestic 
consent. The other strand emphasizes the role of consent by recipients and the 
influence of prestige in this process.99 
Early comparative law scholarship understood legal transplants in a positivist 
sense, including legislation, institutions, principles, and doctrines.100 Positivism, as 
opposed to other schools of thought, such as legal pluralism, understands law as the 
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creation of the State.101 A notable exception, which moves beyond focusing only on 
the positive law diffusion between countries, is legal pluralism.102 Legal pluralism 
perceives law as a plural structure, which consists of three levels of law—official law, 
unofficial law, and legal postulates.103 Commentators who share this fundamental 
assumption about the nature of law elaborate how the transplanted law is shaped 
through the interaction of the “official law” with local customs, unwritten rules, and 
cultural paradigms. For instance, in his account of the reception of Chinese and 
Japanese law, Masaji Chiba elaborates on the fusion of indigenous Japanese law with 
received law and highlights how some elements of the former were maintained in the 
“official law” of Japan—the only kind of law that Japan officially recognizes.104 
However, the sections below outline the main terms and approaches that have been 
expressed in relation to the study of legal transplants in the positivist sense. These are 
the approaches which are most directly relevant to our study of the establishment of 
juries in Georgia. 
Scholars have used a number of different terms to describe various processes 
of legal transplantation. Terms such as diffusion, export, transfer, and translation have 
been coined. In relation to terminology, however, Alan Watson maintains, 
[. . .] receptions and transplants come in all shapes and sizes. One might think 
also of an imposed reception, solicited imposition, penetration, infiltration, 
crypto-reception, inoculation and so on, and it would be perfectly possible to 
distinguish these and classify them systematically. [. . .] There is no point in 
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elaborating a details classification of borrowing until individual instances have 
been examined to see what they reveal.105 
Nevertheless, different expressions indicate the authors’ different approaches 
to a number of issues, including the relationship between the structure and agency,106 
and law’s relationship to society. Below I focus on the main debates concerning five 
concepts: legal transplants, imposed law, translation and transposition, reception, and 
the Americanization thesis. 
A. Legal Transplants 
According to Alan Watson, “most changes in most systems are the result of 
borrowing.”107 The simple and standard example of a legal transplantation might be 
described as follows: in Year X, “. . . Country A imported from Country B a statute, a 
code, or body of legal doctrine and this has remained in force ever since.”108 As 
William Twining indicates, however, this uncomplicated way of illustrating the legal 
transplantation process contains a number of assumptions and simplifications that 
require interrogation.109 Rich scholarly debates on legal transplants have unpacked 
these assumptions and put forth a sophisticated kaleidoscope of processes involved in 
the process of legal transplantation. 
The comparative law110 debate on legal transplants can be traced back to the 
publication in 1974 of two divergent approaches by Alan Watson and Otto Kahn-
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Freund. The difference between the views rests in their different assumptions 
regarding law’s relationship to society.111 In his now seminal work Legal Transplants: 
An Approach to Comparative Law, Watson posits that law is autonomous of the social 
structures in which it exists. Thus, law is fully mobile: “[t]here is no exact, fixed, 
close, complete, or necessary correlation between social, economic, or political 
circumstances and a system of rules of private law.”112 
Watson distinguishes between major and minor transplants. Voluntary major 
transplants—movement of an entire legal system or a large part of it to a new area—
take place in three situations, all of which are related to the movement of peoples: (1) 
when people move to a new territory, where there is no comparable civilization, and 
take the law with them; (2) when people move to a new territory with comparable 
civilization and transmit their law with them; and (3) when people voluntarily accept a 
large part of the laws of another people.113 In his initial work on the subject, Watson 
does not elaborate further on the issue. 
In his subsequent work Watson proposes nine conditions that determine the 
transferability of laws. These are pressure force, opposition force, transplant bias, the 
discretion factor, the generality factor, societal inertia, felt-needs, source of law, and 
law-shaping lawyers.114 
In January 1974, Modern Law Review published Otto Kahn-Freund’s Chorley 
Lecture, which he had given at the London School of Economics on June 26, 1973. 
Kahn-Freund expressed skepticism concerning the use of comparative law as a tool for 
law reform and offered an approach resting on the conception that legal rules have an 
inherent connection to the environment in which they develop. Thus, using the 
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metaphors of a kidney transplant and a carburetor, Kahn-Freund inquires about the 
processes and conditions that are necessary for successful transplantation of laws.115 
Therefore, the transferability of laws cannot be taken for granted.116 There are 
“degrees of transferability,” which are determined by the nature of the rule and the 
structures within which it was born as well as the socio-political conditions in the 
recipient state.117 
Legal transplants scholarship has not developed without its opponents. Pierre 
Legrand, one of the best-known critics118 of the concept, argues that rules are deeply 
embedded in the local legal culture. Whereas rules can be transposed from one culture 
to another, epistemology, in which the rules are embedded, is not transferable.119 
Therefore, as seemingly similar rules are given meaning during implementation by 
officials and individuals with divergent underlying worldviews and cultural 
paradigms, the end result is not a “transplant” but a completely different rule. “A 
crucial element of the ruleness of the rule—its meaning—does not survive the journey 
from one culture to another.”120 
Pierre Legrand’s position on the intrinsic connection between the social 
context and laws has been echoed by other commentators. In relation to the question 
of whether Alternative Dispute Resolution mechanisms have been transplanted from 
pre-modern societies to Western countries, Elisabetta Grande has argued that it is 
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unadvisable to divorce the conflict resolution practices in Africa from their context. 
She elaborates how these practices are premised on the importance of communities 
and the failure of a Western model of a State in Africa. Therefore, scholars should 
analyze the concepts in relationship with the context. In Western societies, where the 
state is a viable institution, the African model of dispute resolution would be 
incompatible.121 Echoing Legrand’s arguments, Grande provides, “[. . .] the 
institutions are complex devices and can be understood only in context. No useful 
knowledge can be obtained by insulating them; even less by mystifying their 
operation.”122 
Jonathan Miller suggests a typology of transplants. Arguing that knowing the 
motivating factors that drive the process of translation is paramount for understanding 
the process of legal transplantation, Miller provides a typology of transplants based on 
the recipients’ motivating factors. The types are (a) the Cost-Saving Transplant, (b) 
the Externally-Dictated Transplant, (c) the Entrepreneurial Transplant, and (d) the 
Legitimacy-Generating Transplant. Miller emphasizes that often transplants include 
elements of different types and that the types rarely exist in the ideal form.123 
Most literature on transnational norm diffusion explores the diffusion of legal 
norms in the context of the center–periphery relationship. Scholarship in what is 
termed the “country and Western” tradition explores diffusion of formal law from the 
parent civil or common legal system or from a country to the recipient developing 
country.124 However, relatively recently, this relationship has been reconfigured to the 
studies of diffusion from the periphery to the center. Maximo Langer puts forth an 
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account of the diffusion of criminal procedural norms in Latin America and describes 
the process, which he calls the “diffusion from the periphery.” Langer’s model centers 
the role of norm entrepreneurs from the periphery, namely that of Latin American 
activist lawyers in the role of regional norm diffusion.125 
Sociological scholarship on legal transplants, namely the work of Yves 
Dezalay and Bryan Garth, highlights the processes of legal transplantation in the wider 
context of globalization and transnational activity of lawyers. Dezalay and Garth 
develop the concept of “international strategies” as “the ways that national actors seek 
to use foreign capital, such as resources, degrees, contacts, legitimacy, and 
expertise . . . to build their power at home.”126 International strategies provide access 
for domestically disadvantaged groups to international capital, which they can then 
reinvest in their domestic political battles.127 
Thus, Dezalay and Garth indicate that it is not helpful “to ask whether a 
transplant fits or does not fit the culture.” Rather, they focus on the positioning of legal 
transplants within the wider dynamics of international strategies and the power 
relationships between legal actors from different countries. 
B. Imposition 
A significant strand of the literature explores the imperial foundations of the 
process of legal diffusion and examines the colonial and post-colonial implications of 
transplantation. For some commentators within this school of thought, legal 
transplants occur in a wider context of international politics marred by structural 
inequalities. Therefore, the perceptions of consent by the domestic actors in the 
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process of reception should be evaluated while keeping in mind these larger structures. 
However, it must be stressed that authors who write about the processes of imposition 
of laws do so from a variety of perspectives and assumptions. 
The terminology used in this scholarship reflects the fundamental attitudes 
toward structure. To describe the processes of diffusion, these scholars usually speak 
of the process of “imposition” of legal transplants, rather than using expressions such 
as “translation.” For example, Ugo Mattei posits that “[l]egal transplants impose 
aspects of the rule of professional law in non-western countries . . . .”128 
Sandra Burman and Barbara Harrell-Bond as well as the contributors to the 
volume The Imposition of Law theorize the concept of Imposition of Law. The 
academic discussion on this issue was launched at the conference “The Social 
Consequences of Imposed Law” held in April 1978.129 The contributors approach the 
issue from a social science perspective.130 
Vilhelm Aubert defines Imposed Law as “. . . the lack of correspondence 
between the interests, needs, attitudes, and convictions of a population and the 
interests and norms embedded in the law that is governing them.”131 
Robert Kidder puts forth a taxonomy of existing theorizations on imposed law 
and provides an alternative framework with which to analyze it.132 The primary 
example of imposed law is law in the colonial context, when legal systems of 
metropolies were imposed on the dominated populations.133 Kidder critiques what he 
calls a “command model” of imposed law for, primarily, being too static and missing 
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the interactive aspect of imposed law.134 As an alternative to this dominant model, 
Kidder develops what he calls a “hypodermic,” or interactive, view of imposed law. 
The interactive model is based on two main concepts: the idea of external law, and 
power relations. 
For Kidder, “externality” is determined by the distance between the interests, 
institutions, and values of the law-makers and the community that is subject to 
lawmaking. Conversely, the lesser the “layers of intervening organizational 
complexity between the lawmakers and the governed,” the smaller the degree of 
externality.135 Externality means that outsiders will find externally relevant reasons to 
become involved in the conflict, which gives rise to the application of rules. When the 
legal system is external, the conflict to be resolved will be applied meanings external 
to the community where the conflict originated.136 Moreover, externality should be 
understood as a continuum rather than as part of the internal/external dichotomy. 
Therefore, it is important to examine the different layers and degrees of externalities in 
any given situation.137 
According to Kidder, the intentions of the imposers do not matter in the 
process of conceptualizing the imposed law. The introduction of external law will 
result in the disruption of local social relations notwithstanding the intentions of those 
who introduce it.138 Moreover, external law also brings a specific power dynamic to 
the relationship where it is imposed. External law increases the power of external 
actors, while making the internal system and actors more vulnerable.139 
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Okoth-Agendo disagrees with the use of the concept of imposition of law only 
in the context of the institutional aspects of colonialism.140 He defines imposition as 
“any situation where fundamental change is contemplated in society through the 
medium of laws or legal institutions whose content is clearly contrary to the perceived 
and accepted normative order of those whose behavior it seeks to regulate or 
change.”141 
Okoth-Agendo puts forth three criteria that compose the process of imposition. 
First, the aim of the imposition of law aims to foster change. Second, it includes the 
reliance on norms, which are external to the society where it is applied. Third, during 
imposition there is an absence of democratic consensus from the society.142 Okoth-
Agendo provides both epistemological and ideological explanations for why legal 
impositions happen. From the epistemological point of view, imposition of law is an 
intellectual process, which takes place through providing new models to the decision-
makers through the educational process.143 From the ideological point of view, 
imposition is a part of the political economic system that the elites share.144 From this 
perspective, the imposition is seen to be originating outside the country.145 From the 
micro perspective, the imposition can be understood as an act of commitment to a 
specific set of values from the decision-makers in a state. New laws perform the role 
of the institutional framework within which these commitments can be implemented. 
As a result, the new institutions contribute to reshaping the system into the new 
structures. These new structures, put in place by elites, reaffirm their dominant 
position.146 
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Ugo Mattei suggests conceptualizing the phenomenon of legal transplants 
through the lens of hegemony and counter-hegemony.147 Drawing on the works of 
Antonio Gramsci, Louis Althusser, Foucault, and Gui Debord, Mattei suggests three 
specific models for understanding the diffusion of laws: (1) direct imperial/colonial 
rule or imposition of legal institutions through force; (2) imposition through legal 
bargaining, that is, when the process of legal transplantation involves blackmail or 
threats; and (3) diffusion through admiration and prestige, which is, in turn, 
conditioned by the operation of larger ideological apparatuses.148 The process of 
reception of legal transplants is a complicated one, which operates on the level of the 
spread of legal consciousness facilitated by ideological forces. The concept of 
“Imperial Law” is necessary to explain the process of Americanization of law and the 
intricacies of processes at what Mattei calls “the context of production” and “the 
context of reception.”149 
For Mattei the exchange of knowledge takes place efficiently and smoothly 
when the systems from which the knowledge is derived and to which it is transmitted 
have shared institutional foundations. The process of legal transplantation between 
legal systems which have very little in common with each other can be best explained 
by the idea of “legal imperialism.”150 The transfer of knowledge, rather than being a 
pattern of communication and exchange between different legal systems, becomes a 
one-sided exportation of legal rules and concepts that usually end up being rejected, or 
creating intellectual dependency.151 
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Political scientist John Owen discusses the phenomenon of forcible domestic 
institution promotion defined as “any effort by state A to create, preserve, or alter the 
political institutions (as distinguished from the ruler of government) within a State 
B.”152 Otherwise, he calls this phenomenon “impositions.”153 He explores how foreign 
countries build and maintain institutions in other countries by force. Through the 
statistical analysis of forcible institutional promotion, Owen posits that great powers 
engage in forcible institutional promotion (1) when they need to expand their power, 
(2) by establishing the institutions they can support maintaining their ideological allies 
in power and thus bring the countries under influence.154 
C. Translation and Transposition 
A number of scholars have written about the concept of translation in 
comparative law. Rodolfo Sacco emphasizes the problems related to the translation of 
legal concepts. Translation, according to Sacco, requires the work of a jurist familiar 
with the linguistics and legal concepts of the language from which the concept is 
translated as well as the language to which it is translated. Moreover, the process of 
translation involves not only linguistic and legal knowledge, but knowledge of 
extralegal circumstances, such as, for instance, the existence of a scholarly consensus 
on the meaning of a particular expression.155 
Maximo Langer further develops the concept of “translation.” According to 
Langer, the metaphor of legal transplants suffers from a number of shortcomings, 
including that it might convey the impression that legal institutions could be simply 
copied from one system to another. The concept of “translation” cures these 
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imperfections. It accounts for the processes that “legal translators” (law reforms) 
embark upon in order to transform an institution from one system to being applicable 
to another.156 
In the course of exploring the processes of legal transplantation that have 
unfolded in Turkey, Esin Örücü developed the term “legal transposition.”157 In the 
perception of the author, the term remedied the deficiencies of existing terminology in 
adequately describing the interpreting processes that the recipients of the new norms 
engage in. The process of “transposition” involves steps in “tuning” by local actors, 
during which the actors can even apply wrong epistemology.158 
D. Reception 
Authors use the term “reception” to indicate the reasons behind the voluntary 
adoption of legal transplants by actors. Reception can be defined as “adoption of that 
which is foreign.”159 One could discern several undercurrents of thought on reception. 
It has been explained as alliance, as construction, as due to the prestige of the 
originating system, and as due to the efficiency of the transplant. 
Patrick Glenn contrasts two sources of authority: binding law and persuasive 
authority. Glenn posits that as the phenomenon of binding law has been extensively 
explored, the concept of persuasive authorities has been understudied and under-
theorized.160 Glenn posits that reception of law is explained, generally, by obedience 
to the persuasive authority of the received law. In the process of describing the process 
of reception of law, Glenn suggests that reception is necessarily voluntary even in the 
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case of adherence to colonial legal structures. “It is . . . inappropriate to consider 
reception as either imposed, following conquest, or voluntary, since all reception 
which occurs is necessarily voluntary.”161 Glenn distinguishes between two modes of 
reception: reception as alliance and reception as construction. Reception as alliance 
occurs when the recipient actors act in the spirit of alliance with the sources of origin 
of law. Reception as construction takes place when the recipient actors do not share 
any ideological affiliation with the sources of law but count to derive advantages from 
the appropriation of the foreign model. As an example of reception as alliance, Glenn 
proposes the instance of reception of Roman law in Europe, which occurred as a result 
of political affinities with earlier Rome or the Holy Roman Empire as well as 
reception of Roman law, common law, and laws of European countries in North 
America.162 Reception by alliance, therefore, is predicated on overarching political 
loyalty to the originator of the adopted law. 
Reception as construction occurs without an overarching political commitment 
or loyalty. Such reception is more “discriminating and particularized.”163 Glenn 
substituted “reception” with “borrowing.” Such reception is driven by instrumental 
purposes and lacks underlying commitment to a particular philosophy of law.164 
Reception involves the workings of persuasive authority. Persuasion leaves 
room for local creativity.165 The fact of reception of formal law marks the end of 
persuasive authority and the start of binding law.166 
Gianmaria Ajani asserts that “. . . It is certainly true that today, in contrast to 
the past, reception takes place not only on the initiative of those who receive the new 
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models, but also on that of those who propose them.”167 In the process of unpacking 
the process of transplantation, Ajani asserts that there is a local “demand for new 
models.”168 He then identifies the specific areas within the civil and commercial law 
which, according to him, have necessitated foreign intervention.169 He does not, 
however, investigate further to what extent this demand is socially constructed, or how 
this demand is perceived/comprehended or assessed by the actors who supply these 
models. 
Rodolfo Sacco divides the process of legal transplantation into “global 
reception,” according to which ideas are received as part of widespread and 
transnational movement, and “selective adoption,” according to which countries adopt 
particular institutions and laws.170 
According to Sacco, most instances of reception happen as a result of the 
degree of prestige that is attendant on the legal instrument transplanted. “Usually 
reception takes place because of the desire to appropriate the work of others. The 
desire arises because this work has a quality one can only describe as ‘prestige.’” This 
explanation, however, has been criticized for being tautological and for lacking an 
adequate definition of prestige.171 
Gianmaria Ajani also points to the factor of prestige in the adoption of 
reception of legal transplants in the countries of the former Soviet Union. Since the 
breakdown of Communism, the countries of the Soviet Union have drawn upon legal 
models from Continental Europe and the EU, as well as Anglo-American principles.172 
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Ugo Mattei argues that the concept of efficiency to explain the reasons behind 
legal transplants. Mattei asserts that existing explanations within comparative law 
scholarship for why transplants occur are unsatisfactory.173 The concept of efficiency, 
alongside that of prestige, can explain why legal change occurs in a society. Efficiency 
may be a method to evaluate different transplants. Mattei develops the construct of a 
“market of legal culture” where different legal instruments developed by various legal 
systems compete. The most efficient legal doctrine survives the competition.174 
E. Americanization Thesis 
Another, relatively recent, aspect of comparative law literature is concerned 
with the worldwide spread of American law and American legal principles’ influence. 
This scholarship, relevant to our study on juries, advances the so-called 
Americanization thesis. The section below outlines the main arguments within this 
school of thought and delineates how the thesis has been applied in particular to rule 
of law reform efforts by state and non-state actors in the former Communist countries. 
Comparative law scholars have been accustomed to studying legal families in 
four classifications: (1) common law, (2) civil law, (3) socialist law, and (4) other 
conceptions of law.175 Although there have been more contemporary attempts to add 
refinement to this classification,176 it has persisted.177 
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Although this classification remains one of the basic conceptual devices with 
which to understand law and legal developments in the world, the cross-fertilization of 
principles from different legal families and countries is not a new phenomenon. 
Borrowing of principles and institutions from Common Law to Continental Law and 
vice versa has been taking place for centuries. Germanic and Romano Canonical 
origins have been at the foundation of both systems, although each system drew from 
Germano or Roman origins disproportionately and differently than the other one.178 
Just as Anglo-American civil procedural principles have made advancements towards 
approximation with the principles of continental civil procedure, so have Continental 
procedural institutions incorporated principles characteristic of Anglo-American 
procedure.179 US law has borrowed and built upon certain principles from English law, 
in particular, the fundamental tradition of the independent judiciary. The US has also 
borrowed richly from continental European legal traditions, such as, for instance, the 
idea of codified universal rights from France.180 Moreover, the influence of Dutch 
legal concepts on the Anglo-American conflict of laws theories has been well 
documented.181 
According to Arthur Miller, 
If we consider the trend of English and American Procedural reform in the past 
three quarters of a century . . . we are bound to admit that the inexorable logic 
of events is approximating our procedural institutions more and more to those 
in use on the Continent.182 
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However, since the 1960s legal scholars have written about the increasing 
spread and dominance of American law and legal principles. Marc Galanter alluded to 
the trend in his 1966 article “The Modernization of Law.”183 Wolfgang Wiegand 
articulated the trend in more detail in his study Reception of American Law.184 
Wiegand compared the spread of American Law in Europe to the rediscovery and the 
reception of the Roman law in the 11th century—the phenomenon which dramatically 
changed European legal systems. The argument was solidified as the Americanization 
thesis. 
In 1993 Martin Shapiro wrote about the overlap between the globalization of 
law and Americanization. Shapiro understands Americanization of law, the worldwide 
adoption of certain aspects of US-style law, as one aspect of globalization of law.185 
Shapiro described the trend of adoption of American law models abroad, the extensive 
involvement of US legal experts in the former Soviet Union law reform efforts, and 
adoption of the American regulatory style in the European Union. Americanization of 
law will not proceed, maintained Shapiro in a predictive mode, as a reciprocal process 
of Europeanization or borrowing of principles of any other system. Changes in the 
American law itself will most likely come from domestic, rather than transnational, 
sources.186 Although Shapiro briefly notes what can be the driving process of 
Americanization—establishment of the United States as the leading industrialized 
economy after the Second World War, he mainly describes the trend and stops short of 
in-depth examination of the reasons behind Americanization. 
Ugo Mattei suggests a meta theory about the global leadership of legal ideas. 
According to Mattei, there is a relationship between the locality and positivism of law 
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and the potential of its global leadership. The more that legal ideas are conceived to 
facilitate the social organization of a society and the less they are intertwined with the 
particularities of the localities where they originate, the bigger the potential for global 
influence.187 Mattei claims that this theory explains the influence of the French, 
German, and American legal ideas in the Western world.188 
For Mattei, “test of leadership is the capacity of a legal system or of some of its 
products (codes, pieces of legislation, legal institutions, scholarly writings) to exert 
influence not only within closely related legal systems but also outside of them.”189 
However, legal leadership can be easily lost. Mattei points out the history of French 
influence on German law, and then the influence of European civil law on American 
Law. After the 1930s, however, Mattei notes, the influence of American law on 
European law was evident.190 
Although Mattei does not develop a full theory of the leadership of American 
legal ideas, he provides some explanations for the ascendance in leadership. The ideas 
of wide application are generated within the scholarly domain, whereas legal ideas that 
are more parochial belong to the domain of practice and politics. Therefore, the first 
are capable of moving out from the loci of their prestige, whereas the latter need to be 
pushed out from their initial origins by politicians and made acceptable mainly as a 
result of the prestige of the system where they originate.191 Prestige is the main factor 
of the leadership of any legal system. In order to maintain influence, legal ideas must 
be accepted by the thinkers within their own realms. Hence the leading legal culture 
must be at the same time “meta positivist and politically acceptable.”192 
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In 1996 Wolfgang Wiegand expanded his Americanization thesis further. 
Wiegand documented changes in civil procedure, criminal procedure, constitutional 
law, and other areas of substantive law in Europe and credited the change to the 
influence of American law and legal thinking. His explanation of the reasons behind 
this influence is the leading role that the US has been playing in the world as the most 
industrialized nation. For Wiegand, the adoption of American law in Europe is a 
“natural phenomenon.” He disagrees with the assertion that the changes could be 
explained simply by the convergence of legal systems of industrialized economies. 
Rather, “It is a true reception, in a sells well-known from history: the leading 
power . . . acts as a model; other societies adopt this model, including the legal culture 
of the dominant nation.”193 In Wiegand’s analysis the freedom of the recipients to 
adopt the model or not is part of the process of reception. For Wiegand, European 
nations opt to choose American models for legal issues where the United States was 
an innovator, such as legal issues dealing with capital markets or prohibition of 
discrimination.194 Although Wiegand delineates the areas where American influence is 
most present, he stops short of describing through which processes and specifically 
how this influence permeates legal systems of European countries. 
The influence of Anglo-American legal thinking has been explained by a 
number of other factors, including the connection between the efficiency, flexibility, 
and independence of private international law from public law models of the Anglo- 
American legal models. 
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According to Ugo Mattei, the hegemonic spread of imperial law, at the 
foundation of which is US law, can be well understood in relation to the United States’ 
dominance in the economic, military, and political arenas.195 
Maximo Langer differentiates between two—“the strong” and “the weak”—
Americanization theses. Exploring the transposition of the American plea-bargaining 
system to a number of European countries, Langer argues that the “thick” 
Americanization thesis is inadequate.196 His research on the acceptance of plea- 
bargaining in civil law jurisdictions in Europe shows that the countries have accepted 
the institution in divergent ways. The Americanization thesis in the “thick” sense 
implies that after importing “American-inspired” reforms, the recipient systems will 
resemble the American legal system. The effect, Langer argues, is rather “thin” 
Americanization. The result of Americanization in the “thin” sense is that the recipient 
systems will not altogether resemble the American legal system. By translating some 
principles and ideas differently in different countries, and by merging the new 
principles with the underlying inquisitorial culture of criminal law, the borrowing 
results in the differentiation of those aspects of recipient systems which were 
previously homogeneous.197 
3. International Law Scholarship 
The scholarship on the legitimacy of international tribunals has examined the 
role that NGO participation plays in increasing the international courts’ legitimacy. 
International institutions, including international courts, suffer from the lack of 
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legitimacy characteristic to domestic institutions.198  Nevertheless, the number of 
international, regional and hybrid courts is gradually growing.199 As the tribunals 
exercise public authority beyond the state, they face questions about the legitimacy of 
their actions.  
For example, Armin von Bogdandy and Ingo Vezke question the legitimacy of 
international tribunals specifically in light of the democratic theory,  
[m]any domestic courts decide in the name of the people and thus invoke the 
authority of the democratic sovereign literally at the very beginning of their 
decisions. International courts, to the contrary, do not say in whose name they 
speak the law. This void sparks our driving question: how does the power of 
international courts relate to the principle of democracy?200 
The authors state that the actions of international tribunals “[…] require a 
genuine mode of justification that lives up to basic tenets of democratic theory.”201 
The authors examine the potential of the procedures of international tribunals to 
respond to the pressures for legitimation. They indicate that the provision of more 
avenues for intervention and participation is one possibility with which international 
courts can respond to the problems in justification of authority.202 In particular, they 
argue about the legitimating potential of the procedures for third party interventions 
and amicus curiae submissions. For instance, they stress the legitimating potential of 
NGO amici interventions, “[a]bove all NGO participation may open up legitimatory 
potential.”203 The commentators point out two specific reasons how NGOs’ amici 
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interventions can contribute to the international courts’ legitimation: first, NGOs may 
serve as intermediaries between the legal procedures and the wider public; second, 
NGO participation may contribute to the diversification of perspectives represented 
before the tribunal, “scandalization” of cases and the mobilization of the public, 
especially from the periphery.204  
Nienke Grossman argues that the traditional explanations of the legitimacy of 
international courts are outdated. There is a scholarly consensus that international 
tribunals routinely engage in law-making. Therefore, their decisions impact states and 
individuals beyond those who take part in the proceedings. Therefore, according to 
Grossman, the traditional explanations of legitimacy, primarily based on state consent, 
are no longer sufficient.205 Applying Daniel Bodansky’s definition to international 
adjudicatory bodies, Nienke Grossman defines legitimacy as a combination of 
qualities that “[…]that leads people (or states) to accept [its] authority . . . because of a 
general sense that the authority is justified.” Advancing her theory of legitimacy, 
Grossman suggests that the international tribunals are legitimate when, “it is (1) fair 
and unbiased, (2) interpreting and applying norms consistent with what states believe 
the law is or should be, and (3) transparent and infused with democratic norms.”206  
Grossman points out the relationship between the sociological legitimacy of 
international tribunals and the views and values of stakeholders. She indicates, “If a 
tribunal makes decisions over time that run contrary to an international actor's interests 
and values, its legitimacy is likely to decline. Also, tribunals risk undermining their 
authority to interpret a normative regime by failing to address international actors' 
concerns external to the law, or by ignoring shifting ideological and political winds 
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and moral concerns.”  Grossman emphasizes that the tribunal that constantly adopts 
the decisions against the interests and values of actors will be perceived as less 
legitimate.207 
Other scholars also stress the relationship between the stakeholders’ values and 
the legitimacy of international tribunals. For instance, in their study of highest national 
courts in Europe and the United States, James Gibson and Gregory Caldeira indicate 
that there is a relationship between the public’s support of the court’s policy outcomes 
with overall support for the institution itself. According to the authors, public’s 
satisfaction with the individual decisions over time significantly influences the public 
support for the institution itself.208  
Yonatan Lupu explains the mechanisms through which the international 
tribunals enhance their legitimacy. He shows that the legitimacy deficit of 
international courts might be related to the information problems encountered by 
international tribunals. As international tribunals serve publics with diverse and often 
contradictory preferences, “international courts are more likely to make decisions 
without anticipating the extent to which they may be opposed by national publics and 
actors, especially constituent governments.” As a result courts face instances of “curbing,” 
i.e. instances when the courts are rebuked for their decision-making and when their 
legitimacy is questioned. 209 
Calls for NGO participation as amici curiae in order to increase legitimacy of 
international law making have been most pertinent in the area of international 
environmental law.210 For example, Barbara Gemmill and Abimbola Bamidele-Izu 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
207 Id.  
208 James L. Gibson & Gregory A. Caldeira, The Legitimacy of Transnational Legal Institutions: 
Compliance, Support, and the European Court of Justice, 39 AM. J. POL. SCI. 459, 464 (1995). 
209 Yonatan Lupu, International Judicial Legitimacy: Lessons from National Courts, THEOR. INQ. IN L. 
(Forthcoming 2013).  
http://dss.ucsd.edu/~ylupu/Lupu%20-%20International%20Judicial%20Legitimacy.pdf 
210 Neil A.F. Popovic, The Right to Participate in Decisions that Affect the Environment, 10 PACE 
ENVT. L. REV., 683 (1993); Kal Raustiala, The “Participatory Resolution” in International 
	  54 
have indicated the need to create structures for NGO participation in advocacy for 
environmental justice.211 They welcome the creation of opportunities for NGO 
participation as amicus curiae, “the submission of ‘friends of the court’ opinions 
would be well-suited to the skills and interests of NGOs.”212  
However, writing about the legitimacy deficit of the international 
environmental law, Daniel Bodansky cautions against confusion between NGO 
involvement and public participation. As Bodansky emphases, “[w]hat is meant more 
precisely is participation by non-governmental groups, such as Greenpeace, the Sierra 
Club, and the Global Climate Change Coalition, which often have opposing positions 
and may or may not reflect ‘the public interest’ – if such a thing exists at all. Indeed, 
even if international meetings were opened up and NGOs given unrestricted access, 
few members of the public would as a practical matter be able to participate.”213 
Sally Engle Merry has illustrated how local civil society organizations and 
social movements serve as intermediates in translating and adapting to the vernacular 
international human rights instruments against domestic violence.214 Harold Koh has 
written about “the transnational legal process”—the process through which norm 
entrepreneurs or “agents of internalization” facilitate the internalizing of international 
rules by States.215 According to Koh, Transnational Legal Process is a theory which 
explains the “critical issue of compliance with international law.”216 Koh asserts that 
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in the process of internationalization of international law by states, NGOs play the role 
of “norm entrepreneurs.” Literature on “law from below” has acquired a normative 
dimension, as authors aim to map and resurface local civil society resistance to 
international law, including to international human rights law.217 
International courts, including the ECtHR, have mostly been explored “top-
down,” as scholarship has been centered on examining the impact of international 
courts on domestic legal systems or concentrated on the judges themselves.218 In 
particular, the influence of the ECtHr on the political and social change in member 
countries has been amply documented.219 However, as was indicated even with regard 
to the European Court of Justice, the most studied of all transnational litigation 
processes,220 “we know surprisingly little about the behavior and organization of 
litigators of EC law, and nothing from a comparative perspective.”221 So far, minor 
attention has been paid to mapping the development of international regimes from the 
perspective of the actors who take part in it. We are even less informed about the 
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forces that drive amicus interventions specifically and the conditions under which the 
dynamics of interventions change. 
Writing about amicus curiae submissions by NGOs in the World Trade 
Organization (WTO) and drawing on Jurgen Habermas’s work, Robin Eckersley 
argues that NGO participation as amicus curie has the potential to create a 
transnational space for dialogue on environmental matters, or a transnational “green 
public sphere.” “Cosmopolitan public spheres are conceptualized as specialized, 
intermediary structures, with multiple strategic and communicative functions, that 
mediate between supra-national governance structures and regional and domestic civil 
societies.”225 According to Eckersley, transnational public spheres can partly remedy 
concerns about the lack of external accountability of international courts. 
Furthermore, there is a scholarly consensus that amicus curiae interventions 
before the European Court have an impact on its judgments and pronouncements on 
international human rights law.227 Nevertheless, most legal articles in this area are 
descriptive: they provide a picture of NGO participation before the Court yet do not 
theorize about the phenomena they encounter. Second, most of the materials on the 
subject are dated, in most cases including analysis of judgments only up to 1995. 
Third, the authors have not looked at the dynamics of NGO interventions over time 
and have not compared different modes of NGO litigation strategies. 
Putting aside natural law theories on international lawmaking, McDougal and 
Reisman have argued that international lawmaking is a process based on 
prescription.234 By “prescription,” the authors mean “a process of communication 
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which creates, in a target audience, a complex set of expectations . . . .”235 This 
process of communication can be relatively formal and homogenous, or highly 
informal, heterogeneous, and involving a multiplicity and diversity of actors.236 
A number of commentators have built on the New Haven School and have 
explained NGOs’ transnational lawmaking activity as their participation in the 
international legal process. As one commentator points out, “Private parties, non-
governmental organizations (NGOs), and/or mid-level technocrats coalesce around 
shared, on the ground experiences and perceived ‘self–interests,’ ‘codifying’ norms 
that at once reflect and condition group practices.” Over time, these informal rules 
embed, often unintentionally, in a more formal legal system and thereof become 
“law.”237 
Jost Delbruck has analyzed the role of NGOs in the international legal process 
from the perspective of the Legal Process School and has termed NGOs “limited 
derivative legal subjects under secondary rules of international law.”238 
Scholars working on the international legal process tradition have emphasized 
their normative approach to the trend of increased NGO participation in international 
lawmaking. For instance, Janet Levit remarks, “in an era of globalization, the 
international lawmaking universe is disaggregating into multiple—sometimes 
overlapping—lawmaking communities, and neither the President, political elites, nor 
any of the other protagonists that star in the neo-conservative account are at the center 
of many of these communities.” Some may recoil at this reality; I, on the other hand, 
celebrate this moment as one of possibility and promise, as an opportunity “to invite 
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new worlds.”239 Other commentators as well regard participation of NGOs at various 
levels of international governance as “mechanisms for democracy.”240 
Nevertheless, scholarship has so far overlooked the processes which relate to 
or result from the NGO uses of the amicus curiae procedure in international tribunals. 
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Chapter III: NGOs as Amici in International Tribunals 
Amicus curiae participation submissions are a form of third-party intervention, 
which consist in the presentation of views of a party not represented before the judge 
on points of law or fact.241 This type of intervention in judicial proceedings has rapidly 
expanded from common law systems, where it originated in countries with a civil law 
tradition as well as international adjudication. Its role is increasing in parallel with the 
expansion of international litigation.242 Amici are not bound by the decision of the 
court in the case, and amici do not bear the full burden of proving their legal standing 
in the case.243 Amici do not receive case materials, they cannot control in which 
direction the trial will go, and they are not compensated for their costs at the end of the 
hearing. Although the disadvantages might outweigh the advantages in some 
instances, amicus curiae participation is the only way for NGOs to participate in a 
case. Original parties to the case are entitled to respond to any comments submitted by 
the third-party intervener.244 
The number of international tribunals has been gradually increasing.245 This 
chapter provides a chronological overview of the legalization of NGO amicus curiae 
submissions by five important international tribunals, arguing that international 
tribunals have been moving towards formalization of amicus curiae procedure for 
NGOs. 
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All of these tribunals have legally formulated a procedure for accepting amicus 
curiae submissions by NGOs. Each has chosen an individual approach to amicus 
curiae petitions. The International Court of Justice, for instance, authorizes NGOs to 
submit amicus curiae briefs and provides a specific procedure for addressing them, 
while not making such submissions part of the official case file. The Inter-American 
Court of Human Rights, on the other hand, accepts all amicus briefs indiscriminately 
without specifying if and based on what criteria they may be rejected. Nevertheless, it 
is indisputable that over the last 30 years, all the major international courts have 
chosen to regulate amicus participation for NGOs. 
The first international court to legalize the procedure formally for amicus 
submission by non-state actors was the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR), 
which was set up in 1959. The Court was based on the European Convention for the 
Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms after eight state parties 
delivered their instruments recognizing the compulsory jurisdiction of the Court.246 
The Court’s initial structure allowed neither for the right of individuals to address the 
Court nor for the right of third parties to request the Court to hear their views.247 
However, the European Convention recognized the procedure in 1998 when in 
addition to other reforms in the Convention structure, the newly adopted Article 36 (2) 
granted the states, individuals, and organizations that are not party to the proceedings 
to intervene. The ECHR’s approach to NGO amicus briefs has been more expansive 
relative to the International Court of Justice’s as amici. Under the ECHR, NGOs have 
a right to submit unsolicited requests to the Court, though the requests may be rejected 
by the Court “in the interests of justice.” 
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Currently, NGOs are very active in participating as amici in litigation in the 
European Court of Human Rights.248 For instance, on March 18, 2011, the European 
Court of Human Rights handed down the judgment in Lautsi v. Italy, concerning the 
display of religious symbols in classrooms in Italy.249 The case is noteworthy for its 
record number of amicus curiae interveners. The Court’s final judgment mentions 
amicus submissions from the governments of Armenia, Bulgaria, Cyprus, the Russian 
Federation, Greece, Lithuania, Malta, the Republic of San Marino, and the 
principalities of Monaco and Romania. Submissions from the NGOs included the 
Greek Helsinki Monitor, Associazione nacionale del libero Pensiero, the European 
Center for Law and Justice, Eurojuris, International Commission of Jurists and Human 
Rights Watch, Zentralkomitee der deutschen katholiken, Semaines sociales de France, 
Associazioni cristiane lavoratori italiani, and thirty-three members of the European 
Parliament.250 
Moreover, the Court sometimes rejects NGO submissions. For instance, the 
US-based organization Rights International was denied the possibility of submitting an 
amicus intervention in the case of Ahmed Sadik v. Greece.251 In the case of McGinley 
and Egan v. UK, the President of the Court granted the right to submit amicus briefs to 
two non-governmental organizations, Liberty and the Campaign for Freedom of 
Information, whereas it declined this possibility without further justification for 
another organization, the New Zealand Nuclear Test Veterans’ Association.252 
The International Court of Justice, the principal judicial organ of the United 
Nations, is an adherent of a more restrictive model of accepting NGO amicus 
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interventions. Article 34 of the Statute of the ICJ allows “public international 
organizations” to submit their views about a case before the Court proprio motu as 
well as to authorize the Court to inform the named organization if the construction of 
the constituent instrument of the organization or international convention has been 
invoked in the case.253 NGOS have petitioned the Court to accept their briefs as amici 
curiae in contentious proceedings.254 However, the Court has never formally accepted 
an amicus brief from an NGO in such proceedings.255 
Nonetheless, the Court has been more welcoming of amicus submissions by 
NGOs in its advisory proceedings than in the contentious ones. Article 66 of the 
International Court of Justice’s Statute refers to two types of entities that can voice 
their opinion as amici curiae in advisory proceedings: “States” and “international 
organizations.” The practice under the Article has been varied, for the Court has 
requested an amicus curiae brief from Palestine (neither a State nor an international 
organization at the time), and it has also consented to receiving an amicus curiae brief 
from the International League for the Rights of Man in 1950 in the International 
Status of South-West Africa case.256 Furthermore, in 2004, the Court adopted Practice 
Direction XII, an addition to earlier Practice Directions, for which it regulated amicus 
curiae submissions by international NGOs.257 Practice Direction IX states, 
1. Where an international non-governmental organization submits a written 
statement and/or document in an advisory opinion case on its own initiative, 
such statement and/or document is not to be considered as part of the case file. 
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 2. Such statements and/or documents shall be treated as publications 
readily available and may accordingly be referred to by States and 
intergovernmental organizations presenting written and oral statements in the 
case in the same manner as publications in the public domain. 
 3. Written statements and/or documents submitted by international 
non-governmental organizations will be placed in a designated location in the 
Peace Palace. All States as well as intergovernmental organizations presenting 
written or oral statements under Article 66 of the Statute will be informed as to 
the location where statements and/or documents submitted by international 
non-governmental organizations may be consulted.258 
Thus, although the Court does not officially recognize NGO amicus curiae 
submission, the practice direction does indicate that it has decided to take the issue of 
accessibility of NGO submissions seriously.259 
Issues arose in 1998 related to whether WTO Dispute Panels should accept 
amicus curiae briefs or not in the Shrimp/Turtle case.260 The two briefs were submitted 
by the Center for Marine Conservation (CMC) and the Center for International 
Environmental Law (CIEL) jointly, and by the World Wide Fund for Nature 
(WWF).261 The Panel’s decision to accept or to reject the briefs rested on the 
interpretation of  13 of the Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the 
Settlement of Disputes. Article 13 states, “1. Each Panel shall have the right to seek 
information and technical advice from any individual or body which it deems 
appropriate. However, before a panel seeks such information or advice from any 
individual or body within the jurisdiction of a Member it shall inform the authorities 
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260 Appellate Body Report, United States—Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products 
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of that Member . . . 2. Panels may seek information from any relevant sources and 
may consult experts to obtain their opinion on certain aspects of the matter . . . .”262 
In relation to the Panel’s right to receive unsolicited briefs, the Appellate Body 
in the Shrimp/Turtle case held on November 6, 1998, that “authority to seek 
information is not properly equated with prohibition on accepting information which 
has been submitted without having been requested by a panel. A panel has a 
discretionary authority either to accept or to reject information and advice submitted to 
it, whether requested by a panel or not.”263 
In November 2000, in relation to the case between Canada and France 
concerning France’s ban on the import of asbestos, the Division of the Appellate Body 
tasked with considering the dispute issued “The Additional Procedure for Purposes of 
Canada’s Appeal Only.”264 The procedure specified the process through which entities 
interested in submitting amicus curiae briefs could request participation. The 
Additional Procedure also established relatively stringent criteria that the petitions for 
amicus curiae intervention should have met, including the requirement to provide 
information about the petitioner’s relationship to the case and the parties.265 
ICC’s procedural rules regarding amicus curiae interventions mirror the 
phrasing of a similar rule, Rule 74 of the Rules of Procedure and Evidence of the 
International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY), and Rule 74 of the 
Rules of Procedure and Evidence of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda 
(ICTR).266 
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The Rules of Procedure of the International Criminal Court allow for amicus 
curiae interventions by entities other than states. Rule 103 indicates the power of the 
Chamber to invite a State, organization, or person to submit written or oral 
observations.267 Rule 149 extends the same authority to the Appeals Chamber.268 
NGOs have used the possibility of amicus curiae intervention a number of times. For 
instance, on May 12, 2012, the ICC Pre-Trial Chamber I agreed to hear the views of 
two organizations, Lawyers for Justice in Libya and the Redress Trust, in relation to 
The Prosecutor v. Saifal-Islam Gaddafi and Abdullah Al-Senussi case.269 
Moreover, the ICC continues to provide an important and expansive 
interpretation of the amicus curiae procedure. On June 8, 2012, the ICC put forth an 
important interpretation of Rule 103. The Office of Public Counsel for Victims filed a 
motion requesting leave to reply to the amicus’s submission, even though the entity’s 
right to reply to amicus briefs is not mentioned explicitly in the rules. The Chamber 
granted the request, finding that the Chamber also has discretion to grant participants 
leave to reply to such filings. The Chamber “reviewed the Request, and considering 
the issues for which leave to submit amicus curiae observations has been granted, the 
Chamber is of the view that it is appropriate in the present circumstances to accord the 
OPCV the opportunity to submit a response to the amicus curiae observations.”270 
The Inter-American Court of Human Rights formalized the amicus procedure 
for NGOs in 2009, although in practice it has admitted amicus interventions by NGOs. 
The Inter-American Court of Human Rights was created in 1979 as an autonomous 
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judicial organ of the Organization of American States (OAS). Its creation came about 
through the entry into force of the Inter-American Convention on Human Rights on 
July 18, 1978.271 The Inter-American Convention created the Court for the purpose of 
applying and interpreting the Convention and formalized the relationship between the 
Commission and the Court. The Court’s jurisdiction extends only to the 25 states that 
have ratified the Convention, whereas the Commission has a more general competence 
under the OAS Charter. 
The Court adopted its rules of procedure during its third ordinary session held 
from June 30 to August 9, 1980. The rules have been subsequently amended several 
times; the most recent amendments were adopted in 2009. In the amendments, the 
Court formalized the procedure for submitting amicus curiae interventions, which 
should be emphasized. Although recent cases at the Inter-American Court have 
witnessed burgeoning amici interventions both from domestic and international non-
governmental organizations,272 this activity has so far remained unregulated. 
Henceforth, amicus curiae interventions will be sent to the Court and be 
admissible within 15 days following a hearing. If no hearing has been appointed, amici 
brief should be submitted following the Order that set the deadlines for submission of 
final arguments and documentary evidence.273 In its unconditional acceptance of 
amicus briefs, the Inter-American Court is even more welcoming to civil society’s 
participation than its European counterpart.274 
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Chapter IV: NGOs within the European Court of Human Rights 
NGOs have an impact on the jurisprudence of the ECHR275 in four main ways: 
filing direct complaints, acting as witnesses, providing legal assistance to victims to 
bring cases before the Court, and filing amicus curiae briefs. 
NGOs can file applications under Article 34 of the ECHR, which specifies the 
following: 
The Court may receive applications from any person, non-governmental 
organization or group of individuals claiming to be the victim of violation by 
one of the High Contracting Parties of the rights set forth in the Convention or 
the protocols thereto. 
Thus, NGOs, on equal footing with individuals, can claim to have been victims of 
violations of rights enshrined in the Convention and bring the claim before the 
ECtHR. 
NGO representatives can also appear as witnesses. For example, Amnesty 
International’s first direct involvement with the Court took place in 1968, when the 
Council of Europe Human Rights Commission declared admissible applications by 
Denmark, Norway, Sweden, and the Netherlands in January 1968 against widespread 
torture in Greece. Amnesty’s lawyers Anthony Marreco and James Becket, who had 
conducted a research trip to Greece a year earlier, appeared as witnesses before the 
court.276 
Another way to study NGO influence on the ECtHR is to research NGO legal 
services for complaints to be brought before the Court. NGOs provide legal assistance 
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in multiple ways, including just providing legal advice to victims of human rights 
violation, counseling them on the ECHR procedures for applications, as well as 
representing them before the Court as attorneys on the record. In fact, one of Amnesty 
International’s first experiences with ECHR was indirect, when the founder of 
Amnesty, the British lawyer Peter Benenson, established a Human Rights Advocacy 
Service designed to give assistance to persons wishing to bring cases before the 
ECHR.277 
The Convention also allows for amicus curiae briefs, which will be elaborated 
on below. 
1. The European Court of Human Rights: General Structure 
NGOs, together with legal activists, have become central participants in the 
enforcement of human rights law in Europe—all with the effect of demanding and 
achieving more accessible legal institutions.278  
The ECtHR has particular importance within the context of international 
human rights for several reasons: it was the first comprehensive treaty in the world in 
this field; it established the first international complaints procedure and first 
international court for the determination of human rights matters; it remains the most 
judicially developed of all human rights systems; and it has generated a more 
extensive jurisprudence than any other part of the international system and is now 
applied to roughly 30% of the nations in the world.279 The ECtHR exerts a profound 
influence on the laws and social realities of its Member States and has become the 
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paradigm for other regional human rights courts, not to mention other international 
judicial bodies in general.280 Beginning from a modest position, the Court has 
succeeded in transforming its relatively empty docket into a teeming one.281 From a 
feeble regional institution the European Court of Human Rights has developed into 
“[. . .] an instrument of the European public order (ordre public) for the protection of 
individual human beings.”282 In the words of its late President, Rolv Ryssdall, the 
Court has become “a quasi-constitutional court for the whole of Europe” and “has 
developed into a regional human rights protection system of unparalleled 
effectiveness.”283 
NGOs participate in shaping the jurisprudence of the ECtHR in the following 
ways: filing direct complaints, acting as witnesses, providing legal assistance to 
victims to bring cases before the Court, and filing amicus curiae briefs. The system of 
considering individual complaints of human rights violations is the hallmark of the 
ECtHR regime. The right of individual petition for violation of human rights has been 
called “a key component” of the machinery for the protection of human rights.284 It 
took several waves of reform to change the individual petition procedure from an 
optional mechanism to a widely accepted and influential instrument. Initially, all 
complaints were heard by the European Commission on Human Rights, which aimed 
at arriving at friendly settlements between complainants and respondent States. Later, 
more States accepted the compulsory jurisdiction of the Court, and in 1990 the 
acceptance of the complaints procedure became mandatory. After a major reform in 
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1998, individuals obtained the right to bring a complaint directly to the Court. Member 
States supported a much-needed modernization of the system through the reforms of 
Protocol 11,285 which strengthened the independent judicial character of the 
Convention machinery. Instead of the original system characterized by the complex 
interplay of three institutions, the Commission and Court of Human Rights and the 
Committee of Ministers,286 a new, single European Court of Human Rights was 
created whose judges would work full-time, and the right of individual petition 
became mandatory.287 The Convention established that the Court can award just 
satisfaction to an injured party if it has “[found] that there has been a violation of the 
Convention or the Protocols thereto.” 
The work of the Court has transformed the regional human rights regime and 
has added considerable concreteness to abstract human rights promulgated in the 
European Human Rights Convention.288 The Court has generated a more extensive 
jurisprudence than any other part of the international system.289 It has had a profound 
influence on the laws and social realities of its Member States and has become the 
paradigm for other regional human rights courts, not to mention other international 
judicial bodies in general.290 
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The European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and 
Fundamental Freedoms (hereafter ECHR) was signed in 1950.291 The European Court 
of Human Rights was established in 1959 when eight state parties delivered their 
instruments recognizing the compulsory jurisdiction of the Court.292 From its time as a 
feeble regional institution, the Court has subsequently developed into “[. . .] a quasi-
constitutional court for the whole of Europe” and “a regional human rights protection 
system of unparalleled effectiveness.”293 The long-term effect of the Court’s 
jurisprudence on the domestic policy changes in Member Countries is amply 
documented.294 Today, the Court’s jurisdiction encompasses 800 million people in 47 
countries.295 
The initial structure of the Court was based on the dynamics between three 
parties: the Human Rights Commission, the respondent state, and the Court. The 
Court’s original design allowed neither for the right of individuals to address the Court 
nor for the right of third parties to request that the Court hear their views. However, 
this structure was fundamentally changed in 1998. The Commission was abolished, 
and individuals obtained the right to directly petition the Court.296 Currently, the 
system of considering individual complaints of human rights violations is the hallmark 
of the ECHR regime.297 Article 41 of the Convention establishes that the Court can 
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award just satisfaction to the injured party if it has been previously “[found] that there 
has been a violation of the Convention or the Protocols thereto.”298 
The Court considers on merits only a tiny number of applications. The Court 
declares some 90% of applications inadmissible.299 Hence, the applications that 
surpass admissibility are the tip of the iceberg of all claims of rights violations in 
Europe.300 Even more so, the number of those instances in which the Court rectified 
the violations of rights is minimal compared with the number of rights violations 
experienced by stateless persons. The Convention mandates that local judicial 
remedies be exhausted before any case reaches the European Court.301 Although in 
some circumstances the requirement to exhaust domestic remedies can be waived,302 
statelessness had not served as an excuse to avoid their exhaustion. The stateless 
themselves usually do not make such requests. In all cases at hand, the applicants 
exhausted local legal remedies as required by the Court.303 In certain cases, (i.e., those 
in response to overly excessive claims made by the government), the Court exhibited a 
small measure of flexibility in exercising the requirement.304 
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The process of exhaustion of legal remedies, coupled with the time spent in 
waiting for the Court’s judgment, usually spans from five years to more than a decade. 
For example, in Kaftailova v. Latvia, the applicant lodged her first legal request with 
the Interior Ministry in February 1993.305 She had to litigate for eleven years until the 
Court handed down the judgment in her case in 2007.306 In the case of Sisojeva and 
others v. Latvia, the applicants applied for regularization of their stay in 1993.307 The 
final decision of the Senate of the Supreme Court denying their appeals was handed 
down on April 12, 2000.308 The judgment of the European Court was handed down on 
January 15, 2007.309 In other words, the applicant spent approximately fourteen years 
waiting for the verdict from the Court and for the solution to her legal status. 
In some cases, the claimants underwent long periods of detention and 
impending deportation.310 
The problem is exacerbated by the Court’s enormous backlog of cases. By 
2009 the Court had a backlog of 119, 300 cases.311 Commentators have emphasized 
the Court’s difficulty handling the backlog and the toll it was taking on the length of 
proceedings.312 The backlog significantly contributed to the current situation where the 
cases remain on the Court’s docket sometimes for longer periods than the Court allows 
for domestic courts of respondent states.313 Both the outsiders as well as the 
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representatives of the Court stress the negative effect that the backlog has had on 
claimants’ rights.314 
Prohibitively high financial costs associated with such prolonged domestic and 
international litigation is another factor that stands in the way of bringing claims. 
For example, the ECtHR considered that to account for an hourly rate for legal 
work in Bulgaria to USD 40, USD 25 is a reasonable fee.315 In another situation, the 
Court considered a rate of GBP 100 to prepare a case before the Grand Chamber to be 
reasonable.316 Although legal fees fluctuate from one country to another, even the 
lowest common denominator of these fees is a heavy burden for stateless individuals, 
who usually are economically at the margins of society.317 
Moreover, the Legal Aid Fund has granted aid to some applicants whose 
complaints were examined above.318 The Legal Aid Fund was established to help with 
costs of litigation before the ECtHR. However, eligibility for the Fund is highly 
selective. Applicants can receive legal aid only in the later stage of proceedings, after 
the respondent government writes its observations on the admissibility of the case or 
when the Court declares the case admissible.319 In addition, most member states of the 
Council of Europe do not provide domestic legal aid for litigation in Strasbourg.320 
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2. NGOs as Claimants 
This part examines the role of NGOs as claimants in front of the ECtHR. This 
is done through analyzing the ECtHR’s handling of the admissibility of NGO 
applications. It is through this ratione personae admissibility test that the Court 
establishes its understanding of the term “non-governmental organization.” 
It should be noted that the number of admissibility decisions in which NGO 
complaints were declared inadmissible is certainly higher; for example, a complaint by 
the Association of Victims of Terrorism against Spain was declared inadmissible in 
2001. Similarly, an application by “Domowina—Association for the Protection of 
Serbian Interests” against Germany was declared inadmissible in 2000. The decision 
regarding inadmissibility of applications by NGOs should certainly be studied in order 
to gain a fuller picture of NGO efforts to access the ECtHR. 
Development of the ECtHR’s approach to defining “a non-governmental 
organization” in pursuance of it admissibility requirements illustrates that the Court 
does not have an easy task. In line with literature on the proliferation of non-state 
actors in international law, this account of case law shows that NGO applications have 
become increasingly diverse in their legal forms and objectives. As more of these 
different organizations attempt to defend their rights under the European Convention, 
the Court’s task is becoming more complicated and difficult. Increasingly 
sophisticated organizational forms of applicant organizations prompt the Court to 
move from a relative simple “public functions” test, with which the Court responded 
to the earliest applications by NGOs, to a sophisticated legal exercise. 
The fact that the Court had to develop this relatively complicated matrix from 
its early “public functions” test confirms that its response to the newly emerging types 
of organizations is becoming more sophisticated. 
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Initially, the Court aspired to maintain a strict binary governmental/non-
governmental system, including all commercially and publicly oriented organizations 
in the same “non-governmental” category. In certain cases, this task was easy. When 
the Court examined applications by associations/companies founded by private 
individuals or by local municipalities, it encountered no difficulty in completing the 
task. As time passed, however, preservation of the simple binary system became more 
difficult. Entities which maintain the characteristics of both categories emerged, and 
the line between the two became more blurred. Hence the Court could no longer 
survive with the simple dichotomy. It had to create a more complicated approach to 
determine into what category applicant organizations fall. 
It is in relation to this relatively complicated task that the category of the 
“degree of independence” became gradually more important. For the purposes of 
admissibility test, the Court had to determine whether the applicant organizations were 
independent from the government. In the process of reconfiguring its general 
admissibility test, the Court expanded its definition of the category of “degree of 
independence,” thus allowing a flow of more NGO applications. In 1994, having first 
elaborated the requirement of “independence,” the Court insisted that applicant 
organizations must be “completely independent” from the government. In 2003, while 
revisiting its approach, the Court indicated that the applicant organizations can be 
“substantively independent.” However, in 2007, the Court stated that it would not 
admit the applications of those organizations that are strictly controlled by a 
government. In this environment, where the Court is asked to adjudicate on the claims 
of numerous organizations, whose ties with the state are extremely blurred, 
maintaining a strict independent test, as it was envisaged initially, becomes less 
feasible. By relaxing the test, the Court remains welcoming to the increasing flow of 
the applications by these organizations, thereby strengthening its jurisdiction and 
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authority. Thus, over time, more and more opportunities for claim-making on the 
international plane arise for entities that claim to be “non-governmental.” 
Portrayal of the Court’s struggles to define the “governmental” and the “non-
governmental,” in which the Court often bends its own previously stated principles, 
confirms the difficulties associated with the changed nature of the nation-state and of 
the institutions affiliated with it. Second, the case law confirms that as more and more 
entities of a hybrid nature emerge, combining features of both public and private law 
and operating on the borderline of each, the ECtHR is having difficulty devising 
principles based on the Treaty text written more than 70 years ago. Third, the study 
shows that as the Court relaxed its “independence” test over time, more and more 
entities acquire the opportunity to claim rights as applicant NGOs. Therefore, 
international legal opportunities for NGOs are expanding further. 
In this chapter I argue that the ECtHR develops its relationship with NGOs 
through changing the interpretation and the construction of the definition of “a non-
governmental organization,” that is, through regulating the admissibility of 
applications by NGOs. This chapter evidences the fact that the Court has first 
constructed a “negative-substantive” test to ascertain which entities’ applications 
should be admissible. The criterion of “independence” from government appears to be 
the most crucial in determining whether an applicant entity is indeed non-
governmental. However, the Court has remained flexible in interpreting the required 
threshold of “independence” from the State. As the legal form and nature of applicant 
organizations has become gradually more sophisticated, the Court has been faced with 
the task of coming up with more refined doctrines of ratione personae admissibility. 
It is also noteworthy that despite the growing number of applications that 
threaten the Court with case backlogs, it has remained welcoming to NGO 
applications by broadening, rather than restricting, certain criteria within the test. The 
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broadening of the definition allows more applicants to take advantage of the 
Convention system and bring applications before the Court. This process continues 
notwithstanding the mounting criticisms by lawyers and experts of the Court’s 
existing backlog. 
The ECtHR develops its doctrine as it encounters new types of organizations 
active in different areas and performing different functions. As the Court grapples with 
the task of responding to challenges presented by the status and activity of an 
applicant organization, it develops its own approach to categorizing this organization 
as “a non-governmental organization.” 
A. Evolving Negative-Substantive Admissibility Test 
The ECtHR will only admit NGOs’ applications for examination if it is 
ascertained that the organizations concerned can claim to be victims of a breach of one 
of the rights protected by the Convention.321 This is possible through Article 34 of the 
European Convention on Human Rights, which states: “The Court may receive 
applications from any person, non-governmental organization or group of individuals 
claiming to be the victim of violation by one of the High Contracting Parties of the 
rights set forth in the Convention or the protocols thereto.” Therefore, for applications 
by legal entities to pass the Court’s ratione personae admissibility test, they must 
prove that they fall within the category of “non-governmental organization” and claim 
to have been victims of violations of rights enshrined in the Convention, and bring the 
claim before the ECtHR. 
However, the term “non-governmental organization” in Article 34 was not 
unequivocal. The specific meaning of the term, which could result in admitting an 
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organization’s application or denying its admission, has been subject to arguments 
between applicants and respondent States. The Court has controlled the admission of 
NGO applications through carefully constructing the criteria allowing it to recognize 
whether a specific entity was “non-governmental” or not. Construction of the criteria 
took place through what I call a “negative-substantive” test with which the Court dealt 
with applications by legal entities. This test is “negative” because instead of engaging 
in discussion about what “non-governmental” would mean, the Court strives to 
explicate the nature of “governmental” organizations and exclude those organizations 
which it considers to be too closely related to government. Therefore, if the answer to 
this question is negative, then the applicant entity could be characterized as “non-
governmental.” 
Furthermore, the test is “substantive” because the Court, as opposed to 
following a “formalistic” view according to which it would look only at formal legal 
criteria with respect to whether an entity is legally defined as “non-governmental” 
under domestic law or not, took a much broader substantive approach. As will be seen 
below, applicant entities could be considered non-governmental irrespective of 
whether they were registered under domestic private or public law. However, in 
considering their nature the Court goes much further than just looking at the status of 
the applicant organization and, where needed, examines the nature of its powers, the 
degree of its independence, the level of control exercised by the government, and other 
substantive questions. 
The Court elaborated the test as it proceeded to respond to applicants who 
maintain different levels of connection to the State. The Court found it easiest to 
respond to two types of cases: applications by municipalities and by corporations 
established under domestic private law by private individuals seem to be the easiest to 
handle. In response to such applications the Court proceeded with a simple 
	  80 
admissibility test. However, as the organizational forms of applicant organizations 
became more complicated, so did the Court’s reasoning on their admissibility. 
Therefore, the Court took a further step in complicating its ratione personae 
admissibility test as applications from public corporations came in. These are 
corporations registered under domestic public law (under Statutes) that retain certain 
ties to the government. In such organizations, as we shall see in the cases below, the 
State plays a certain role either in governance, financing, or supervision, or in all of 
the above. However, such organizations are technically not part of the State machinery 
and maintain formal legal independence. The Court found it difficult to use preexisting 
legal concepts with such complicated organizational and legal forms and devised a 
more sophisticated test in response to their pleas for admissibility. Finally, it was 
equally complicated for the Court to respond to applications by companies, registered 
under domestic private law, engaged in commercial activity, but founded by the State 
or government officials. 
There are applications brought under the prong of “non-governmental 
organization” in which the question of admissibility is not even raised. These 
organizations unequivocally fall into the orbit of the “non-governmental.” Applicant 
organizations in such cases are registered under domestic private law and are 
established by and run by private individuals. The nature of applicant organizations 
varies: some engage in religious activities, while others are aimed at making a profit. 
Despite this variation in their objectives, the Court does not hesitate to qualify them as 
“non-governmental.” What seems to be of paramount importance for the Court is that 
applicant organizations have no ties with the government, that is, that their 
independence is in no doubt. Therefore, it is noteworthy that contrary to the position 
of some scholars, for whom NGOs are only those organizations that do not aim at 
making a profit, the ECtHR maintains a broader definition of an NGO. It considers 
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both companies and non-profit-making entities to be “non-governmental 
organizations.” These organizations do share several traits: all were founded by 
private individuals under the private law of the state. Such organizations include 
business companies, charities, religious organizations, and trade unions. The following 
series of cases illustrate this point. 
Interestingly, the first case decided on the basis of the complaint by a non-
governmental organization was a case lodged by a trade union of policemen. The 
National Union of Belgian Police launched a complaint against the Kingdom of 
Belgium.322 The Union alleged that Belgium violated its rights under Article 11 
(freedom of association) and Article 14 (prohibition of discrimination) of the 
Convention.323 The Union was established as a non-profit-making association and 
function under the civil law of the country.324 
The issue of inadmissibility of the application based on the status of the 
applicant organization was not raised. The respondent government did not contest that 
the complainant qualified as a non-governmental organization. The Court, in its turn, 
had no trouble in admitting this claim without any debate on the admissibility of the 
applicant, and proceeded to the discussion of the merits of the case. 
Similar processes take place in relation to other applicants, who are founded by 
private individuals under domestic private law, notwithstanding the objective (profit-
making or not) of the applicant organization. For example, in the case of National and 
Provincial Building Society et al v. The UK, the applications were brought by three 
building societies.325 Building societies operate as “mutual societies” as opposed to the 
status of companies established under company law. The building society’s members 
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were investors who deposited savings with it and received interest in return. Its 
borrowers were charged interest on their loans. Mostly, loans were taken out by 
borrowers to buy private residential property.326 Again, as in the case of the National 
Union of Belgian Police, the question of admissibility of the complaint was not raised. 
No one doubted that the applicant organization indeed qualified to act as a non-
governmental organization under the Convention. Building societies at hand, just as 
any other organization whose status as an NGO was not questioned by the Court, were 
established by private citizens and functioned solely under the private law of the 
respondent State. 
In Cha’are Shalom Ve Tsedek v. France, the applicant was a Jewish liturgical 
association.327 The applicant organization alleged that the French state had violated the 
provisions on freedom of religion and non-discrimination of the Convention by 
refusing to grant it the approval necessary for access to slaughterhouses to perform 
ritual slaughter in accordance with the religious prescriptions of its members.328 The 
applicant was an association registered under French Law.329 Its aims were religious, 
and included among other things, “[. . .] to organize, subsidize, encourage, revive, 
assist, promote and finance, in France, public Jewish worship and any other related or 
connected activities of a religious nature [. . .].”330 As in previously mentioned cases, 
the admissibility of the application by this organization was not challenged during the 
proceedings. Although this particular applicant had been pursuing religious activities, 
it was regarded as a non-governmental organization. 
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In Vgt Verein Gegen Tierfabriken v. Switzerland, the applicant was an 
association against animal cruelty registered in Switzerland.331 The applicant claimed 
that the Swiss authorities’ refusal to grant it permission to broadcast an advertisement 
against animal cruelty violated the right to freedom of expression under the 
Convention.332 The applicant organization’s aim was to protect animals.333 The 
application was admitted without any discussion of the nature of the applicant 
organization or doubts about its status as a non-governmental organization for the 
purposes of the Convention. 
In the same year, the Court recognized that Italy had breached the rights of the 
Masonic association.334 The applicant, Grande Oriente d’Italia di Palazzo Giustiniani, 
was an association registered under the civil law of Italy. It was a Masonic 
organization affiliated with Universal Freemasonry. It had the status of an 
unrecognized private-law association under the civil law of Italy.335 As with all other 
previously mentioned cases, the respondent government did not raise preliminary 
objections with regard to the non-governmental status of the applicant organization. 
Because the Court regarded the complaint admissible without any further discussion, 
we can conclude that it was clear for the Court as well, for admissibility purposes, that 
by the way of its incorporation the applicant met the requirements for admissibility 
under then-Article 25 of the Convention. 
The above-cited judgments evidence that the Court had been experiencing no 
difficulty in admitting the applications by organizations, which had been established 
and run by private individuals under the private/civil law of the state. The number of 
judgments issued in response to applications by similar non-governmental 
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organizations is much higher than the few cases indicated above. However, the 
instances referenced above prove one of my main points: it has been easiest for the 
Court to handle applications by those organizations that are completely segregated 
from the government, that is, established and run by private individuals under the 
private law of the state. The aims and objectives of applicant organizations, for 
example whether profit making or not, do not play a role in relation to their status as 
non-governmental organizations under the admissibility provision of the Convention. 
The Court’s approach to applications brought by local territorial entities is also 
clear-cut. They fall within the ambit of “governmental organizations,” as opposed to 
non-governmental organizations and hence are not eligible to submit applications. 
However, this set of cases is interesting because in these decisions the ECtHR 
developed the “public functions” prong of the negative-substantive test. 
In the case of Sixteen Austrian Communes v. Austria (1974), the applicants 
were Communes that had discontinued their existence after one of the Austrian 
provinces passed an Act reorganizing the communes and merging several of them. 
They alleged that their rights had been violated by this decision, as well as in the 
process pursued, which followed their appeal of the decision.336 The Commission 
examined whether the applicants could be recognized as non-governmental 
organizations for the purposes of Article 25 of the Convention. At this point the Court 
pronounced the “public functions” test: it finds that local government organizations 
such as communes, which exercise “public functions” on behalf of the State, are 
clearly “governmental organizations” as opposed to the non-governmental 
organizations referred to in Article 25.337 
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In a similar vein, the Court in the decision of Ayuntamiento de M v. Spain 
(1989) reaffirmed the “public functions” test. In this case the City Council appealed to 
the European Commission, requesting that it be regarded as a non-governmental 
organization within the meaning of Article 25 since, inter alia, “the system of 
administrative decentralization that obtains in Spain makes it independent of 
Government.” The applicant, who was prevented from submitting an amparo appeal to 
the Spanish Constitutional Court, alleged that it had not been given a fair hearing in 
Spain. The Commission considered whether the Council would qualify as a non-
governmental organization for the purposes of the treaty. It noted that local authorities 
are public law bodies, which perform official duties assigned to them by the 
Constitution and by substantive law. As such, they “quite clearly” were governmental 
organizations and were unable to submit the complaints. However, the Commission 
went further to elaborate, with reference to international law, which “governmental 
organizations” refer not only to the government or the central organs of the State but 
also to “any national authority that exercises public functions.”338 The decision was 
reinforced several times, including in the case of Danderyds Kommun v. Sweden,339 in 
which an applicant Swedish municipality was regarded as “clearly a public organ 
exercising public functions.” 
The Court reaffirmed the same approach when dealing with municipalities of 
other countries.340 In the case of Ayuntamiento de Mula v. Spain (2000),341 the 
applicant municipality argued that it had not received a fair hearing in the Supreme 
Court of Spain. Nevertheless, the Commission considered whether it qualified as a 
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non-governmental organization. Again with reference to international law, the 
Commission reiterated that “non-governmental organizations” could not only refer to 
the Government or the central organs of the State, but should rather refer to any 
national authority that exercised public functions. The applicant municipality 
attempted to convince the Court that local authorities exercised both public and private 
functions, and during the latter acted as non-governmental organizations. In Spain, in 
the case at hand, local authorities were authorized to defend their property rights, 
among other things by filing submissions to the Court. Moreover, as the local 
authorities had existed before the State, and owned the property, they could have been 
regarded as non-governmental organizations. Nevertheless, the Court opted for stating 
that due to the exercise of public functions, and notwithstanding the fact that local 
municipalities owned property and could defend it in court, they could not be equated 
with non-governmental organizations.342 
One of the first cases where the Commission established its “public functions” 
test was Consejo General de Colegios Oficiales de Economistas de Espana v. Spain 
(1995).343 The General Council of Official Economists’ Associations in Spain, a 
public law corporation established under the laws of Spain, alleged that inability to 
bring a claim under domestic law violated its right to a fair trial under the Convention. 
The European Commission for Human Rights, however, stressed that “[t]he General 
Councils of Professional Associations are public law corporations which perform 
official duties assigned to them by the Constitution and the legislation.” The 
Commission emphasized that no national authority exercising “public functions,” even 
along decentralized lines, can bring a claim. After analyzing the legislation with 
respect to such Councils, the Commission concluded that it could not have been 
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characterized as a non-governmental organization under the meaning of Article 25 of 
the Convention and hence that its complaint was inadmissible. 
The first instance when the Court moved to a “substantive test,” looking 
beyond the functions endowed by the founding public law, is the 1994 case of The 
Holy Monasteries v. Greece.344 In this case, in response to applications brought by 
several Greek monasteries, the Court established its three-pronged substantive test. As 
a new type of public corporation, different in its objectives from those that brought 
earlier applications, the Court was prompted to continue the discussion of its 
principles beyond the question of delivering public functions. 
Law No 1700/1987 of the State of Greece changed the rules with respect to the 
management and representation of monastery property. It also provided that within six 
months of its publication the State would become the owner of all monastery property 
unless the monasteries proved title (kyriotita) established either by a duly registered 
deed (metegrammeno), a statutory provision, or a final court decision against the 
State.345 The applicants alleged that State action against monastic property would 
“deprive them of the means necessary for pursuing their religious objectives.” 
In a preliminary objection to the admissibility of the application, government 
representatives argued  “[. . .] The applicant monasteries were not non-governmental 
organizations within the meaning of Article 25 of the Convention.”346 To prove their 
argument, they stressed the historical, legal, and financial links with the Hellenic 
nation, which included the public law attribution of legal personality to the Church 
and its constituent parts, the monasteries.347 
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The fact that the Court’s approach is substantive, rather than formalistic, is 
substantiated by its handling of the question of the organization’s registration under 
the public or private law of a country. When registration of an organization under 
public law was mentioned as an impediment to its recognition as a non-governmental 
organization, the Court has taken a more substantive look at the nature and purpose of 
such registration. The mere fact of registering under public law was not sufficient to 
dismiss the entity’s recognition as an NGO. For example, in the case of Holy 
Monasteries, the Court stated, “[f]rom the classification as public law entities it may 
be inferred only that the legislature—on account of special links between the 
monasteries and the State—wished to afford them the same legal protection vis-à-vis 
third parties as was accorded to other public law entities.”348 So the Court was not 
satisfied that the mere fact of the monasteries’ registration under public law was 
sufficient to deprive them of NGO status. The Court took a further step and examined 
the purpose of such registration. Moreover, in response to its “governmental powers” 
doctrine, the Court stressed that the monasteries do not exercise such powers but that 
their objectives—ecclesiastical, spiritual, cultural, and social ones—do not allow for 
their classification as governmental organizations established for public-administration 
purposes.349 
Moreover, the Court went on to consider the degree of independence of the 
monasteries from the State and stated that “[. . .] the monasteries come under the 
spiritual supervision of the local archbishop (s39 (2)), not under the supervision of the 
State, and they are accordingly entities distinct from the State, of which they are 
completely independent.”350 
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For the first time, the Court elaborated on the applicant entity’s degree of 
independence from the State. In this particular case the fact that the monasteries were 
supervised by the Archbishop, and not a State agency, spoke in favor of admissibility 
of the claim. Nevertheless, by the same token, the Court established the precedent of 
not only speaking about registration under public or private law, or possession of 
“governmental powers,” but also of the need for “complete independence” from the 
State. 
The precedent and emphasis on the nature of powers exercised by the body in 
question was later reinforced in the decision Finska församlingen i Stockholm & 
Teuvo Hautaniemi v. Sweden.351 The case concerned a religious public corporation 
from another state. In this decision the Church of Sweden and its members were 
recognized as non-governmental organizations even though they had been registered 
as corporations in public law. The Court established that, “[A]s these religious bodies 
cannot be considered to be exercising governmental powers, the Church of Sweden 
and notably the applicant parish can nevertheless be regarded as non-governmental 
organizations [. . .]”352 
Therefore, in trying to justly respond to claims of applicant organizations, the 
Court moves from the public functions test to something more complicated. 
The case of RENFE v. Spain (1997) is both similar to and different from the 
previous cases. RENFE, the Spanish national railway company, submitted an 
application before the Commission alleging violation of the right to a fair hearing in 
Spanish Courts.353 The applicant was a public-law corporation created by the State to 
run the state rail network as an industrial company. The applicant had its own distinct 
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legal personality, different from the State, and was administratively independent, 
although its board of directors was answerable to the government; its internal structure 
and the conduct of its activities were regulated by a Decree, later supplemented by 
Law. Nevertheless, the organization maintained a monopoly in providing a public 
railway service.354 Noting that governmental organizations cannot introduce an 
application at any stage of proceedings, the Commission engaged in the test of 
assessing whether the entity was “governmental.” The Commission noted that 
although the company had its own legal personality and was administratively 
independent, a combination of several factors did not allow it to claim to be non-
governmental and submit an application: (a) it was a public law corporation 
established by the law to run the state rail network as an industrial company; (b) its 
board of directors was answerable to the government; (c) it was a monopoly, that is, 
“the only undertaking with the license to manage, direct and administer the state 
railways, with a certain public-service role in the way it does so”; and (d) the 
applicant’s internal structure and manner of conducting business was regulated by a 
decree. 
The Court followed up on the criteria of “public functions” and 
“independence” that it had elaborated earlier. To these, it added the new category of 
“monopoly with a public service role,” to respond to the specific situation of RENFE. 
As a result the Commission concluded that the applicant entity was not qualified to 
appear as a non-governmental entity and declared the application inadmissible.355 
The case of Radio France against France is seminal in this regard.356 Here the 
main applicant was Radio France, a media company incorporated under the French 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
354 Id.  
355 Id.  
356 Radio France v. France, App. No. 53984/00, Sept. 23, 2003.  
	  91 
statute.357 The government contended that because Radio France belonged to the 
public sector it did not qualify as a “non-governmental organization” under the 
Convention and did not have the right to bring the application.358 The Court’s 
reasoning proceeded as follows: first, returning to its “negative” test, the Court defined 
a “governmental organization” as opposed to a “non-governmental organization.” In 
this respect the Court stated that the term “applies not only to the central organs of the 
State, but also to decentralized authorities that exercise ‘public functions,’ regardless 
of their autonomy vis-à-vis the central organs; likewise it applies to local and regional 
authorities.”359 Furthermore, the Court summed up and refined the principles briefly 
set out in Holy Monasteries and RENFE, stating: 
The category of “governmental organizations” includes legal entities that 
participate in the exercise of governmental powers and run a public service 
under government control.360 
But the court further developed the test, stressing that in order to determine 
whether any given legal person other than a territorial authority falls within that 
category, “[. . .] account must be taken of its legal status and, where appropriate, the 
rights that status gives it, the nature of the activity it carries out and the context in 
which it is carried out, and the degree of its independence from the political 
authorities.”361 
“Where appropriate” shows that the Court will consider factors other than 
formal status, once again exceeding the pure formal legal aspect of the fact of 
incorporation of the application entity, and thereby reinforcing its “substantive test.” 
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In the decision of Radio France v. France the category of “degree of 
independence” emerged as decisively important. The applicant is still granted the 
status of “non-governmental” despite the fact that Radio France “[. . .] depends to a 
considerable extent on the State for its financing.” Yet, this fact of dependency is 
negated, in the Court’s view, by the fact that “[. . .] the legislature has devised a 
framework which is plainly designed to guarantee its editorial independence and 
institutional autonomy [. . .]”362 
It should be emphasized that the Court changed the degree of independence 
required for the admissibility of applications. As indicated above in Holy Monasteries, 
the Court stated that in order for the applicant entity to be recognized as “non-
governmental” it should have been “completely independent” from government. In 
Radio France, however, the French state held all the capital in Radio France, its 
memorandum and articles of association were approved by decree, its resources were 
to a large extent public, it performed “public-service missions in the general interest” 
(prescribed by the Act), and it was obliged to comply with terms of reference and to 
enter into a contract with the state setting out its objectives and means.363 However, in 
this case the Court moved to allowing “substantive independence.” 
By discussing the specific circumstances related to the Radio’s functioning, for 
example the fact that it falls not under the control of the State but under the 
supervision of a specially created authority, and the fact that its actions are essentially 
governed by the company law, the Court opted for considering the applicant as a “non-
government organization.” The Court thus moved beyond the “complete 
independence” test to a test through which it would assess step by step whether the 
applicant organization was substantively independent. Hence, the Court has moved 
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from the initial “complete independence” test to a broader and less strict “substantive 
independence” test. 
The application by Radio France was closest to being recognized as an 
application by a governmental agency and thus at risk of being dismissed. 
Nevertheless, the ECtHR stayed faithful to its initial “broad” definition of a non-
governmental organization. In its words, the Court found that the national French 
company Radio France was a non-governmental organization “[. . .] despite the fact 
that the State held all of the capital in Radio France, its memorandum and articles of 
association were approved by a Decree, its resources were to a large extent public, it 
performed public service missions in general interest, and it was obliged to comply 
with terms of reference and to enter into a contract with the State setting out its 
objectives and means.”364 
In Islamic Republic of Iran Shipping Lines v. Turkey (2007)365 the Court 
reaffirmed and further developed the principles already set in Radio France. The case 
was brought by a company registered in Tehran alleging that Turkey violated Article 1 
of Protocol 1 of the European Convention by unlawfully seizing and detaining vessels 
chartered by it. The respondent raised the admissibility objection, arguing that the 
company was a state-owned corporation, which could not be distinguished from the 
Government of Iran.366 
The Court set out through its routine negative test by clarifying the meaning of 
“governmental organization”367 and then applying the test of “governmental 
organization” to the applicant company. The Court affirmed that although the 
applicant company was wholly owned by the state at the time of lodging the 
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application, and although a majority of the members of its Board of Directors were 
appointed by the State, it was legally and financially independent from the State as 
evidenced by its Memorandum of Association. It reaffirmed the “substantive 
independence” test by examining both the legal and financial independence of the 
applicant company.368 And, more importantly, it reinterpreted the principle of 
“substantive independence” mentioned in Radio France to the requirement of “strict 
control by the State.” The Court established that “Public corporations under the strict 
control of a State are not entitled to bring an application under Article 34 of the 
Convention.”369 In order to strengthen its point, for the first time in this line of cases, 
the Court recalled the travaux preparatoires of the Convention by interpreting the 
“strict control” test in light of the object and purpose of this provision. The Court 
provided that the idea behind this principle was to prevent a Contracting Party from 
acting as both an applicant and a respondent party before the Court.370 
Moreover, to distinguish this case from all other cases where applications were 
brought by public corporations, and to create a further aid for the purposes of its 
“independence test,” the Court devised additional criteria for judging whether a 
privately registered corporation is “run as a commercial business.” The court indicated 
that three particular circumstances would be considered in judging whether a 
company, even if established by a state, qualifies as “a non-governmental 
organization”: (a) company law essentially governs the corporation, (b) it does not 
enjoy any powers beyond those conferred by ordinary private law in the exercise of its 
activities, and (c) it is subject to the jurisdiction of the ordinary rather than the 
administrative courts.371 On the one hand, with this new addition to the preexisting 
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test, the Court eased its own task—it merely summed up in a separate drill the criteria 
applicable to companies. On the other hand, the overall exercise became even more 
difficult. 
B. Conclusions 
It should be pointed out that the analysis started from associations established 
by private individuals under domestic private law, in relation to which the Court had 
no difficulty recognizing that they were NGOs. These include profit-making entities, 
religious organizations, and non-profit advocacy groups. Applications from local 
governments and municipalities followed next, the Court finding it relatively easy to 
provide reasoning to decline their recognition as NGOs. As the Court moved on to 
considering applications by public law corporations, it was prompted to make its 
response more nuanced. Therefore, it continued to elaborate the concepts that it had 
already adopted, making them more sophisticated in response to more complicated 
case scenarios. Finally, as applications from companies established by state agencies 
under domestic private law came in, the ECtHR elaborated the admissibility test 
further by adding more criteria for recognition of independence from the state. 
The case of Islamic Republic of Iran Shipping Lines v. Turkey is the last case 
in which the Court ended up complicating even further its own principles regarding 
admissibility of NGO claims. Recall that the Court started out considering the claims 
by entities of public law with a relatively straightforward “public functions” test. 
Later, as the Court continued to receive applications by public corporations of diverse 
natures and objectives (religious, public service delivery, media), it moved to creating 
more elaborate responses to their admissibility claims. Through judgments on Holy 
Monasteries and RENFE, the court supplemented the “public functions” test with the 
criteria of “monopoly / public service delivery” and “degree of independence.”
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However, the types of applicant organizations became further complicated. And as the 
line between the state and non-state, the governmental and non-governmental, grew 
even harder to discern, the Court became more and more stranded in its attempt to 
draw a strict line between “governmental” and “non-governmental” organizations, and 
in the case of Radio France v. France it had to change its previous test and suggest a 
more comprehensive one. At this point the Court remained concentrated on the 
“negative-substantive test” for public law corporations. However, in Islamic Republic 
of Iran, having first based its judgment on the negative-substantive test for public law 
corporations, the Court realized that the nature of the applicant was different. As 
opposed to those in previous cases, the applicant here was registered and run under 
domestic company law. 
Furthermore, it must be stressed that in this process of interpretation the Court 
referred to the travaux preparatoires of the Convention only once. In other instances, 
as the Court moved forward with elaborations of the admissibility test, it did not deem 
it necessary to refer to the intentions of the Convention drafters or relevant 
discussions. The Court aspired to create new approaches to the sophisticated and 
hybrid entities that present the Court with a set of new challenges. Therefore, the 
Court moved ahead with creating concepts that can serve as useful tools in dealing 
with new legal issues. 
One should also keep in mind the fact that the Court does not differentiate 
between profit-oriented and non-profit organizations in recognizing them as NGOs. 
Instead, the Court places importance on the category of “degree of independence” 
from the government. The “degree of independence” first emerged as a separate 
criterion in the case of Holy Monasteries, where the entities were “completely 
independent.” The determination, did not however, remain static. The court 
reformulated it in the case of Radio France, where the fact of “substantive 
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independence” was sufficient. In Iranian Shipping Lines the test was relaxed further, 
when the Court stated that only claims made by entities “strictly controlled by the 
State” would be inadmissible. 
With this changed definition the Court achieved several outcomes. First of all, 
the threshold for admissibility of claims by organizations was lowered. In the 
beginning the entity should have been completely independent from the state to be 
admitted, but later claims by organizations of lesser independence were also held 
acceptable as long as they were not “strictly controlled” by the state. Second, in 
lowering and relaxing the threshold, the Court acknowledged that it is unfeasible to 
maintain the strict admissibility test in an environment in which the nature of applicant 
organizations is becoming more and more hybrid. By reviewing the applications of 
organizations active in various new areas, whether religious affairs, media, or 
commerce, many of which retained characteristics of both governmental and non-
governmental entities, insistence on “complete independence” from the state would 
result in turning down and alienating them. In a world in which the trend toward the 
blurring of public–private lines could not be reversed, the Court opted for admitting 
their grievances. 
No doubt, by maintaining a broad definition of NGOs the Court facilitated 
submission of more such claims, even in instances where the organization was 
established by the state, where the capital was owned by the state, and where the 
resources were to a large extent public. This self-serving strategy by international 
tribunals of incrementally increasing their caseload and authority is familiar to 
scholars of judicial politics.372 Nevertheless, the European Court of Human Rights 
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continues to engage in it despite widespread criticism of its backlog and recognition 
that the backlog of cases resembles “a catastrophe.” Whether these moves by the 
ECtHR can inform us substantially about the politics of judicial expansion is a 
question worthy of a separate study. 
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Chapter V: Domestic Legal Origins of Amicus Curiae Procedure 
The Principles of Transnational Civil Law, a codification of internationally 
accepted “best practices” of civil procedure by the influential American Law Institute 
and UNIDROIT, put forth the following description of the amicus curiae procedure: 
Written submissions concerning important legal issues in the proceeding and 
matters of background information may be received from third persons with 
the consent of the court, upon consultation with the parties. The court may 
invite such a submission. The parties must have an opportunity to submit 
written comment addressed to the matters contained in such a submission 
before the court considers it.373 
The commentary to the Principles indicates that in general civil law, nations do 
not possess a practice of allowing amicus curiae submissions, though some countries 
from civil law tradition, such as France, have developed the practice in their case 
law.374  
Amicus curiae intervention practice has been an integral part of English law 
and practice. Some sources reveal that the practice of amicus curiae or “friend of the 
court” has existed in England since at least Edward I.377 Other sources indicate that the 
practice was enacted in 1403 by Henry IV, who mandated that any layperson or 
stranger might petition the Court as “amicus curiae,” or as one “who assists the court, 
upon the case already before it, by acting as an adviser, or by calling the court’s 
attention to law, or to facts and circumstances that may have escaped 
consideration.”378 
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Although the practice, mirroring its predecessor, involved only the barristers or 
counselors, by the statute of Henry IV, “a bystander” was also endowed with the 
possibility of amicus curiae functions including “instructing, warning, informing, and 
moving the court.”379 
Amici did not have an entitlement to intervene. However, the discretion was 
wide, for amicus interventions took place for different purposes, including relieving 
problems created by an adversarial system.380 Moreover, amicus interveners were 
allowed to expand their role from neutral informers of the Court, on matters that the 
Court would have otherwise overlooked, to advocates of parties, whose interests might 
have been prejudiced by the impending judgment.381 Samuel Krislov cites a number of 
early English cases that refer to the participation of amici curiae.382 
Indeed, amicus curiae submissions are customary in a number of countries that 
share the fundamental principles of common law, including the United States, Canada, 
the United Kingdom, and Australia. As Professor Michael Reisman wrote in 1970, “In 
common law countries, the amicus curiae brief has been an institution which has 
provided useful information to courts, permitted private parties who were not litigating 
to inform the court of their views and the probable effects the outcome might have on 
them and, overall, has served as means for integrating and buttressing the authority 
and conflict-resolving capacities of domestic tribunals.”383 
In the United States, the procedural institution of amicus curiae has a long, rich 
history. For instance, Rule 29 of the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure establishes 
the process in accordance with which entities can file amicus briefs in the US 
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appellate courts.384 Rule 37 of the Supreme Court Rules indicates the methods for 
filing amicus briefs before the US Supreme Court.385 Scholars have extensively 
written on the amicus curiae institution.386 
The Canadian Supreme Court has allowed amicus curiae interventions since 
the first rules of procedure were adopted in 1878.387 Further, amicus curiae 
interventions also have a long history in Australia.388 The amicus curiae participation 
procedure has also been accepted recently by countries of civil law tradition. For 
instance, Mitchel Lasser indicates that amicus curiae style petitions have recently 
become acceptable in France.389 
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Chapter VI: Internationalization of Amicus Procedure to the ECtHR 
In the middle of the nineteenth century a French commentator to the old 
Napoleonic Code de Procédure Civile wrote, “Ilest quasi impossible d’exporter des 
institutions de la Procédure civile: iln’existeaucuneexemple de réussite à cetégard.”390 
In other words, “it’s nearly impossible to export civil procedure institutions: there isn’t 
a sole example of success in this regard.” The aim of this section is to refute this claim 
specifically and to illustrate how the procedure for amicus curiae intervention was 
internationalized from the United Kingdom to the European Court of Human Rights. 
Internationalization of procedural change occurs in three stages. Initially, at the 
stage of “norm externalization,” domestic actors externalize the norm from domestic 
law and practice to an international setting. At this stage the communication between 
the actors and the decision-makers takes place. Actors use persuasion strategies, 
leverages, and allies to convince the decision-makers to implement the procedure. The 
next stage is “piloting.” After successful persuasion, both decision-makers and actors 
proceed to piloting, during which stage the decision-makers and the entrepreneurs 
implement the practice without the relevant legal foundation. It is a tryout of the 
procedure and at the same time a form of concession from the decision-makers to the 
interveners. Piloting meets the instrumental needs of the interveners. Piloting can 
encounter resistance from other parties with more established interests. Decision-
makers aspire to retain control over the piloting stage by setting the boundaries for the 
activities of actors, and by making sure that piloting is not perceived as a precedent for 
a permanent representation of interests. After piloting, the decision-makers move to 
adoption. 
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Figure 1. The internationalization of domestic procedure.  Blue arrows denote 
domestic actors; red arrows, international actors. 
In the present instance, piloting took place after the persuasion efforts by the 
allies and the interveners succeeded and the Court allowed for the interveners’ 
documents to be circulated. The piloting phase builds on a precedent. However, the 
decision-makers are careful to retain control over the stage of piloting and not to 
promise precedent-setting. The difference between successful and unsuccessful 
attempts allows us to conclude that the Allies and Persuasion Strategies built on 
possession of allies are paramount for successful internationalization. 
During piloting, actors and decision-makers implement innovative procedures. 
This stage is characterized by flexibility of terms. Therefore, it gives actors some room 
to maneuver. Actors and decision-makers might encounter resistance from other 
parties to the innovation in practice. Decision-makers maintain control over the 
process by emphasizing the uniqueness of the situation and avoiding the impression of 
setting a precedent. 
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A. The Initial Structure of the Court 
The initial structure of the ECtHR allowed neither for the right of individuals 
to address the Court nor for the right of third parties to request that the Court hears 
their views. The procedure operated on the basis of a similar provision incorporated 
into the Rules of Procedure in 1982. On November 24, 1982, the judges of the Court 
held a plenary session in which they adopted the revisions to the procedural rules.391 
The new Rule 37 in Chapter III established the possibility of intervention by third 
persons. Clause 2 stated: 
The President may, in the interest of proper administration of justice, invite or 
grant leave to any Contracting State that is not a Party to the proceedings to 
submit written comments within a time limit and on issues that he shall 
specify. He may also extend such an invitation or grant such a leave to any 
person concerned other than the applicant.392 
The procedural amendment of 1983 instituted two important changes. First, the 
entities other than parties (i.e., States) acquired the right to request the intervention in 
cases. The President of the Chamber would agree to such request or decline it. 
Previously, it was only up to the Chamber to invite such persons to intervene. Second, 
third parties became entitled to make written submissions. Prior to the amendment, 
entities other than parties were able to make oral representations before the Court 
when asked to do so. The section below outlines in detail the framework for 
participation in the Court proceedings prior to the 1983 amendment. 
The Court’s initial structure allowed for a number of forms of individual 
participation. Subjects allowed to participate in the proceedings were (a) parties to the 
case, and their agents; (b) Commission delegates, advisers, and aides; (c) witnesses; 
(d) experts; and (e) other persons, whom the Chamber would decide to invite. 
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Article 25 of the Convention and the relevant Rule 26 provided the right of 
persons, groups of individuals, and non-governmental organizations to submit 
applications before the Commission. However, the initial version of the Rules of the 
Procedure did not allow direct participation of applicants in the proceedings before the 
Court.393 In the initial version of the Rules of Procedure, even the issue of whether 
victims have the right to appear before the Court in the capacity of witness was 
equivocal. The preparatory working paper drafted by the Directorate for Human 
Rights laying the groundwork for the Rules of Procedure to be adopted by the Court’s 
judges inquired whether individuals who appealed before the Commission or victims 
had the right to appear before the Court in the capacity of witness.394 On the other 
hand, the Court’s capability to summon witnesses and experts was not questioned.395 
The initial version of the Court’s Rules defined as Parties as “Those 
Contracting Parties which are the Applicant and the Respondent Parties.”396 Parties 
could be represented by Agents, who, in turn, may have been assisted by advocates or 
advisers.397 Rule 1 of the 1982 Rules, titled “definitions,” did not mention third 
parties. The Rules define the term “Parties” as “those Contracting Parties which are 
the Applicant and Respondent Parties.”398 The legal standing as parties has remained 
limited just to States, parties to the Convention. 
Rule 29 allowed the Commission to appoint one or more of its members as 
Delegates before the Court. Rule 29 (1) indicated that the Delegates, chosen by the 
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Commission to take part in presenting the case before the Court, “may be assisted by 
other persons.”399 
Participation in the proceedings was open to other persons as well, as long as 
they were called upon by the Chamber. The Chamber was entitled to “. . . Hear as a 
witness or expert or in any other capacity any person whose evidence or statements 
seem likely to assist it in the carrying out of its task.”400 However, this possibility 
could be triggered only by the initiative of a Party, Commission Delegates, or the 
Chamber itself.401 Rule 39 detailed the procedures for summoning experts, witnesses, 
and any other persons that the Chamber requested and apportionment of relevant 
expenses.402 
Rule 39 (conduct of the hearings) indicated that the President of the Chamber 
will prescribe the order within which various actors speak in the Court. It is 
noteworthy that persons assisting the Commission’s delegates were entitled to speak 
before the Court.403 The Parties could object to hearing a witness or an expert. 
Nevertheless, the Court retained to hear the person who could not be heard as a 
witness “for the purpose of information.”404 
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Table 1 The Court’s Structure Prior to Amendments of 1982  
Component Rule 
Parties  Rule 1 
“Parties” defined as State Parties. 
Witnesses & Experts  Rule 38 
(inquiry, expert opinion and other measures for 
obtaining information) 
The Chamber may, at the request of a Party or of Delegates 
of the Commission or proprio motu, decide to hear as a 
witness or expert on any other capacity any person whose 
evidence or statements seem likely to assist it in carrying 
out its task. 
 
Rule 39 (conduct of the hearings) 
The President of the Chamber will prescribe the order 
within which various actors speak in the Court. Third 
parties are not mentioned.405 
 
Commission Delegates  Rule 29 (1) 
(Relations between the Court and the Commission) 
Commission Delegates can be assisted by other persons. 
Other persons  Rule 38 
(inquiry, expert opinion and other measures for 
obtaining information) 
The Chamber may, at the request of a Party or of Delegates 
of the Commission or proprio motu, decide to hear as a 
witness or expert or any other capacity any person whose 
evidence or statements seem likely to assist it in carrying 
out its task. 
 
The European Convention recognized the procedure in 1998 when, in addition 
to other reforms in the Convention structure, the newly adopted Article 36 (2) granted 
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to states, individuals, and organizations that are not party to the proceedings the right 
to intervene. Article 36(2) stipulates: 
The President of the Court may, in the interest of the proper administration of 
justice, invite any High Contracting Party which is not a party to the 
proceedings or any person concerned who is not the applicant to submit written 
comments or take part in hearings.406 
Two authors, Anthony Lester and Paul Mahoney,407 both of whom have had a 
close relationship with the Court, indicate that the initial change in relation to the rules 
was made in the light of three cases in which the Court consented or declined to 
receive representations from a “third party.” The insights of these individuals acquire 
even greater importance when considering that the travaux preparatoires of the Rules 
of Procedure are confidential.408 Both commentators personally took part in the cases 
at hand. At the time when the facts unfolded, Paul Mahoney worked as an 
Administrator at the Court. In fact, he signed one of the letters on behalf of the 
Registrar in his absence.409  
Anthony Lester is a QC, a practicing barrister, and a member of Blackstone 
Chambers, London. He is a member of the House of Lords (Lord Lester of Herne Hill) 
and Co-Founder and Honorary President of Interights (The International Centre for the 
Legal Protection of Human Rights).411 He has been involved in an extensive number 
of cases before the European Court of Human Rights and has been a prolific author on 
the subject of the European Court. Lester argued one of the first cases at the Human 
Rights Commission, soon after the Government had accepted the Court’s compulsory 
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jurisdiction. At that time, the Court had decided only one case: Lawless v. UK.412 
However, the commentators have not provided specific accounts and details about the 
change. By putting forth the account of the emergence of this procedure, this chapter 
will remedy the gap. 
Before 1983, there were three informal attempts, one unsuccessful and two 
successful, to intervene as a third party before the Court. All three instances originated 
from the United Kingdom. The first request for intervention took place on June 22, 
1977, in a case known as Tyrer v. the United Kingdom. The second attempt to 
intervene was in the case of Winterwerp v. the Netherlands. The third intervention 
took place in Young, James, and Webster on January 30, 1981. 
B. Tyrer v. the United Kingdom 
The Tyrer v. the United Kingdom intervention is not mentioned in official case 
reports because the attempt was unsuccessful in that the actors did not persuade the 
decision-makers to adopt their claims. However, relevant case files do contain 
correspondence between the parties. 
The actors were established organizations, or individuals who acted on behalf 
of the organizations. In addition, the actors in the case at hand were legal professionals 
and possessed expertise in the domestic law of the UK, of which the amicus curiae 
procedure was an integral part. 
At the age of 15, Anthony Tyrer was subjected to three strikes of the birch on 
the Isle of Man, a punishment imposed by the local juvenile court. Tyrer’s birching 
took place at a police station, where his father, a doctor, and some police officers were 
present. After the birching, Tyrer contacted the National Council for Civil Liberties, 
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which put forth the complaint before the European Court of Human Rights on the day 
Tyrer turned 16.413 The applicant alleged, amongst other complaints, that his birching 
violated Article 3 (prohibition of torture) of the European Convention.414 
Tyrer was represented by Cedric Thornberry, who acted on behalf of the 
National Council for Civil Liberties (NCCL).415 The NCCL, founded in 1934, was one 
of the oldest legal advocacy organizations in the United Kingdom. At the time of 
Tyrer’s request, it already had a rich history of defending civil rights through 
litigation.416 Cedric Thornberry was himself a barrister and Lecturer in Law. He 
appeared alongside Tyrer’s other counsel, all of whom were UK-trained lawyers: 
W.A. Nash, Legal Officer for the NCCL; L. Grant, of the Law Clinic of the University 
of Kent at Canterbury; and Nigel Rodley, Legal Officer of Amnesty International 
(acting in private capacity).417 
However, in January 1976, Messrs. Dickinson, Cruikshank and Co., solicitors 
based on the Isle of Man, notified the Commission that the applicant wished to 
withdraw his application and had already withdrawn his instructions from the 
NCCL,418 but the Commission declined the applicant’s request.419 The Court defied 
public opinion and the will of the nominal applicant himself, who seemed to agree that 
the punishment was justified. Even without the applicant’s consent, the Commission 
decided that the merits of the case deserved closer examination. Tyrer’s family friend, 
Susan Kelly, when commenting on the case, indicated that Tyrer always believed that 
the birching was justified. He was “totally mystified and annoyed about the whole 
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matter.”420 The British judge on the bench, Sir Gerald Fitzmaurice, had written a 
powerful and memorable dissent.421 
The UK submitted that the case should be struck from the list, because, inter 
alia, in the future, some forms of corporal punishment were to be abolished by 
legislation. Nevertheless, both the Commission and the Court opposed striking the 
case from the list. The Court reasoned that the suggested move by the respondent did 
not address the fundamental question raised by the case, whether “the corporal 
punishment as inflicted on the applicant in accordance with Manx legislation is 
contrary to the Convention.”422 
On March 21, 1977, Cedric Thornberry, on behalf of the NCCL, inquired with 
the Registrar about the opportunity to intervene before the Court.423 With the response 
on March 25, 1977, the Registrar explicated that only the Chamber could, proprio 
motu, invite any person to be heard before the Court. Alternatively, the Commission 
could decide to employ the assistance of any individual it deemed necessary.424 
Following the instructions by the Registrar, Thornberry pursued the matter 
further with the Secretary of the Human Rights Commission. In a letter on March 31, 
1977, he requested “audience” with the Court, despite the “somewhat mysterious 
events of early 1976 when the Applicant purported to withdraw his petition.” The 
Council had been involved in preparing the applicant’s submission, and would 
appreciate it if the Commission would consider its involvement in the case 
necessary.425 The Commission’s Secretariat responded that considering that the 
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applicant had withdrawn his instructions from the NCCL, it would not be 
“appropriate” to request its assistance for the hearing.426 
Having been rejected this time by the Commission, Mr. Thornberry wrote 
again to the Registrar of the Court. This time he annexed a Memorandum to the letter, 
elucidating certain questions related to the case that otherwise might not become 
available. In addition, on behalf of the NCCL, he requested the opportunity to develop 
the issues in oral submission.427 On June 29, the Court’s Registrar explained that the 
memorandum could not be treated as part of the official case file because the 
Commission had declined the participation of the organization, which was entirely in 
the hands of the Court. The Registrar assured Mr. Thornberry that the letter along with 
the enclosures would be transmitted to the President of the Chamber. However, they 
could not be treated as part of the official case file.428 In a follow-up letter to Mr. 
Thornberry, the Court’s Registrar informed him that the Court had decided not to hear 
the Council’s position at the public hearings.429 
Communication with the NCCL, however, remains mostly entirely in writing 
with one exception: Mr. Thornberry and Mr. Eissen, the Court’s Registrar, met in 
person in Strasbourg on October 13, 1977.430 
C. Winterwerp v. Netherlands 
The first intervention that the Court welcomed was by Eileen Denza, Agent on 
behalf of the UK government. Ms. Eileen Denza, now a Professor at the University 
College London, was a member of the Bar at Lincoln’s Inn and worked as a Legal 
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Adviser at the Foreign and Commonwealth Office.431 She had a Master’s Degree in 
Jurisprudence from Oxford University and a Master’s Degree in Law (LLM) from 
Harvard.432 
The Winterwerp v. the Netherlands (1979) case concerned the lawfulness of 
detention under Article 5(4) of the applicant, a mentally unstable citizen of the 
Netherlands. The Commission submitted the report to the Court, emphasizing that 
both the applicant and the respondent Dutch government agreed that lawfulness of the 
procedural and substantive bases of detention was subject to the Court’s scrutiny. This 
interpretation contravened the position of the UK, against which similar cases were 
pending before the Commission. Thus, the UK sought to prevent a precedent that 
would adversely impact its national policies.433 Eileen Denza, the Agent of the UK 
government in the case of X v. the United Kingdom, requested the possibility of 
intervention.434 Because the views of the Commission and the UK government 
diverged on important issues, the Agent asserted that the UK government’s views 
could only be properly presented directly to the Court and not through the 
Commission.435 
The UK Agent chose a different strategy in Winterwerp. Even after multiple 
rejections, the Agent persevered with the requests just with the Court and modified the 
claims. In terms of outcomes, the latter approach turned out to be more favorable, for 
the Court allowed the submission of written opinions. 
The UK Government took a different strategy in pursuing their intervention. In 
a letter dated November 1, 1978, the Agent for the UK, Ms. Denza, asked the Court to 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
431 UCL Laws Research: Academics  
http://www.ucl.ac.uk/laws/experts/academics.shtml?z_denza [03.12. 2012 11.30 PM] 
432 United Nations Audiovisual Library of International Law, Aileen Denza, 
http://untreaty.un.org/cod/avl/pdf/ha/notewriters/denza.pdf 
433 Winterwerp v. The Netherlands, App. No. 6301/73, 24 Oct. 1979, para. 7.  
434 Series B. Vol. 31 at 65.  
435 Id. 68.  
	  114 
hear the UK Government’s oral submissions under Article 38.1 of the Rules.436 The 
Court’s response was similar to its reaction in Tyrer. The Registrar advised the UK 
Government Agent to submit the views through the Commission Delegates, pursuant 
to the procedures envisaged in the Rules.437 However, in contrast to the reaction by 
Mr. Thornberry in Tyrer, the UK Government Agent did not comply with the 
recommendation and persisted with her position, “. . . The United Kingdom 
Government believes that their position could only be adequately safeguarded by the 
opportunity to present their argument orally to the Chamber through their own 
representative.”438 
The Agent requested that the Court hearings be adjourned until the judges 
decided whether to allow UK intervention in the case or not.439 The Court rejected this 
request as well. Having learned of the rejection, the Agent expressed disappointment 
on behalf of the UK Government.440 Later, the Agent modified the claim, requesting 
that the Court proceedings not be closed on the scheduled date. Leaving the 
proceedings open formally would allow the UK Government to submit the 
Government’s views, which would “go some way to protect the position of the United 
Kingdom.”441 
The Court met the position favorably. Although the original request would not 
be satisfied, the Court did deem it appropriate to allow the UK Government to submit 
its written views through the Commission “during or soon after the hearings fixed for 
28 November.”442 The President of the Court implemented this promise with his 
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announcement at the end of the public hearing and through subsequent 
correspondence.443 
In Winterwerp, the UK Government Agent acknowledged possessing “no right 
to intervene” in the case. Nonetheless, he suggested making use of Rule 38(1). 
According to the argument put forward by the UK representative, if the judges so 
desired, they could call on this representative to make submissions on the proper 
interpretations of the convention article in question.444 At the same point, the 
representative promised to confine the submissions to the question of Article 5(4) and 
not extend them to other cases.445 The agent made a plea that the Court hear the 
party’s legal submission “in the interest of justice.”446 
However, in Winterwerp, the very first letter in the case files contained signs of 
prior informal communication between the Government and the Court. In the initial 
letter to the Registrar of the Court, a representative of the UK government in the case 
X v. the UK wrote, “David Anderson has already spoken to you informally about the 
concern . . .”447 At the time, David Anderson served as a Legal Counselor in the 
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.448 
In another period that involved negotiation processes with the Court, the Agent 
for the UK indicated that there had been a telephone communication between the 
negotiating parties, in addition to the written correspondence. In a letter to the Court 
dated November 21, 1978, the agent wrote, “I have been informed by telephone that 
the President of the Chamber has not felt able to agree to the request of the United 
Kingdom Government . . .”449 
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Informal communication between the Court and the Agent for the UK 
continued. In a letter written the next day, the Court’s Registrar indicated that a later 
telephone conversation on November 21 had taken place between Paul Mahoney, an 
employee of the Registrar, and the Agent’s office: “The present reply is to confirm the 
information communicated to your Government by Mr. Mahoney of the registry in his 
telephone conversation yesterday with your colleague Mrs. Glover.”450 
Informal communications continued after the hearing. At the conclusion of the 
public hearing on December 5, 1978, the Court’s Registrar wrote to the Agent of the 
UK, acknowledging previous communication again by telephone, “in confirmation of 
what Mr. Petzold told you by telephone on 24 November last.”451 
In a later letter from the UK Agent to the Commission, in which the Agent 
requested an extension of a time limit to file a written statement, the Agent noted that 
“the President of the Court has indicated informally that there will be no difficulty in 
meeting this request but has asked that it should be formally be transmitted to you.”452 
In the Winterwerp case, the submissions of the interveners were circulated 
through the Commission. Sir James E.S. Fawcett, the President of the Commission, 
who also served as the Commission delegate to the Court, appealed to the Court to 
hear the intervener’s submission. 
Sir James Edmund Sandford Fawcett, Q.C.was elected as the Member of the 
Commission on January 30, 1962, to replace Sir Humphrey Waldock, the previous 
Commissioner from the UK. At the time of election, Sir Fawcett was a Bursar of All 
Souls College, Oxford.453 On June 30, 1979, the Committee of Ministers re-elected Sir 
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Fawcett as a member of the Commission; the previous year, on July 7, 1978, they re-
elected him as President. His term was to expire on May 17, 1984.454 
As the President of the Commission and the Commission’s Principal Delegate, 
Fawcett appeared before the Court to present the case and the rationale behind the 
Commission’s decision.455 This time the Commission’s decision was unanimous.456 
The main objective behind bringing this case before the Court was the Commission’s 
request for the Court to interpret Article 5.1 and 5.4 of the Convention, particularly to 
specify the scope of review necessary to satisfy the requirements of the condition 
involving “lawful detention of persons of unsound mind” under the respective 
article.457 The bigger issue at stake was whether the psychiatric detention should have 
been subject to judicial review or left under the jurisdiction of the administrative 
authorities.458 
Fawcett’s efforts to persuade the Court to become acquainted with the UK 
submissions are evident from the record of public hearings. In one of his addresses to 
the Court, Fawcett mentioned the impact that the Court’s judgment would have on 
psychiatric detention in countries other than the Netherlands, mentioning the request 
of the UK government to present its views on the legal interpretation of Article 5.4. He 
suggested that if the Court would interpret the article so that it would have 
implications for countries other than the Netherlands, the Court should consider 
leaving the proceedings open so as to allow submission of opinions by the UK 
Government: “We believe that this would be of assistance and we believe that, when 
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the Court is making possibly a wider interpretation . . . it is important that the counter-
arguments be fully presented.”459 
In fact, the Court’s President explicitly relied on the efforts by Commissioner 
Fawcett in his decision to extend the time limits of the proceedings and to allow the 
UK Government to make a written submission. At the end of the public hearing, the 
President of the Court announced: 
Based on the suggestions by the President of the Commission, I will not 
declare the procedure closed. I declare it only provisionally closed so as to 
allow the Commission, should it consider it useful to submit to us another 
document from . . . the British Government. The Commission could submit 
this document, within . . . let us say, a fortnight.460 
Reliance on Fawcett’s request was repeated in a follow-up letter from the 
Court, with which the Court fixed the specific conditions for the British Government’s 
submission: “The Chamber, after duly considering your Government’s request and the 
submission made by the President of the Commission at the public hearing on 28 
November, has decided that the proceedings in the Winterwerp case should not be 
formally closed for the present.”461 
After hearing the request by the President of the Commission, the President 
announced his decision to extend the time limit for the proceeding and, with this 
gesture, to allow the UK Government to make their submissions: 
And possibly it [British Government submission] might be submitted with 
some comments from the Commission. In any event, I am not at present in a 
position to indicate what the further procedure will be; we must wait and 
see.462 
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Within his final statement, the President outlined the main principle that would 
be relevant at that particular stage. At this moment of uncertainty, it would be 
important to continue to safeguard interests of the parties appearing in the case: “It is 
only then that we shall be able to take a final decision as to the closure of the oral 
procedure.”463 
The flexibility of that stage is also shown in the lack of fixed boundaries in 
terms of time limits. The Court’s President set the initial time limit at his statement 
during the hearing, using expressions in relation to fixing the time limit that illustrate 
that the time limit was flexible. The President stated, “ . . . [t]he Commission should 
submit this document, within, let us say, a fortnight . . .”464 The term was more a 
suggestion that required an agreement, rather than a determination, for Sir Fawcett 
replied, “[Y]es, I believe that is possible, Mr. President.”465 
Subsequent events confirmed that the time setting was adaptable. The UK 
government made two requests to extend the time limit, both of which were satisfied 
by the Court. First, the Government Agent requested that the deadline be moved from 
December 13 to December 22. This extension had been informally negotiated with the 
President of the Court.466 Later, the Government asked for the second extension, 
having realized that postal service would be delayed over the Christmas holidays. The 
Government asked for the time limit to be extended until January 5.467 Both extensions 
were granted on the same day.468 Therefore, the Commission sent the UK 
Government’s submission to the Court on January 5, 1979.469 
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The Court itself acknowledged the presence of specific case-related interests. 
In a letter explaining to the representatives of the Trades Union Congress (TUC) why 
the Court had decided to hear the UK government in the case of Winterwerp v. the 
Netherlands, although the UK had not been a party to the case, the Registrar 
maintained: “ . . . in an earlier case . . . the Court, by way of an ad hoc solution and 
without prejudice to the question of principle involved, accepted the written 
observations from the United Kingdom government, which was not a party to the case 
but had an interest therein . . .”470 
Thus, for instance, even if the Court was interested in building the precedent 
and repeating the experience from the previous case, the Registrar made an effort to 
show that the final decision-making authority remained with the judges. As a matter of 
retaining control over the precedent and indicating that the precedent would not imply 
any entitlements, the Registrar stated, “If such a course was taken, it would, needless 
to say, still be for the Court to determine whether and to what extent those 
observations would be taken into account.”471 
In both cases, the Court constructed the boundaries in relation to the 
submissions. However, in Winterwerp, the Court found it acceptable to hear the 
intervener’s observations on the issue of legal interpretation: “He [the President] 
would look favorably upon the Delegates of the Commission filing written 
observations from the Government on the construction of Article 5.4 of the 
Convention, within the limits indicated in paragraph 1 of your letter . . .”472 
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D. Young, James, and Webster v. the United Kingdom 
In Young, James, and Webster, J.E.S. Fawcett acted as a Commission Delegate 
to the Court, having dissented with the Commission’s majority finding that the UK 
had breached its obligations under the Convention by mandating a “closed-shop” 
system of union membership.473 Thus, his position coincided with the position of the 
TUC. Although there was no adequate legal foundation for his action, it was through 
Mr. Fawcett that the document was circulated during the hearing and introduced to the 
Court’s consideration.474 
In the case, the applicants alleged a “closed shop” agreement between British 
Rail and three railway workers’ unions. As a result of the “closed shop” agreement, 
which was concluded between trade unions and employees, the employees were 
required to be or to become members of a specified union. The applicants alleged that 
the practice violated their rights to freedom of association under Article 11 of the 
Convention.475 
In their letter of January 30, 1981, requesting the possibility of intervention, 
the solicitors for TUC provided that the three unions implicated in the cases were part 
of the TUC’s umbrella structure. The organizations affiliated with the TUC were 
engaged with Union Membership agreements. Therefore, the judgment would have 
great importance in the law and practice of the conduct of labor-industrial relations in 
the UK.476 
The representatives of the TUC indicated that they did not expect the UK 
Government, even though it was acting as a respondent in the case, to put forward the 
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adequate argumentative defense for their position.477 Having examined the memorial 
submitted by the UK Government to the Court, TUC’s representatives asserted that the 
UK would not put forward adequate information and justification in defense of its own 
laws.478 Although the UK was the only party with the full power to provide the Court 
with relevant knowledge and “historical, legal, and social” information, the failure of 
the UK Government to do so would create an important detriment for a judgment.479 
J.E.S. Fawcett also used the term amicus curiae during the public hearings on 
the Trades Union case, even though the term was nowhere mentioned in the 
Convention or the Rules. In his efforts to persuade the Court to consider the document 
put forth by the TUC, Mr. Fawcett introduced it as an extension of the Commission’s 
existing function to assist the Court. He explicated this amicus curiae function as an 
activity separate from, yet related to, the Commission’s established mission to 
represent the position of applicants.480 
TUC sought an opportunity to voice its views on the issues raised in the 
Young, James, and Webster case. On January 30, 1981, the lawyers for the TUC 
requested that the Court’s registrar admit their application in relation to the case. Their 
legal argument was twofold: First, they argued that their application should have been 
admitted based on Rules 38 and 41 of the existing Court. Alternatively, they requested 
that the Court allow their application “under its inherent jurisdiction.”482 Moreover, 
Commission President James Fawcett introduced the document submitted by the TUC 
as an extension of the Commission’s existing mandate to assist the Court.483 
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Even a minor accusation that the interveners intended to abuse the existing 
rules could be the cause of a strong defensive reaction. Lord Wedderburn of Carlton, 
in reply to the accusations that the TUC’s attempted intervention defied the rules, 
maintained, “First, it was suggested that the procedure that we adopted was an attempt 
to abuse the procedure of this Court. This is a proposition which we vigorously resist, 
both on behalf of myself and even more on behalf of the senior members of the Trades 
Union Congress.”484 He then continued to explain that the main legal foundation, on 
which the intervention had been based, was primarily Rule 38. 
Indeed, the records indicate that the parties involved understood a minor 
semantic move by the TUC as a very brave form of disobedience and subversion. In 
their initial letter, requesting the right to submit their views to the Court, the lawyers 
for the TUC used the word “application.” 
In the Trades Union case, the Court insisted that the submissions be strictly 
limited to factual circumstances. In a letter confirming the Court’s willingness to hear 
the oral submission by the TUC’s representatives, the Registrar underlined the 
framework for their presentation. The oral submission was to be limited only to the 
facts of the case as well as to English law and practice. Therefore, the interveners in 
Trades Union were are not allowed to do exactly what the UK government did in the 
previous instance. 
In strict authoritative language, the Registrar indicated, 
Accordingly, it is to be understood that the matters on which that 
representative will be heard do not include pleading as to the interpretation of 
the law of the European Convention on Human Rights.485 
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In the Trades Union case, even after the public hearings, as the TUC presented its 
submissions, the Court opened up the opportunity for the UK Government and the 
applicants to provide their comments on the TUC’s intervention. Nevertheless, the 
Registrar insisted on a strict division between facts and arguments on the legal 
questions raised by the case. In his letter, asking the UK Government to submit its 
observations on Lord Wedderburn’s intervention, the Registrar insisted: “ . . . [I]t is to 
be understood that they are to be limited to issues of fact, including English law and 
practice. The decisions taken by the Court are not to be construed as authorizing the 
filing of observations or submissions on the issues of law arising in this case.”486 The 
Registrar used exactly the same phraseology in his correspondence with the 
Commission.487 The Court’s intent was clearly understood by the applicants, who 
indicated that “[i]t was the Court’s express intention that Lord Wedderburn should 
confine his remarks to issues of fact on which TUC information might be useful to the 
Court, and that he should refrain from presenting argument, making submissions or 
expressing particular opinions.”488 
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Chapter VII: NGOs as Amici Curiae before the ECtHR 
1. The International Human Right to Property 
This part puts forth a study of the role of amici interventions in the cases 
before the ECtHR. It must be stressed that the analysis includes only those amicus 
briefs that were declared admissible by the Court. For example, in 1997 the Court 
declined the submission of an amicus brief by Rights International. 72 Similarly, in 
McGinley and Egan v. the UK the court rejected third-party participation by the New 
Zealand Nuclear Test Veterans’ Association and allowed submission of briefs by 
Liberty and the Campaign for Freedom of Information.489 Although instances of 
rejection of NGO participation are relatively rare, I still concentrated on the analysis 
of only those amicus submissions that were declared admissible. Contrasting the 
analysis of those briefs that were admitted to those that were rejected is a worthwhile 
subject for further study. 
This part provides a case study of amicus curiae participation in the 
development of the international human rights law on property by the European Court 
of Human Rights.490 Some commentators claim that a new body of international law, 
international property law, is emerging.491 Human rights law on property is part of this 
new corpus of international rules.492 On the one hand, the human right to property is 
enshrined in the earliest international human rights instruments.493 Moreover, a wide 
variety of states’ policy measures, including those related to debt cancellation, 
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taxation, and banking and financial policies, currently fall under international scrutiny 
within the rubric of interfering with the human right to enjoyment of property.494 A 
combination of these factors makes the development of the international human right 
to property an interesting topic for study. 
On June 30, 2005, the ECtHR announced its judgment in the case of 
Bosphorus hava yollari turizm ve ticaret anonym sikreti v. Ireland (hereinafter the 
Bosphorus Airline Company case). The case concerned the impoundment by Ireland of 
an aircraft leased by a Turkish company from the Socialist Federal Republic of 
Yugoslavia (SFRY).495 The applicant argued that Ireland’s actions breached its right to 
the peaceful enjoyment of possessions under the European Convention.  496 The Court 
ruled that Ireland acted within its duties of membership within the European 
Communities, and that therefore its actions did not constitute a violation of the 
Convention.497 
This case is noteworthy not just for substantive reasons. A variety of entities 
took part in the judicial proceedings as amici curiae. The Italian and the United 
Kingdom governments, the European Commission, as well as a French organization, 
the Institute de formation en droit de l’homme du barreau de Paris, took part in the 
proceedings by submitting their briefs.498 
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This part posits that there are five types of amici interveners: (1) individuals, 
(2) NGOs, (3) international organizations, (4) states, and (5) national independent 
statutory bodies. They influence judicial decision-making, primarily, through practices 
of knowledge production. I define “knowledge production practice” as a systematic 
practice of assigning meaning to information.499 Amici interventions engage in two 
disparate modes of knowledge production, which I call here “activist” and “expert” 
modes. In the activist mode, in which organizations originating in the United Kingdom 
engage, amici follow a four-step process. 
 
Figure 2. The activist mode of knowledge production. 
In the activist mode, intervening entities make a claim in the realm of de lege 
ferenda, or what the law should be. In the activist mode, the amici formulate a 
“constitutive claim,” a claim about a new factual reality that necessitates development 
of new international law and principles.500 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
499 The definition draws on the concept of knowledge in constructivist scholarship in international 
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MICHAEL BARNETT & MARTHA FINNEMORE, RULES FOR THE WORLD: INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS 
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However, most amici engage in an expert mode of knowledge production. An 
“expert” is defined as somebody “skillful by practice or experience.”501 This mode 
misses a larger constitutive claim about the changed reality in relation to which new 
law needs to be developed. In the expert mode, the amici support a resolution of a 
particular case in relation to one of the sides, the applicant or the respondent. This 
chapter shows that amici present factual information and research and argue about 
how the law should be applied to the facts as understood in the context of the 
submitted research. However, in the “expert” mode, the intervening entities make 
claims in the realm of de lex lata, of what the law is, and not in the sphere of de lege 
ferenda. In doing so, the interveners marshal information and evidence from domestic 
jurisdictions, and make claims for how the existing international law should apply to 
these facts. 
 
Figure 3. The expert mode of knowledge production. 
Through analyzing the claims by amici, I show that amici employ these modes 
of knowledge production to support the position of party, the applicant, or the 
respondent government. Individuals and NGO interventions, including the NGOs that 
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engage in the activist mode of knowledge production, support applicants; international 
organizations’ support varies. 
This chapter evidences that the fact of the possession of a link to the applicant 
determines the support by states. If the intervening state has a connection to the case 
through the applicant, then the state supports the applicant. If not, the intervening state 
invariably supports the respondent government’s position. NGO amici, on the other 
hand, do not possess such a direct link to the case in question. They are related to the 
issue discussed with their organizational mandate. 
The Court engages with the amici in three specific ways: acknowledgment, 
refutation, and corroboration. Almost all amici interventions are acknowledged either 
through a statement in passing, or as a summary of each intervener’s arguments in a 
specifically designated section. In certain cases, the Court engages specifically with 
arguments put forth by amici, including with their claims de lege ferenda, and explains 
why it cannot share amici’s arguments. In the mode of corroboration, however, the 
Court expressly relies on the evidence put forth by amici in the expert mode. 
 
Figure 4. The methods of the Court’s engagement. 
The emergence of international human rights law has eroded the position that 
states will not be held accountable for the ill treatment of residents. The principles of 
human rights maintain that being human is the sole and non-arbitrary basis for the 
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possession of rights.502 As Jack Donnelly succinctly puts it, “human rights are, 
literally, the rights that one has simply because one is a human being.”503 The essence 
of human rights principles is to protect human agency from abuse and oppression.504 
From the Universal Declaration of Human Rights to the Rome Statute, 
increasing kinds of human rights have found expression in international law.505 
Similarly, more states subject themselves to human rights obligations by signing or 
ratifying human rights treaties.506 The proliferation of international courts, tasked with 
enforcing these obligations, has occupied a prominent place on the scholarly 
agenda.507 
Some commentators allude to the emergence of international property law. In 
his recent article John Sprankling argues international property law doctrines emerge 
from four different sources: (a) regulation of the global commons; (b) transnational 
coordination of property rights; (c) adoption internationally of rules to prevent 
specific, including the environmental harm; and (d) development of human rights 
law.508 According to Sprankling, a body of rules about property has developed under 
the umbrella of international human rights law.509 The subject of internationalization 
of property law has been a recurring theme in the critical scholarship of B.S. Chimni. 
Chimni writes, “the phenomenon of internationalization of property rights is crucial to 
the creation of a unified global economic space. By internationalization of property 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
502 David S. Weissbrodt and Clay Collins, The Human Rights of Stateless Persons, 28 HUM. RTS. Q. 
245, 248 (2006).  
503 JACK DONNELLY, UNIVERSAL HUMAN RIGHTS: IN THEORY AND PRACTICE, 10 (2nd ED. 2003).  
504 See generally, MICHAEL IGNATIEFF, HUMAN RIGHTS AS POLITICS AND IDOLATRY (2001). 
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506 For an illustrative table on the proliferation of human rights treaties, see TODD LANDMAN, 
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rights, I mean that the change in the form and substance of property rights is brought 
about through the intervention of international law.”510 
Indeed, the right to property is mentioned in the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights (hereinafter UDHR), a document that serves as a cornerstone of 
international human rights law. Article 17 of the UDHR maintains, “everyone has the 
right to own property alone as well as in association with others. No one shall be 
arbitrarily deprived of his property.”511 Due to ideological tensions during the Cold 
War, states did not include the right to property in two important international 
conventions: the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, and the 
International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights.512 However, the 
United Nations Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against 
Women includes the right to property in Article 16 (h).513 The Convention endorses a 
woman’s right to “the ownership, acquisition, management, administration, enjoyment 
and disposition of property” in the context of elimination of discrimination against 
women.514 
Article 15 of the International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of 
All Migrant Workers and Their Families guarantees the right to property and the right 
to adequate compensation in case of expropriation.515 
The European Convention on Human Rights, the drafting of which was 
inspired in part by the Universal Declaration,516 includes the right to peaceful 
enjoyment of possessions in Article 1 of Protocol 1. 
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The First Protocol to the European Convention was concluded on March 20, 
1952, in Paris and entered into force on May 18, 1954, when the first ten required 
ratifications were delivered.517 The First Protocol encompasses the right to property, to 
education, and to free elections to the legislature, and was drafted almost concurrently 
with the Convention text itself.518 
Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 of the European Convention provides for the 
following: 
Every natural or legal person is entitled to the peaceful enjoyment of his 
possessions. No one shall be deprived of his possessions except in the public 
interest and subject to conditions provided for by law and by the general 
principles of international law. 
The preceding provisions shall not, however, in any way impair the 
right of a state to enforce such laws, as it deems necessary to control the use of 
property in accordance with the general interest or to secure the payment of 
taxes or other contributions and penalties.519 
The Court has interpreted the Article to rest on three interrelated rules. The 
first is of a general nature and embodies general principles of peaceful enjoyment of 
possessions.520 The second covers deprivation of possessions and subjects the 
deprivation to certain conditions.521 The third reaffirms the right of Contracting Parties 
to control the use of property considering general interests.522 In relation to the phrase 
“general principles of international law,” the Court has maintained that these 
principles refer to the principles of compensation applicable to non-nationals.523 
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The right to property was not included in the initial draft text of the European 
Convention. Although initial drafts leading up to the Convention referred to the right 
to property, due to political tensions in the process of drafting, the drafters decided not 
to include the provision in the Convention. Instead they included the right to property, 
alongside the right to education, in a separate Protocol No. 1. 
The European Movement Convention, drafted by the advocates for the 
unification of Europe, served as the first draft of the European Convention. The initial 
draft presented by the European Movement to the Consultative Assembly of the 
Council of Europe, the agency tasked with the elaboration of the Convention text, 
included “the freedom from arbitrary deprivation of property.”524 With regard to the 
substantive scope of the Convention, the initial draft specifically mentioned “[T]hose 
fundamental, personal and political rights which it is practicable to enforce through the 
process of a court of a law.”525 The European Movement Convention was delivered to 
the legal arm of the Consultative Assembly—the Committee on Legal and 
Administrative Questions, presided over by Sir Maxwell-Fife, himself the author of 
the European Movement Convention text. Twenty-four European lawyers were 
members of the Committee.526 
The Committee was divided on a number of issues, including the right to 
property and the rights of parents to choose the modes of education for their 
children.527 Some members of the Committee objected to the inclusion of the right to 
property in the Convention, maintaining that measures adopted by states in relation to 
property should have been considered in the context of social economic circumstances 
in a given country; an international institution would hardly be adequate to evaluate 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
524 ED BATES, THE EVOLUTION OF THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS, 56 (2010).  
525 Id. at 66.  
526 Id. at 61.  
527 Id. at 63.  
	  134 
these circumstances.528 The critics were in a minority, and the majority opted to 
include the right because it was important “for the independence of the individual and 
of the family.”529 
The Rapporteur of the Committee presented the report on behalf of the 
Committee to the Assembly. The Assembly debated the report and as a result adopted 
the Assembly Recommendation 38. The Recommendation was referred to the 
Committee of Ministers.530 
The Recommendation listed a number of substantive rights in Article 22. 
However, both the right to education and the right to property were excluded from the 
recommendation.531 After a heated debate, the Delegates could not reach consensus on 
the formulation of these rights, although everybody agreed that they were important 
for the overall purposes of the Convention—guarantying those substantive rights, 
which were most abused in totalitarian Germany and behind the iron curtain.532 The 
difficulty of reconciling ideological tensions was the crux of the Assembly members’ 
inability to agree on the draft of the two clauses. While it was important to guarantee 
that the precedent of indoctrination of children in school as it took place in Nazi 
Germany would not be repeated, the members aspired to maintain the possibility of 
teaching some religious and philosophical views within schools in their countries.533 
Similar considerations played out in relation to the drafting of clauses on the 
right to property. The members regarded the inclusion of this article as important, 
because deprivation of property was a strategy used by totalitarian states to repress 
their opponents, as well as because the right was important “for the independence of 
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the individual and of the family.” However, specific draft language could not be 
reconciled with the domestic policy intentions of some of the member governments, in 
particular the British.534 
On August 7, 1950, after a series of debates and amendments, the Committee 
of Ministers approved the Convention text. The final text of the Convention reflected 
the spirit of compromise described by MacBride, the President of the Committee of 
Ministers: “very often the choice had to be made between being able to reach 
agreement on a modified text or no text at all.”535 The Committee promised that 
additional rights, including the right to property and education, would be included in 
the Convention later.536 The text was open for signature on November 4, 1950.537 
2. Amicus Curiae and the International Human Right to Property 
A search of the important property case law of the Court identifies 23 such 
cases of high significance in relation to the right to property. Of these, two were 
excluded as irrelevant. Out of the remaining 21, amicus curiae interventions took place 
in all but 2 cases. In all other 19 cases the Court allowed amici curiae interventions. 
There are five types of interveners: (1) individuals, (2) NGOs, (3) international 
organizations, (4) states, and (5) national independent statutory bodies. 
Individuals that act as interveners are a minority. Out of 19 cases, in only one 
case was the intervener an individual, the adoptive father of the applicant. In Koua 
Poirrez v. France, Bernard Poirrez was granted leave to intervene in support of the 
application by his adoptive son.540 
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Similarly, there was only one intervention by a national independent statutory 
body. In J.M. v. the United Kingdom, the Equality and Human Rights Commission 
intervened to support the applicants’ claim. The British Parliament established the 
Commission under the Equality Act 2006 with the mandate “to challenge 
discrimination, and protect, and promote human rights.”541 
A variety of NGOs are allowed by the Court to provide submissions. In cases 
related to the right to property, the European Roma Rights Centre is a repeat player. 
They were granted leave to submit third-party comments in four cases: Jane Smith v. 
the United Kingdom (2001), Lee v. the United Kingdom (2001), Coster v. the United 
Kingdom (2001), and Chapman v. the United Kingdom (2001).542 
The amicus briefs are drawn from organizations on issues related to their 
mandates. All the cases in which the European Roma Rights Centre participated 
concern claims brought by British citizens of Roma origin. The applicants complained 
that government measures against occupation of land by their caravans violated their 
rights under the Convention, including the right to peaceful enjoyment of property. 
For instance, both Age Concern and Help the Aged submitted the briefs in 
Carson and Others v. the United Kingdom. The applicants claimed that the UK 
Government’s failure to uprate their pension in line with inflation violated their 
property rights and the prohibition against discrimination under the Convention.543 
The two organizations, which joined in 2009 to form Age UK, aim to improve later 
life for everyone through consultation, campaigns, training, and research.544 
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In Maria Atanasiu and Others v. Romania, the Court granted leaves to 
intervene to two organizations from Romania, Asociatia pentru Proprietatea Privata 
and Res Ro Interessenvertretung Restitution in Romanien.545 Both organizations aim at 
implementation of restitution laws in Romania. Asociatia pentru strives to advocate 
for the right of private property ownership and enactment of adequate legislation in 
Romania.546 Res Ro is an organization registered in Germany in 2007 whose objective 
is “to ensure the enforcement of restitution claims against Romania and the 
observance of human rights by the Romanian authorities.”547 
Furthermore, intervention by international organizations has been 
commonplace in the Court’s litigation. For instance, in the case of Blecic v. Croatia 
(2004),548 the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) 
intervened as a third party, to illuminate the Court on the status of “occupancy rights” 
in Bosnia-Herzegovina.549 Similarly, the European Commission participated as a third 
party in Bosphorus Airways v. Ireland.550 
States are active amici as well. Out of 19 cases, in 7 the President of the Court 
granted leave for third-party intervention to at least one state. In a number of cases the 
interventions were predetermined by the presence of a relevant link to the case, most 
often the applicant. The position of the intervening state is closely related to this link: 
states that have a relationship to the applicant, whether through his or her nationality, 
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place of residence, or another factual circumstance, intervene in cases to support the 
applicant’s position.551 
In Xenides-Arestis v. Turkey, the Government of Cyprus intervened as a third 
party.552 Cyprus was implicated in the case because the applicant was a Cypriot 
national who lived in Nicosia. The applicant owned property in the territory of the so-
called Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus. She alleged that she had been forced to 
leave her native town by the Turkish military forces and since then had been unable to 
enjoy her possessions.553 
In Baklanov v. Russia, the applicant, a Russian national, lodged a claim against 
Russia. Latvia intervened as a third party. Latvia’s connection to the case was 
determined by the fact that the applicant was born and lived in Riga. In 1997 he 
decided to move from Latvia to Russia and asked one of his acquaintances to move all 
his savings from Latvia to Russia. His savings, in the amount of 250,000 USD, were 
confiscated as “an object of smuggling” upon crossing the border at the airport.554 
Latvian intervention supported the applicant’s claim and alleged that Russia had 
violated his rights under the Convention. 
Similarly, in Kovacic and Others v. Slovenia, Croatia intervened as a third 
party555 because it had a connection to the case. The bank whose status was the 
concern of the dispute was a branch of a Slovenian bank located in Zagreb, Croatia. 
Croatia maintained that the measures taken by Slovenia interfered with the applicants’ 
exercise of their rights. 
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In all other cases, when the intervening state does not have a link to the case, it 
supports the position of the respondent government. 
Entities acting in the activist mode gather information and conduct research in 
order to make constitutive claims about a new social reality. This new social reality, in 
turn, requires new legal principles from the Court. Hence, the Court is urged to 
reinterpret some of its old principles and, in effect, create new law. In making their 
constitutive claims, intervening entities rely on information-gathering and research 
findings. Organizations put forth constitutive claims through the production of 
knowledge. To be clear, I do not claim that this is the only way that amici curiae’s 
normative arguments are structured. This is one of the patterns that emerge in the 
analysis of their claim-making. 
Interveners who make claims in the expert mode do not purport to convince the 
Court to innovate. They produce information and either directly or indirectly urge the 
Court to apply its law taking this information into consideration. 
The interventions by Interights and by the OSCE in the case of Blecic v. 
Croatia illustrate the differences between the activist and expert modes of knowledge 
production.556 The Blecic case concerned the tenancy rights of ethnic Serbians in 
Croatia in the early 1990s. Interights’s amicus submission gathered evidence from the 
Court’s case law to urge a narrow interpretation of the principle of a state’s margin of 
appreciation in interpreting Article 8 (the right to family life) within the Convention. 
The organization argued that the Court should adopt a special approach and exercise 
special vigilance in interpreting widely a State’s margin of appreciation when the 
applicant concerned is particularly vulnerable.557 
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The OSCE submitted an amicus brief in the same case. The OSCE’s 
submission has a different objective. The amicus brief states, “The purpose of this 
submission is to provide the Court with an analysis of the legal status accorded to 
‘occupancy rights’ to former socially-owned apartments in Bosnia-Herzegovina.” In a 
ten-page brief, OSCE provided a detailed study of the history of occupancy rights in 
the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRY), before and after its 
dissolution.558 
The interventions of the European Roma Rights Centre in a series of cases 
illustrate the structure of a normative argument. The Court granted permission to the 
Centre to file amicus submissions in four concurrent cases, all of which were filed in 
the court on December 10, 1999. In all cases the Centre submitted identical 
submissions. The organization claimed that the Convention had to be reinterpreted in 
light of the international consensus regarding the urgent need for international action 
in response to the plight of Roma, 
There had emerged a growing consensus among international organizations 
about the need to take specific measures to address the position of Roma, inter 
alia, concerning accommodation and general living conditions.559 
To support their claim about the international consensus, the organization pointed out 
the newest reports by international organizations and marshaled research on the 
growing number of international instruments regarding the rights of Roma.560 
The Equality and Human Rights Commission also acted an activist mode in the 
case of J.M. v. the United Kingdom (2010). The Commission urged the Court to 
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reconsider its definition of “family life” under Article 8 of the Convention and to 
include in this definition the relationships of same-sex couples. To support their 
request, the Commission pointed out that the reality within Member States in terms of 
attitudes towards cohabitation of same-sex couples has changed since the Court’s 
earlier decision. 
Given the Court’s strong stance against discrimination on groups of sexual 
orientation, it necessary followed that the Court should accept in principle that 
a same-sex relationship is no less capable of constituting family life than a 
heterosexual relationship. . . . In that (earlier) decision the court had noted that 
there was little common ground among the Contracting States at that point in 
time with respect to the recognition of homosexual relationship. Since then, 
however, there had been a clear and well-documented movement across 
Europe towards such recognition.561 
To illustrate their conviction that a new pattern of consensus has been emerging in 
Europe, the Commission relies on research on the legislative changes in different 
countries. 
In Carson and Others v. the United Kingdom (2010), two organizations 
registered in the UK, Age Concern and Help the Aged, intervened. This collective 
claim by applicants claimed that the UK Government’s failure to uprate their pensions 
in line with inflation violated their property rights and the prohibition against 
discrimination under the Convention.562 Thirteen applicants had spent most of their 
working lives in the United Kingdom and had emigrated abroad, including to South 
Africa, Canada, and Australia, upon retirement. Their pensions, however, had 
remained fixed while they lived abroad. The applicants argued that their pensions 
would have grown had they been uprated correspondingly with inflation. 
The interveners relied on research findings to prove that the existence of 
family ties abroad was an important factor in older peoples’ decision to emigrate 
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abroad. According to the interveners, the Court should have taken into account the 
hardship into which the retired individuals would fall if it did not consider their need 
to keep adequate pensions in order to join their families abroad.563 
The amicus submission by the European Commission in the Bosphorus 
Airlines case illustrates the “expert” mode. In the Bosphorus case, the EU Commission 
brief clearly maintained, “[t]he commission supports Ireland in this case.”564 The brief 
proceeded to explain the degree of fundamental rights protection within the European 
Union, the case law of the European Court of Justice, as well as the obligations of 
Member States. Based on the knowledge presented in the brief, the Commission 
argued that Ireland should be absolved of its responsibility under the European 
Convention.565 
In Maria Atanasiu and Others v. Romania, two organizations, Asociatia pentru 
Proprietatea Privata and Res Ro Interessenvertretung Resrtitution in Romanien, were 
granted leave to intervene.566 The applicants attempted to obtain restitution of property 
that had been confiscated from their ancestors in the period when large-scale 
nationalization was conducted by the Communist government in Romania. Although 
after the fall of the Communist regime the Romanian government enacted legislation 
with respect to property restitution, the applicants’ attempts to recover their 
confiscated property failed. They alleged that Romania violated both their right to 
peaceful enjoyment of property and their right to a fair trial. 
The two intervening organizations provided information about the restitution 
procedures available in Romania. They critiqued the procedures, which, according to 
the interveners, were marred by procedural and administrative irregularities. They 
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argued that legal mechanisms other than restitution were available domestically. The 
amici also asserted that reduction of the amount of compensation was not justified.567 
In Jelicic v. Bosnia and Herzegovina, an association from Bosnia-
Herzegovina, the Association of Foreign-Currency Savers, submitted an amicus curiae 
brief. The Association explained the background to the problems associated with hard-
currency reserves in the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. The organization 
also provided information about legal judgments on the release of foreign-currency 
savings in Bosnia-Herzegovina.568 
In Suljagic v. Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Court permitted the submission by 
the same Association of Foreign-Currency Savers together with the submission from 
the Association for the Return of Foreign-Currency Savings of Bosnia-Herzegovina 
and Diaspora.569 The third parties described in detail the circumstances under which 
the foreign-currency holders accepted privatization certificates for their currency 
savings.570 
3. The Court’s Methods for Engagement with Amici 
The Court engages with the amici curiae in three modes. Almost all amici 
submissions are acknowledged by the Court’s summary of the amici’s arguments. 
Summaries are of two forms. On the one hand, the Court may mention an amicus 
submission in passing, as one sentence alongside the summary of the applicants’ and 
respondents’ arguments. On the other hand, the Court may summarize the amicus 
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position under a separate sub-section, spelling out the position of each of the amici and 
their arguments. 
Regarding submissions of some amici, the Court goes further than just 
acknowledging their participation. In such instances, the Court uses two specific 
modes: refutation and corroboration. In refutation, the Court engages with amici’s 
stand, discussing their arguments, yet disagrees with them and provides its own 
reasoning for a decision contrary to amici’s suggestions. In corroboration, the Court 
agrees with some of the arguments by amici and builds its reasoning in part on their 
expertise expressed in their submissions. 
A. Acknowledgment 
In almost all cases the Court acknowledges amici interventions. For instance, 
the Belgian and Irish governments submitted amicus curiae briefs in Burden v. the 
United Kingdom.571 The final judgment summarized their submissions under the 
Section “The Third Parties’ Submissions.” However, the Court did not discuss the 
submissions or engage with them otherwise. In a similar mode, submissions by two 
organizations were acknowledged through summary in Maria Atanasiu and Others v. 
Romania.572 
B. Refutation 
The adoptive father of the applicant, Koua Poirrez, was permitted to intervene 
in the case of Koua Poirrez v. France. The father supported the application of his son, 
who alleged that France’s refusal to award him disability allowance for adults due to 
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his lack of French nationality discriminated against his exercising of property rights.573 
The intervener also requested damages in addition to the compensation claims 
presented by the applicant.574 In response to his claim, the Court explicated the scope 
of rights associated with the status of an intervener. According to the Court, the status 
did not include a number of rights, including the right to claim damages, associated 
with the status of a party.575 
In Kovacic and Others v. Slovenia (2008), the Court permitted the intervention 
of Croatia.576 Prior to the dissolution of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia 
(SFRY), the applicants, Croatian nationals, had deposited their hard foreign-currency 
savings in the Zagreb (Croatia) office of a Slovenian bank, the Ljubljana Bank. The 
Ljubljana Bank was one of the main banks with branches in many other Republics in 
SFRY.577 In response to the financial crisis which followed the dissolution of the 
SFRY, Slovenia adopted banking system reforms in the 1990s. The applicants alleged 
that the Slovenian government’s actions prevented them from withdrawing their 
savings and thus violated their property rights. The intervening government of Croatia 
presented an extensive overview of the financial and banking situation in the SFRY. 
The government provided its own explication for the legal status of the Bank, where 
applicants had made their deposits.578 The Court noted, “[T]he applicants, the 
respondent Government and the intervening Government have in effect requested the 
Court to go into a number of issues pertaining to the circumstances of the break-up of 
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the SFRY, its banking system [. . .]” However, the Court decided that these issues 
were subject to the decision-making of the domestic policy-makers.579 
In Scordino v. Italy the Court engaged in a dialogue with amici, the Polish, 
Czech, and the Slovakian governments, refuting some of their statements, which the 
Court perceived as criticism. Four Italian nationals complained that the Italian 
Government unjustly interfered with their right to peaceful enjoyment of possessions 
and that their right to a fair trial was breached as well.580 The applicants had inherited 
a plot of land from Mr. Scordino. The land had been expropriated with a view to the 
construction of housing. Subsequently, the Calabria Regional Council included the 
plot in a zonal development plan and allowed a cooperative society to carry out 
construction work.581 Mr. Scordino was offered compensation, the amount of which 
they contested. The proceedings, including the appeal, lasted almost eight years, and 
the judgment of the Court of Cassation was pronounced on August 3, 1998.582 The 
applicants alleged that the expropriation violated their property rights and that the 
length of the proceedings interfered with their right to a fair trial. 
The intervening governments posited that states should have been allowed a 
wide margin of appreciation in determining the length of time to be considered 
“reasonable” in judicial proceedings. Their intervention rested, primarily, on the 
argument that domestic authorities are better equipped to judge what time frames are 
considered reasonable and what compensation is adequate for compensation claims 
when the indicated time frames are breached. The judgment summarized the position 
of each Government.583 The Court opened up its reasoning by responding to the 
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allegations articulated by the amici: “[t]he Court will begin by responded to the 
observations of the different Governments.”584 Afterward the Court presented in detail 
its rationale for gradually increasing the awards for non-pecuniary damage incurred 
through lengthy trials. In response to the aforementioned governments’ statements, 
which the Court perceived as indirect critique, the Court explicated that it had 
developed its approach as a result the failure of some states to respond to its previous 
pronouncements on significant delays in judicial proceedings.585 
In Carson and Others v. the United Kingdom, the Court reflects on the 
arguments put forth by third parties: 
Much is made in the applicants’ submissions and in those of the third party 
intervener of the extreme financial hardship which may result from the policy 
not to up-rate pensions and of the effect that this might have on the ability of 
certain persons to join their families abroad.586 
Nevertheless, having acknowledged the arguments of the interveners, the Court 
maintained that it cannot take this consideration into account. The Court refused to 
generalize on the situation of many individuals who might be in a position similar to 
that of the applicants.587 
C. Corroboration 
In Back v. Finland, the Court allowed intervention by the governments of the 
Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, and the United Kingdom.588 The applicant had agreed 
to serve as a guarantor on a loan to N. The debtor could not pay off his debt and had 
applied for debt adjustment in 1995. In 1993, in response to the financial crisis leading 
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585 Id. paras 173-177.  
586 Carson and Others v. The United Kingdom, App. No. 42184/05, March 16, 2010. para 62.  
587 Id. para 62. 
588 Back v. Finland, App. No. 37598/97, July 20, 2004, para. 10.  
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up to the high volume of unpaid debts, Finland had adopted legislation allowing the 
writing-off of debts as long as the debtor met certain conditions, including following a 
payment schedule. Based on this legislation, the Finnish courts adjusted N’s debt, 
which substantially reduced the amount that Back could recover from N.589 The 
applicant, a Finnish national, alleged that his right to peaceful enjoyment of property 
under the Convention was violated by Finland’s actions.590 
The judgment summarized the arguments of all interveners. The Netherlands, 
Norway, Sweden, and the United Kingdom all indicated that the respective countries 
possessed domestic legislation allowing for debt adjustment. More specifically, the 
Netherlands pointed out that it had passed the relevant act in 1998, Norway indicated 
that the Norwegian Debt Settlement Act was passed in 1992, the Swedish Government 
pointed out that the Swedish legislature adopted a similar Act in 1994, while the UK 
brief generally described the debt-cancellation system in the UK.591 
In its assessment the Court touched on a number of legal issues raised by the 
applicant’s claim, including the applicant’s allegation that the Finnish debt-adjustment 
act had a retroactive effect because it applied to contracts concluded prior to its entry 
of force. The Court indicated that this concern about the lawfulness of the measure 
was valid. Nevertheless, the Court observed that in remedial social legislation and in 
particular in the field of debt adjustment the legislature should be able to take 
measures that affect the execution of previously concluded contracts in order to attain 
the aim of the policy adopted.592 In the process of substantiating this argument, the 
Court referred to Norway’s and Sweden’s debt-cancellation legislation with 
retroactive effect.593 
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In Bosphorus Airline Company (2005), the Court granted leave for intervention 
to the Italian and UK Governments, the European Commission, and the Institute de 
formation en droit de l’homme du barreau de Paris. The applicant, a chartered airline 
company registered in Turkey,594 had leased two aircraft from Yugoslav Airlines, the 
national airline of the former Yugoslavia when the United Nations passed, and the 
European Community implemented, sanctions against the Federal Republic of 
Yugoslavia. On May 17, 1993, one of the aircraft arrived in Dublin for a technical 
check to be conducted by an Irish company. Upon completion of the check, the 
aircraft was not permitted to leave the airport, in accordance with the UN sanctions. 
Ireland had a wide margin of discretion in choosing the methods for implementing its 
UN as well as its European Community obligations concerning the sanctions.595 The 
applicant company submitted that Ireland’s impoundment of the aircraft constituted a 
deprivation of its possessions as understood under Article 1 of Protocol 1.596 The case 
raised the question of the degree of Ireland’s responsibility with the view that Ireland 
possessed international obligations within other international organizations. 
In the judgment the Court spelled out in detail the arguments of each of the 
interveners, underlining the differences of opinion among them. The judgment 
presented a summary of arguments of the Italian and British Governments, the 
European Commission, and the Institut. Moreover, the Court expressly shared 
arguments presented by one of the interveners—the European Commission: 
The Court finds persuasive the European Commission’s submission that the 
State’s duty of loyal cooperation . . . required it to appeal the High Court 
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judgment of June 1994 to the Supreme Court in order to clarify the 
interpretation of Regulation [. . .]597 
The Court also openly agreed with another argument, presented by both the 
intervener and the Government of Ireland, with the following words: “The Court 
would also agree with the Government and the European Commission that the 
Supreme Court had no real discretion to exercise, either before or after its preliminary 
reference to the ECJ.”598 
Although amici curiae interventions have become commonplace in litigation 
within international tribunals, international relations and international law scholarship 
on international judicial decision-making have so far overlooked their impact. The 
literature has yet to conceptualize the role and influence of amicus curiae interventions 
on the development of international law. I argue that one of the main modes of amici 
influence on decision-making by international judges is knowledge production. Amici 
engage in two, activist and expert, modes of knowledge production. NGOs originating 
from the UK engage in the “activist” modes. The Court engages with amici by 
acknowledging their submissions, refuting their arguments, or using their knowledge 
to corroborate its own reasoning. The Court explicitly draws on knowledge provided 
by amici when they put forth the knowledge as “experts.” 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
597 Id. para. 146. 
598 Id. para. 147.  
	  151 
Chapter VIII: NGOs as Amici Curiae in the International Tribunal for the Law 
of the Sea 
On February 1, 2011, the Seabed Disputes Chamber of the International 
Tribunal on the Law of the Sea (hereafter ITLOS) issued an advisory opinion in Case 
No. 17, Responsibilities and Obligations of States Sponsoring Persons and Entities 
with Respect to Activities in the Area (hereinafter Case No. 17).599 The commentators 
have highlighted a number of important aspects in this opinion. First, from a 
substantive viewpoint, the Advisory Opinion was hailed as historic because it set the 
highest standards of due diligence, a legal obligation to apply precaution, best 
environmental practices, and Environmental Impact Assessment by the sponsoring 
states in relation to the activities of the sponsored organizations in the Area. Second, 
for the first time, the advisory jurisdiction of ITLOS was invoked. Third, the Advisory 
Opinion in Case No. 17 was unanimous, an unprecedented occasion in the line of the 
Tribunal’s earlier decisions marked by separate and dissenting views by judges.600 
This article highlights another aspect of the case, hitherto unrecognized. Case 
No. 17 was the first instance in which non-governmental organizations (NGOs) took 
part in the Tribunal’s proceedings in the capacity of amici curiae. First, the Tribunal 
requested the amicus curiae brief of the International Union for the Conservation of 
Nature (hereafter IUCN). Under the United Nation’s definition the IUCN is 
considered an NGO. Second, on August 17, 2010, the ITLOS Registry received a 
request by Stichting Greenpeace Council (Greenpeace) and the World Wide Fund for 
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Nature (WWF) to permit them to participate in the Advisory proceedings as amici 
curiae.601 The President of the Court informed the organizations with individual letters 
on August 27 that their statement would not be included in the case file because it was 
not submitted in accordance with the procedural rules. However, it would be 
transmitted to the states, intergovernmental organizations, and the Seabed Authority. 
On September 10, 2010, the Chamber decided not to grant the request for participation 
to the two organizations and informed them of this decision on the same day.602 The 
Advisory Opinion was issued on February 1, 2011.603 
NGO participation in the ITLOS Case No. 17 is an example of a larger trend in 
which entities not party to litigation take part in the proceedings before international 
tribunals as amici curiae. More often than not, litigation within the international 
tribunals involves a number of amicus curiae interventions by NGOs. 
I analyze ITLOS’s action with respect to the NGO amicus curiae petition on 
two levels. On an immediate level, the Tribunal’s actions represent a cautious 
welcome to NGO participation in the Tribunal’s proceedings. The Tribunal’s actions 
towards the amici petition point to its favorable disposition. This, in turn, widens the 
possibility of NGO participation and influence in the lawmaking process within the 
Tribunal. In this regard, I discern the Tribunal’s positive approach in two specific 
actions: first, in its decision in Case No. 17, ITLOS clarified that it was open to 
considering amicus briefs by organizations other than those whose members were 
exclusively states. By requesting amicus curiae views from a number of organizations, 
including the International Union for Conservation of Nature and Natural Resources 
(IUCN), ITLOS expressed its welcome to amicus curiae briefs by NGOs—at least as 
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the term is understood by the United Nations. The Tribunal established a precedent by 
which NGOs that contain states, state agencies, and their representatives as members 
can be invited as amici curiae to submit their views. 
Second, the Tribunal was neither required nor authorized to undertake the steps 
they did in relation to the submission by Greenpeace and the WWF. However, the 
Tribunal used its discretion favorably towards the NGO petition and allowed it to 
attain the maximum effect: even though the Tribunal officially declined to admit the 
amici curiae submission, it in fact fostered the dissemination of NGO arguments. 
From a more general perspective, the case has important implications for NGO 
participation as amici in the international legal process. Alongside the International 
Court of Justice, up until this case the ITLOS remained as one of the last bastions 
untouched by NGO attempts to participate as amici and to put forth their views. Many 
other international tribunals were already accustomed to handling NGO petitions for 
intervention as amici. Moreover, international tribunals often draw on research and 
expertise provided in NGO amicus briefs. By its most recent actions in Case No. 17, 
the Tribunal followed the path that many other international courts had traveled 
earlier. 
This chapter proceeds as follows: part II stresses that NGO participation as 
amici curiae in international dispute resolution is one form of NGOs’ activity in 
international lawmaking. It maps the theoretical discussions regarding the role of 
NGOs in international lawmaking, and specifically, in international environmental 
lawmaking. Part III sketches out the domestic legal origins of the procedural 
institution of amicus curiae intervention. Part IV highlights how the amicus curiae 
participation procedure was adopted by international tribunals. It shows the active role 
that NGOs play as amici curiae before five major international tribunals. Part V 
presents the jurisdiction of ITLOS and outlines the contours of the legal framework 
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regulating non-state actor access to the Tribunal. Part VI provides the factual 
background to the advisory opinion in Case No. 17 and amicus curiae petitions in the 
case. Part VII analyzes the Tribunal’s approach and explores the implications of the 
Tribunal’s approach from the perspective of NGO participation as amici within 
ITLOS. Finally, Part VIII highlights the importance of the Tribunal’s approach to 
NGOs in Case No. 17 from the general perspective of NGO participation in the 
international legal process. 
1. NGO Access in the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea 
ITLOS was founded as a dispute resolution mechanism under the United 
Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS).604 Although there has been 
extensive academic discussion on whether the Tribunal allows access to NGOs as 
applicants and as amicus curiae, prior to Case No. 17 the issue had not been tested in 
practice. Moreover, when referring to amicus curiae interventions, the Tribunal’s 
Statute and Rules of Procedure mention “intergovernmental organizations.” The 
commentators have been discussing whether the term includes “NGOs.” Furthermore, 
amicus curie can participate in the Tribunal’s proceedings only if requested by the 
Chamber. The section below outlines ITLOS’s basic structure and delineates the main 
procedural aspects related to the applicant and amicus curiae access. 
A. Background 
ITLOS is a judicial body entrusted with the adjudication of disputes that arise 
out of application and interpretation of the United Nations Convention on the Law of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
604 Cathrin Zengerling, NGOs versus European Pirates: Fisheries Agreements, IUU Fishing and ITLOS 
in West African Cases in INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW-MAKING AND DIPLOMACY REVIEW 
107, 121 (ED COUZENS & TUULA HONKONEN EDS. 2008).  
	  155 
the Sea (UNCLOS).605 UNCLOS resulted from one of the most complex and 
protracted diplomatic negotiations in the 20th century, and as such was hailed as a 
success.606 The Tribunal was established pursuant to Annex VI of UNCLOS. Annex 
VI contains the Statute of the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea.607 The 
Tribunal had its first session in October 1996,608 in which its judges adopted the Rules 
of Procedure in accordance with Article 16 of Annex VI on October 28, 1997.609 
The Tribunal, which is composed of 21 members,610 has its seat in Hamburg, 
Germany.611 The first case of ITLOS, M/V Saiga (St. Vincent and the Grenadines v. 
Guinea) was submitted to the Court on November 13, 1997.612 ITLOS is split into four 
chambers: the Chambers for Summary Procedure, Fisheries Disputes, Marine 
Environments Disputes, and Seabed Disputes. The Seabed Disputes Chamber that 
issued the Advisory Opinion in Case No. 17 consists of 11 members.613 
The Tribunal has jurisdiction in two kinds of proceedings: contentious and 
advisory.614 In terms of access, the Tribunal is a hybrid mechanism. The issues related 
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to access to the tribunal should be considered in two separate areas: (a) access in the 
contentious proceedings, with special considerations given to the issues of access to 
the Seabed Disputes Chamber; and (b) access to advisory proceedings. 
B. Access as Applicants 
Article 20 of Annex VI of UNCLOS stipulates provisions regarding access to 
the Tribunal. First, the Tribunal is open to state parties of UNCLOS. However, access 
is not just foreclosed to them. Article 20(2) states: 
The Tribunal shall be open to entities other than States Parties in any case 
expressly provided for in Part XI or in any case submitted pursuant to any 
other agreement conferring jurisdiction on the Tribunal which is accepted by 
all the parties to that case. 
First, we have to inquire what is meant by a “state party” in 20(1). Article 1(2.1) 
defines state parties as states that have consented to be bound by the Convention and 
for which the UNCLOS is in force.615 Moreover, the meaning of “state parties” is 
extended to entities other than states by virtue of Article 305, which stipulates that 
UNCLOS will accept signatures by entities other than states, including by self-
governing associated states and international organizations.616 Article 305 of Annex 
IX (Participation by International Organizations) establishes: 
For the purposes of article 305 and of this Annex, “international organization” 
means an intergovernmental organization constituted by States to which its 
member States have transferred competence over matters governed by this 
Convention, including the competence to enter into treaties in respect of those 
matters.617 
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Commentary to the UNCLOS has also suggested that the definition entails only those 
organizations to which states transfer competence.618 Some commentators argue that 
this definition includes the European Community (EC) only.619 Indeed, the EC ratified 
the UNCLOS in 1998. Up until now, EC is the only international organization and 
non-state member of the Convention.620 
Second, the Part XI referred to in Article 20 is the Part that regulates activities 
in the Area. Article 187 of Part XI of UNCLOS provides that in the cases when 
disputes arise from the activities in the Area, the relevant Chamber of the Tribunal has 
jurisdiction over disputes between states as well as non-state parties, including state 
enterprises and natural or juridical persons.621 
The third prong, in “any case submitted pursuant to any other agreement 
conferring jurisdiction on the Tribunal which is accepted by all the parties to that 
case,” has been the subject of much academic discussion. 
There are several opinions on how to interpret the word “agreement” in this 
part. Thomas Mensah, for instance, argues that the “agreement” can only be a public 
international agreement as also stated in Article 288(2), which would mean that the 
general contentious jurisdiction is not open for private entities.622 Others, such as 
Sicco Rah and Tilo Wallrabenstein, argue that the phrasing exhibits “theoretical 
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openness” towards NGOs.623 Philippe Gautier, the Registrar of the Tribunal,624 
considers that even if the “agreement” in Article 20(2) does imply the public 
international law agreement as in Article 288(2), access to ITLOS remains open to 
entities that have international legal personality. However, the question of which 
entities possess the international legal personality should be determined based on the 
“needs of the international community.”625 
Moreover, even if meeting the conditions under these provisions theoretically, 
a plaintiff before ITLOS needs to have legal standing according to the general rules of 
international public law. Thus, NGOs would either have to claim infringement on their 
own rights or have the option of arguing altruistically in the common interest. ITLOS 
could develop criteria for such standing.626 In any event, so far the Tribunal’s practice 
has not provided definitive answers for solving these debates. 
Section H of the Rules of Procedure concerns advisory proceedings,627 in 
which Article 133 of the Rules of Procedure spells out the system for advisory 
proceedings, which fall within the domain of the Seabed Disputes Chamber.628 The 
request for an advisory opinion should rest on a legal question arising within the scope 
of the Assembly’s activities. It should also contain a concise formulation of the 
question and be accompanied by the relevant documentation.629 
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C. Access as Amicus Curiae 
The possibility of amicus intervention is not mentioned in the ITLOS Statute. 
However, the Tribunal’s Rules of Procedure allow amici curiae interventions in both 
contentious and advisory proceedings. Rule 84 regulates the procedure of such 
interventions in contentious proceedings. The Tribunal’s procedure allows for amici 
interventions of two basic forms: (a) top-down, that is, when requested by the 
Tribunal; and (b) unsolicited, when an intergovernmental organization seeks to furnish 
information relevant to a case. 
The top-down occasions may have three specific origins: (a) when requested 
by the state party, (b) when requested by the Tribunal proprio motu, or (c) in a special 
instance, when the case before the Tribunal is concerned with the interpretation of the 
constituent instrument of an international organization or a related international 
convention.630 At any time prior to the closure of the oral proceedings, the Tribunal 
may request that the organization “furnish information relevant to a case before it.”631 
In advisory proceedings, the amicus curiae procedure is top-down only. The 
Registrar communicates to all state parties that a request for advisory opinion was 
submitted.632 Article 133 (2) establishes, “The Chamber, or its President if the 
Chamber is not sitting, shall identify the intergovernmental organizations which are 
likely to be able to furnish information on the question. The Registrar shall give notice 
of the request to such organizations.”633 Then the Chamber, or its President, if the 
Chamber is not sitting, will identify an intergovernmental organization that can furnish 
information pertinent to the legal question raised. The organizations and states are 
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invited to submit their opinions within fixed time limits. If the oral proceedings are 
held, then the States and organizations are invited to take make oral submissions.634 
However, scholars have debated the exact meaning of the word 
“intergovernmental” in Rule 133. As noted above, amici interventions under both 
Rules 84 and 133 are limited to “intergovernmental organizations.” Because neither 
the Tribunal’s Statute nor the Rules of Procedure define the characteristics of 
“intergovernmental organizations,” considerable scholarly discussion has been 
generated around the Rules’ use of this term. In particular, scholars have deliberated 
about the frequent and seemingly interchangeable uses of the phrases 
“intergovernmental organization” and “international organization” by the Rules of 
Procedure. 
For instance, Rule 52 elaborates on the procedure for communication to the 
parties and mentions both types of organizations. It indicates that “in the case of the 
International Seabed Authority or the Enterprise, any international organization and 
any other intergovernmental organization [emphasis added] the Tribunal shall direct 
all communications to the competent body or executive head of such organization at 
its headquarters location.”635 
With regard to the possibility of amicus interventions by NGOs, it is important 
to inquire whether the “intergovernmental organization” mentioned in the Rules of 
Procedure provisions about amicus interventions are equivalent to the “International 
Organization” defined in UNCLOS. Could the Tribunal, hypothetically speaking, call 
on an internationally recognized NGO to submit its views under Rules 84 and 133? 
And if not, in what way are “intergovernmental organizations” different from 
“international organizations” for the purposes of submitting amicus briefs? 
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Lance Bartholomeusz highlights the drafting history of the procedural rules of 
ITLOS. He indicates that Article 133 of ITLOS rules of procedure was modeled on 
Article 66 of the ICJ statute and notes that the wording of the rules changed from 
“international” to “intergovernmental organization” only in later drafts.636 According 
to Bartholomeusz, the reading precludes NGOs from participation as amici.637 
Beyerlin agrees with Bartholomeusz’s conclusion, yet does not elaborate in what sense 
an “intergovernmental organization” is different from an “international 
organization.”638 
Philippe Gautier adds that “intergovernmental organization” is broader than 
“international organization” and includes all international organizations, except when 
they are parties or intervening parties in the case.639 According to Gautier, it is 
“difficult to see how the term “intergovernmental organization” could cover an 
NGO.640 
2. Amicus Curiae in Case No. 17 
Case No. 17 concerns an unprecedented instance when the International 
Seabed Authority faced a request by private entities to allow them to explore the 
seabed. However, one of the sponsoring states, Nauru, asked that the Seabed Authority 
request an advisory opinion regarding the contours of state liability for damage in the 
Area incurred by private actors. The Case is noteworthy for amicus participation in 
two respects: first, based on its procedural rules the Tribunal requested amicus briefs 
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by a number of “intergovernmental” organizations that possess Observer status at the 
Assembly of the International Seabed Authority. One of the organizations, which 
submitted a brief in response, was the International Union for the Conservation of 
Nature (IUCN). At the same time, two groups, Greenpeace and the WWF, petitioned 
the Tribunal to accept their amicus curiae brief. This section outlines the relevant 
background to the Tribunal’s opinion, as well as the founding history, organizational 
structure, and membership base of intervening and petitioning amici. 
A. Facts of the Case 
UNCLOS declares the seabed and its resources that lie beyond national 
jurisdiction (known as “The Area”) to be “the common heritage of mankind.”641 The 
Area comprises two-thirds of the earth’s surface. The doctrine of common heritage 
establishes norms preserving a large part of ocean space as a commons accessible to 
and shared by all states and taking into particular consideration the interests and needs 
of developing states.642 The International Seabed Authority (ISA) supervises the 
exploration and exploitation of the Area.643 The Authority adopts rules and procedures 
for the protection and conservation of the natural resources of the Area.644 
All prospective exploration and exploitation activities (carried out by either a 
state entity or a private entity) are required to be sponsored by a party to UNCLOS. 
Sponsoring states must apply to the ISA for approval of a work plan for exploration 
and licenses for exploitation. 
In 2008, the ISA received two applications for approval of work plans for 
exploration in a reserved area.645 They were lodged by Nauru Ocean Resources, Inc. (a 
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Nauruan corporation sponsored by Nauru) and Tonga Offshore Mining Ltd. (a Tongan 
corporation sponsored by Tonga).646 In 2009, as sponsoring countries became anxious 
about the possible liability caused by exploration, they requested that the ISA 
postpone both applications.647 Before proceeding, Nauru proposed that the ISA seek 
an Advisory Opinion from the Chamber on several specific questions to clarify the 
liability of sponsoring states.648 
The ISA Council requested an Advisory Opinion from the Chamber on three 
questions.649 Based on Rule 82 of its Rules of Procedure, the Tribunal asked for an 
amicus opinion only of those intergovernmental organizations that serve as observers 
in the Assembly of the Authority.650 A study of the entities that submitted written 
statements as requested by the Tribunal shows that 11 states, three organizations, and 
the International Seabed Authority furnished such statements.651 
B. Amicus Brief by IUCN 
Rule 82 of the Rules of Procedure of the Assembly specifies the types of 
entities that may be granted observer status. The list includes states that are not 
members of the Authority and the United Nations along with its agencies and non-
governmental organizations. Rule 82.1(e) of the rules of procedure of the Assembly 
defines two types of organizations that can receive an observer status in the Assembly: 
(a) non-governmental organizations with which the Secretary-General has entered into 
arrangements in accordance with article 169, paragraph 1, of UNCLOS; and (b) other 
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non-governmental organizations invited by the Assembly that have demonstrated their 
interest in matters under consideration by the Assembly.652 
Therefore, from the wide range of entities that serve as Observers of the 
Assembly, the Chamber invited only several organizations. The Interoceanmetal Joint 
Organization (IOM), the International Union for the Conservation of Nature (IUCN), 
and the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) submitted statements.653 
The Tribunal invited organizations that are either fully constituted by states, such as 
UNEP and the IOM, or those that have States as members (IUCN). 
The IOM was founded in 1987 by an intergovernmental agreement. The 
current IOM sponsoring states are Bulgaria, Cuba, the Czech Republic, Poland, 
Russia, and Slovakia. It is headquartered in Poland. In fact, since 2001, the IOM has 
had an agreement with the International Seabed Authority for exploration activity in 
the area.654 UNEP is a United Nations arm regarding environmental issues around the 
world. UNEP’s mandate is based on the United Nations General Assembly Resolution 
2997 (XXVII) of December 15, 1972, and subsequent amendments.655 
IUCN is the most hybrid of all the participating organizations. In its 
submission, the organization defined itself as “an intergovernmental organization.”656 
However, in academic literature IUCN and its predecessor are referred to as NGOs.657 
Nevertheless, its membership base goes beyond governments alone. The statement 
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notes, “IUCN is the world’s oldest and largest global environmental network. It has a 
democratic membership union with more than 1,000 government and NGO member 
organizations, and almost 11,000 volunteer scientists and other experts in more than 
160 countries.”658 In it, the Statute of the IUCN indicates that it is registered under 
“Article 60 of the Swiss Civil Code as an international association of governmental 
and non-governmental members.”659 In terms of its members, IUCN classifies 
membership, and in this system of classification, states and integration organizations 
founded by states are Category A, although non-governmental organizations registered 
within states and international NGOs affiliated with more than one state can become 
members of Category B.660 The difference in categories is reflected in the difference 
of rights of entities in these categories, including voting rights. For instance, each 
member state has three votes, while each NGO has one vote.661 
C. Amicus Curiae Petition by WWF and Greenpeace 
On August 17, 2010, the ITLOS Registry received a request by Greenpeace 
and the WWF to permit them to participate in the Advisory proceedings as amici 
curiae.662 The President of the Court informed the organizations with individual letters 
on August 27 that their statement would not be included in the case file, as it was not 
submitted in accordance with Rule 133 of the Court. However, it would be transmitted 
to the states, intergovernmental organizations, and the Seabed Authority. The 
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recipients were also informed that the statement would not be a part of the official case 
file. 
The amicus curiae pleading was submitted by two organizations: Stichting 
Greenpeace (Greenpeace International) and the WWF.663 The petitioners’ pleading 
was innovative relative to requests for intervention as amici in other international 
courts in that it was composed of two related, yet separate documents: the Petition and 
the Memorial. The Petition put forth the organizations’ request to participate as amici 
in the proceedings as well as their justifications for intervention, and the Memorial 
presented the petitioners’ substantive arguments.664 
In particular, in the petition, the organizations requested that (a) the petition 
and the memorial be considered as part of the pleadings in Case No. 17, and (b) the 
intervening organizations be permitted to make oral submissions during the 
hearings.665 
The Petition touches upon three specific issues: (a) the authority of ITLOS to 
accept NGO amicus curiae submissions, (b) the desirability of admitting amici 
submissions, and (c) the interests of the intervening organizations in relation to the 
case. In the section addressing the Tribunal’s authority, the petitioners’ main claim 
rested on the argument that the Tribunal’s statute and rules of procedure neither 
authorize nor bar amici participation. The petitioners write, “In summary, although 
there is no express legal basis for amicus curiae participation in ITLOS proceedings in 
general . . . neither is there a bar to it . . . .”666 The argument in the petition regarding 
desirability of accepting amici submissions rests on a number of claims. 
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First, in what can be called a “lacuna” argument, the petitioners indicate that 
the proceedings before the international tribunals raise many issues that cannot be 
adequately expressed via the views of just governments and intergovernmental 
organizations.667 
Second, the petitions put forth the “diffusion argument,” asserting that amici 
participation is becoming more accepted in international dispute-resolution, 
marshaling evidence from the practice of other international courts, including the 
European Court of Human Rights and the WTO.668 Third, the petitioners highlight 
specific features of the deep seabed regime that warrant representation by entities 
other than governments.669 Last, the petitions respond to an anticipated concern of the 
ITLOS judges in the so-called floodgates argument by arguing that the acceptance of 
amicus briefs will not result in an overwhelming submission of amici petitions. The 
petitioners put forth research from ICJ and the ECHR in this regard.670 
In a separate section, the petitions outline their “interest” in participating in the 
case as amici.671 Both organizations are “foremost environmental organizations 
globally, and both have campaigned for protection of the marine environment for 
decades.”672 They petitioned the Court to highlight that the Law of the Sea Convention 
as well as the customary international law impose serious obligations on states 
sponsoring activities in the Seabed.673 
The combined purpose of these obligations is to ensure that the risk of 
activities in the Area is properly internalized, to discourage ill-advised projects, and to 
ensure that the risk of these activities is not simply transferred to third parties and the 
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environment.674 Last, the petitioners described their organizations, objectives, and 
involvement with the International Seabed Authority.675 
The WWF is a trailblazer in amicus curiae procedures and was one of the 
organizations in relation to which the WTO had to confront the issue of admitting 
amicus curiae submissions. The issue of whether WTO Dispute Panels should accept 
amicus curiae briefs arose in the Shrimp/Turtle case.676 One of the two organizations 
that filed an unsolicited amicus submission in that case was the WWF.677 The two 
briefs were submitted jointly by the Center for Marine Conservation (CMC) and the 
Center for International Environmental Law (CIEL), and by the WWF.678 
Interestingly, the ITLOS petition refers to the precedent within the WTO instance, yet 
does not highlight the fact that the WWF was there as well as the first petitioner.679 
Greenpeace International describes itself as “an independent global 
campaigning organisation that acts to change attitudes and behaviour, to protect and 
conserve the environment and to promote peace . . . .”680 It is present in 40 countries 
across the globe and does not accept funds from governments or corporations.681 
Greenpeace is an experienced amicus curiae submitter both internationally and before 
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domestic courts. For instance, in 2004, Greenpeace submitted an amicus curiae brief 
before the WTO together with 14 other non-governmental organizations in the so-
called Biotech dispute.682 
Nevertheless, Greenpeace has much more experience in amicus curiae 
participation domestically. Greenpeace USA has also been active in filing amicus 
briefs in the courts at home.683 The two organizations have a history of collaboration 
on the submission of amicus briefs. They submitted a joint brief along with other 
organizations in the case of European Communities—Measures Affecting Asbestos 
and Asbestos-Containing Products (“EC—Asbestos”).684 
3. The Tribunal’s Approach 
In Case No. 17 the Tribunal expressed its cautious, yet favorable, approach to 
NGO participation through two distinct means. First, by admitting an amicus brief by 
IUCN under Rule 133, the Tribunal conceded that “intergovernmental organizations” 
as understood under its Rules could include NGOs within the UN definition of this 
term. Second, although the Tribunal dismissed the brief by the WWF and Greenpeace, 
indicating that it was contrary to the Tribunal’s Rules of Procedure, the Tribunal 
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Affecting Asbestos and Asbestos Containing Products: The World Trade Organizations on Trial for Its 
Handling of Occupational Health and Safety Issues, 3 MELBOURNE J. INT’L L.120 (2002). See also 
“NGOs welcome WTO Green Light to French Ban on Asbestos but remain skeptical about the WTO 
Dispute Settlement Process,” Joint Position Statement by Greenpeace International, IBAS (International 
Ban Asbestos Secretariat), FIELD (Foundation for International Environmental Law and Development) 
and WWF (World Wide Fund for Nature, International), March 2001, www.field.org.uk.. 
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undertook a number of steps which point to a favorable treatment of the amicus 
submission by these two public interest organizations. 
A. ITLOS’s Approach to IUCN 
The practice of Case No. 17 refined the meaning of “the intergovernmental 
organization” under Rule 133. By admitting an amicus brief by IUCN, the Tribunal 
approximated the meaning of “intergovernmental organization” to an NGO, at least as 
it is understood by the United Nations. 
The character of organizations invited to submit their views is clarified in the 
meaning of “intergovernmental organizations” under Article 133 of the Rules of 
Procedure: “intergovernmental organizations” is a broader category than “international 
organizations” under Article 305 of UNCLOS. The latter is characterized by two 
conditions: (a) it is constituted by States, and (b) its member States have transferred 
competence to it over matters governed by this Convention, including the competence 
to enter into treaties in respect to those matters.685 
On the other hand, “inter-governmental organizations” are those organizations 
that contain states as members. As Case No. 17 shows, the defining character is not 
the type of the instrument that founded the organization. The IOM was established by 
an intergovernmental agreement, and UNEP was established by a UN General 
Assembly Declaration, whereas the IUCN was founded as an Association under the 
Swiss Civil Code.686 However, all the organizations are “intergovernmental” in that 
states are members of these organizations. In the case of IOM, its membership consists 
of states only, whereas IUCN unites states as well as non-governmental organizations, 
even though states have more rights. 
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The practice of Case No. 17 also shows that membership of 
“intergovernmental organizations” as opposed to “international organizations” might 
not be limited exclusively to states. As indicated above, IUCN’s members are states as 
well as state agencies, NGOs, and individuals. 
By admitting the brief by IUCN, ITLOS approximated its interpretation of an 
“intergovernmental organization” to the definition of an NGO at least as understood 
by the United Nations. The term “non-governmental organization” was first mentioned 
on the global level in Article 71 of the UN Charter, which reads: “The Economic and 
Social Council may make suitable arrangements for consultation with non-
governmental organizations which are concerned with matters within its competence.” 
The Charter did not, however, define “non-governmental organization.” A definition 
was adopted in 1950 by the UN Economic and Social Council, which established that 
for the purpose of consultative arrangements with the Council, NGO meant “[. . .] any 
international organization which is not created by intergovernmental agreement.”687 
The definition was further elaborated in 1996, providing that “[. . .] any such 
organization that is not established by a governmental entity or intergovernmental 
agreement shall be considered a non-governmental organization for the purpose of 
these arrangements, including organizations that accept members designated by 
governmental authorities, provided that such membership does not interfere with the 
free expression of views of the organization.”688 There were other conditions added as 
well, such as that the aims of an NGO must be in conformity with the spirit, purposes, 
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and principles of the UN Charter.689 The definition does not, therefore, include 
possession of a non-profit or public-interest aim as a requirement.690 
IUCN meets this UN definition of an NGO. The UN definition excludes from 
NGO recognition those organizations that were established solely by governments. 
IUCN was founded as the International Union for Protection of Nature (IUPN) in 
Fountainebleau in 1948.691 At the time of founding, it comprised an amalgamation of 
states and non-governmental organizations.692 In 1956, IUPN was renamed the IUCN, 
while its objectives remained. It is hardly doubtful that these purposes correspond to 
the purposes of the United Nations and its principles. 
B. The Tribunal’s Favorable Treatment of the WWF and Greenpeace Brief 
Despite the fact that ITLOS rejected NGO amicus submissions based on its 
Rules of Procedure, with its actions the Tribunal subtly welcomed the WWF and 
Greenpeace brief. Although the amicus brief did not become part of the official case 
file, the actions of ITLOS in regard to the brief, including its display of the brief on its 
website, facilitated its dissemination to a wide audience of the amici’s arguments. As a 
result, the submission is noted and discussed on other websites and scholarly blogs.693 
The NGOs themselves refer to their submission as it is displayed on the Tribunal’s 
page.694 In short, by displaying the submission on its website, the Tribunal granted 
exposure to the amici brief. Moreover, by furnishing the brief to the state parties and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
689 Id. 
690 Anna Dolidze, The European Court of Human Rights’ Evolving Approach to Non-Governmental 
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intergovernmental organizations, ITLOS supported the process of sharing NGO 
arguments with the parties, which allowed the parties to take into account the 
arguments and concerns raised in the brief. Through these actions, the Tribunal 
allowed the NGOs to achieve the aims that would have been attained with their 
official participation in the case. 
First, although the Rules do not expressly authorize or obligate the Tribunal to 
do so, the Tribunal disseminated the NGO submission to the State Parties, Seabed 
Authority, and the organizations that had submitted their statements. The judgment 
notes that these entities “would be informed that the document was not part of the case 
file and that it would be posted on a separate section of the Tribunal’s website.”695 
Indeed, while the letter from the Tribunal to the submitter informs them that their 
submission will not be included in the case file, it includes a promise that “ . . . State 
Parties and intergovernmental organizations admitted to participate in the advisory 
proceedings will be informed of the received of the statement and will receive an 
electronic copy thereof.”696 
Second, the Tribunal displayed the amici brief on their website,697 although the 
Rules of Procedure are also silent on this matter. Article 133 of the Rules of Procedure 
addresses submission of documents within advisory proceedings. It states, “The 
written statements and documents annexed shall be made accessible to the public as 
soon as possible after they have been presented to the Chamber.”698 The question 
arises: which statements and annexed documents are meant under this provision? The 
reading of Article 133 in its entirety answers the question. In 133(1), the Tribunal is 
obligated to inform all State Parties of the request for the advisory procedure. The 
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following provision allows the Tribunal “to identify the intergovernmental 
organizations which are likely to be able to furnish information on the question.” 
Afterward, the state parties and intergovernmental organizations are invited to submit 
their “written statements and documents annexed” regarding the questions raised in 
the proceedings.699 
Thus, according to the Rules, the Court shall make available to the public these 
documents submitted by States and Intergovernmental Organizations. The Tribunal 
indeed did so in this case.700 However, in addition, the Tribunal did more than it was 
required to do in accordance with the Rules and displayed the submission of NGO 
amici briefs.701 
Moreover, the Tribunal’s response to the petitioners includes a promise that 
their submission will be displayed on the website. The letter specifies how the 
submission will be presented: “The statement will be placed on the website of the 
Tribunal in a separate opinion of documents relating to Case No. 17 entitled 
‘statement submitted by a non-governmental organization.’” The statement would also 
indicate that it is not part of the official case file.702 Indeed, the Tribunal followed up 
on the promise.703 
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4. Findings 
The international legal process school has captured the modalities of NGO 
participation in international lawmaking. This chapter underscores one more, hitherto 
overlooked, yet increasingly popular method through which NGOs take part in making 
international law. Although the amicus curiae participation procedure originated 
within the UK and has become a traditional procedural instrument within domestic 
law of common law countries, an increasing number of international tribunals allows 
for the amicus procedure and accepts and engages with amicus curiae briefs submitted 
by NGOs. Up until now ITLOS has remained one of the few international tribunals not 
accepting NGO amicus briefs. However, Case No. 17 signals a change in this policy. 
ITLOS’S approach to amicus briefs in Case No. 17 indicates that opportunities 
for NGO participation in international lawmaking are expanding. First, by admitting 
and considering a brief by IUCN under Rule 133, the Tribunal interpreted 
“intergovernmental organization” to mean an entity that includes states and non-state 
actors as founders and members. This precedent approximated “intergovernmental 
organization” with the term NGO as it is used within the United Nations. This 
practice, if continued, could serve as a pathway for amicus briefs by other 
organizations whose membership is similar to that of the IUCN. 
Second, ITLOS’s approach to WWF’s and Greenpeace’s amicus curiae 
petition showed that the Tribunal is at least partially receptive to hearing NGO claims. 
Although the Tribunal declined the petition by Greenpeace and WWF, the Tribunal’s 
actual response, including the display of the petition on its website, allowed the 
dissemination of NGO arguments. 
Interestingly, records indicate that the Tribunal judges met in 2004 to review a 
number of issues with regard to the Rules of Procedure, including the question of 
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amicus curiae participation.704 During the meeting, the Members of the Tribunal 
discussed whether it was necessary to adopt rules regarding the amicus curiae 
proceedings. In the end, they decided that it was too early to resolve this question; 
thus, they determined that the issue should be resolved by considering future 
developments in the Court’s case law.705 
The decision of the 2004 meeting to discuss the possibility of admitting NGO 
amicus briefs and the judges’ conclusion to wait for relevant precedents demonstrated 
the readiness of the Tribunal to hear NGO arguments. Case No. 17, which concerned 
the issue of the seabed, recognized as the “common heritage of mankind,” served as an 
appropriate opportunity to hear views about the implications of the case beyond the 
interests of the immediate parties to the case. Indeed, to represent the interests that are 
circumvented by the adversarial procedure is one of the inherent functions of the 
amicus curiae procedural instrument, a function which, needless to say, should be 
performed primarily when the fate of the commons of mankind is at stake. 
On a more general level, the cautious welcome by ITLOS of NGO 
participation is an important development for considering the role of NGOs in 
international dispute-resolution. ITLOS was still one of the few international tribunals 
that did not allow for amicus submissions by non-state actors. The welcome to NGO 
briefs in Case No. 17, although timid, may signal that international dispute-resolution 
is becoming more receptive than before to participation by actors other than states. 
Whether or not more opportunities for NGOs’ participation and their active 
involvement in international, and in particular, international environmental law-
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making, will lead to more legitimacy or democratization of such lawmaking, this is an 
issue that future research must answer. 
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Chapter IX: Conclusion 
1. Findings 
The study allows us to draw a number of conclusions. First, as a comparison of 
NGO participation as claimants and as amici shows, opportunities for NGO 
participation are increasing in both realms. The ECtHR has expanded its negative-
substantive admissibility test for NGOs, thus allowing more entities to claim rights 
within the Court’s litigation structure. At the same time, NGOs have become almost 
routine participants as amici in the cases before the Grand Chamber of the Court. The 
study of the most recent instance of NGO petition within ITLOS further strengthens 
the claim that NGO amicus interventions are coming to be accepted by all major 
international tribunals. In Case No. 17, the Law of the Sea Tribunal for the first time in 
its history requested and accepted an amicus brief from one NGO, the IUCN, and 
expressed an indirect welcome to the joint amicus brief by Greenpeace and the WWF. 
Moreover, as records of recent judges’ meetings show, the Tribunal had already 
considered the possibility of amending the amicus procedure and making it more 
expansive so that it unequivocally allows for NGO participation. 
Second, NGO amicus participation has a character distinct from NGO 
appearances in the capacity of claimants. The study shows that NGOs take part in 
cases to which they do not possess any kind of connection. This trend is most visible 
when contrasted with the States’ usage of amicus procedure within the ECtHR. States 
draw on amicus procedure when they have a connection, or what I call a “transnational 
link,” to a case. States apply the amicus procedure when they are related to a case 
based on some fact, for instance when the applicant is a national of the intervening 
state. This right of third-party intervention has been often utilized by the Member 
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States to indirectly support applications by their nationals in a variety of cases.706 For 
example, in the case Slivenko v. Latvia, the applications were brought by former 
stateless residents of Latvia, who later received Russian citizenship.707 Russia 
exercised its rights under Article 36(1).708 Russia again intervened in support of 
applications in Sisojeva et al v. Latvia.709 The same is not true of NGOs, who 
intervene as amici without such a link to the case in question. 
Furthermore, the claim that NGO interventions as amici curiae have a strong 
public-interest dimension, contrary to NGO participation as complainants, is 
evidenced by the fact that all NGO complaints were directed against the same country 
where the NGO is based, while the transnational element is much stronger in cases 
involving NGO amicus brief submissions. A typical case involving a complaint by an 
NGO concerns an organization registered in the same country against which the claim 
is directed. For instance, Unabhängige Initiative Informationsvielfalt, a newspaper 
publisher registered as a non-profit in Austria, filed a complaint against Austria in the 
case of Unabhängige Initiative Informationsvielfalt v. Austria (2002).710 Similarly, an 
association against animal cruelty based in Switzerland—Vgt Verein Gegen 
Tierfabriken711—filed an application against Switzerland in the case Vgt Verein Gegen 
Tierfabriken v. Switzerland.712 
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Nevertheless, amicus interveners do not take part in cases randomly. As the 
study of NGO amicus interventions within the ECtHR shows, NGO amici take part in 
cases and bring forward their views about issues that relate to their organizational 
mandate. For instance, organizations that work on gender equality take part in cases 
relating to gender equality, and NGOs whose mandate concerns property restitution 
become involved in disputes related to property restitution. 
The analysis of the first amicus interventions within ITLOS supports this 
conclusion. In ITLOS the mandate of all three amicus NGOs is related to the study of 
or advocacy about environmental matters, including the questions related to the 
marine environment. 
Moreover, noteworthy findings follow from the historical micro study of the 
internationalization of amicus curiae procedure from the UK to the European Court of 
Human Rights. Contrary to the structuralist perspectives on international legal 
opportunity structure, this part shows that NGOs alongside States take part in creating 
international avenues for their legal action. The case study provides that British NGOs 
and the UK Government, acting independently, engaged with the staff and judges of 
the ECtHR and persuaded the Court to adopt the amicus curiae intervention procedure. 
Recall, however, that originally, amicus procedure offered a possibility for NGOs as 
well as the UK Government to intervene in cases when their interests were not 
presented in the proceedings. Yet later amicus curiae procedure has turned into a 
pathway for NGOS to present arguments in the public interest. As we see from the 
study, NGOs have extensively used the procedure to advance their public interest 
claims. 
In addition, this finding is supported by the study of NGO participation within 
ITLOS. In Case No. 17, two NGOs, Greenpeace and the WWF, petitioned the 
Tribunal to adopt their submission even though there was no relevant legal basis for 
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this in the Tribunal’s procedures. Therefore, although international structures, such as 
international dispute-resolution bodies, attract and foster international claim-making 
by NGOs, the activities of these organizations in turn influence further development of 
these structures. The conclusion has interesting implications for the scholarship on 
international opportunity structures and mobilization. 
Subsequently, it must be noted that NGOs engage with the Court in a specific 
manner: NGOs engage in making what I term “constitutive claims,” arguing that 
newer challenges in reality necessitate development of new international law. States 
that intervene as amici do not go as far, instead indicating what the Court should do in 
the realm of existing law. NGOs support their constitutive claims in relation to the 
ever-increasing need to develop international law by supplying the Court with research 
and area-specific knowledge. It is specifically due to these characteristics, including 
their activity to tap existing international legal structures and to develop them further, 
that I have called public interest NGOs “Global Law Entrepreneurs.” 
A. Normative Considerations 
The admission of NGO amicus briefs and the legalization of amicus 
submission procedure raise a number of normative issues. The sections below lists the 
main considerations that arise in relation to this process. 
First, NGO amicus participation can remedy a gap created by the adversarial 
model of litigation. It can provide the Court with representation of interests beyond 
those of the parties involved in the cases. 
Second, speaking on a more general level, an NGO amicus curiae submission 
might allow the court to create a space for dialogue, or as Robin Eckersley calls it, a 
“transnational public sphere.” Writing about amicus curiae submissions by NGOs in 
the WTO and drawing on Jurgen Habermas’s work, Robin Eckersley states, 
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“Cosmopolitan public spheres are conceptualized as specialized, intermediary 
structures, with multiple strategic and communicative functions, that mediate between 
supra-national governance structures and regional and domestic civil societies.”713 
Transnational public spheres can partly remedy concerns about the lack of external 
accountability of international courts. 
The third argument relates to the international courts whose legitimacy has 
long been questioned. International institutions, including international courts, suffer 
from the lack of democratic legitimacy characteristic of domestic institutions.714 
Legitimacy in international law may be generally defined as “a property of a rule, or a 
rulemaking institution, which itself exerts a pull towards compliance on those 
addressed normatively.”715 Commentators have pointed out that inclusion of a variety 
of actors, including civil society organizations, in international lawmaking may 
address the problem of legitimacy.716 Thus, the courts’ engagement with civil society 
organizations might create the perception of more legitimacy for their 
pronouncements. 
Fourth, on a more practical level, the research provided by NGO submissions 
can serve a valuable function for the Courts, and even more so when NGOs provide 
information and expertise from or about geographic areas that are less accessible. 
NGOs that aspire to participate as amici curiae are often experts in domestic law, and 
in this capacity they can provide important information to judges, information that 
otherwise might be inaccessible or easily overlooked.717 This function is also related to 
research costs and expenses. Hiring staff to conduct case-specific research can be 
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expensive for Courts whose resources are limited. The information and research put 
forth by NGOs can remedy this shortage. 
Last, but not least, is the Courts’ increased publicity as a result of their 
engagement with NGOs. For advocacy organizations, amici curiae briefs are usually 
part of a larger advocacy strategy related to a particular issue. Amicus curiae briefs for 
NGOs serve as a possibility for expanding advocacy campaigns and targeting the 
Court with advocacy efforts. By accepting amicus briefs, the Courts become part of 
these NGO advocacy campaigns, a role that leads to greater exposure for the Court 
and the possibility of attracting public attention to its activities. 
For example, in the first request to submit an amici curiae brief, the 
International League of Human Rights was seen as a possibility for advancing views 
on the issue of colonialism in a legal forum. The League’s main objective was to 
combat colonialism in all its forms, and the fact that the ICJ was seized for the matter 
gave the League a chance to voice its opinions on the issue.718 Even after the case 
concluded, the League continued to advocate for its issues of concern719 through what 
Keck and Sikkink call “information politics.” 
Fifth, submission of amicus briefs leads to the parties encountering amicus 
arguments and entails their right to respond to them, a possibility that may lead to 
party awareness of the position of amici, including their stance on the public interest 
implication of the parties’ arguments and the Court’s decision. 
Nevertheless, the issue of engaging with NGO amicus submissions has its own 
disadvantages. First is the danger of “opening the floodgates.” The Registrar of the 
International Court of Justice mentioned the floodgates counter-argument in his reply 
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to the amicus petition by the International League of Human Rights.720 The argument 
is certainly true in relation to the high-profile cases, that such cases draw a wide 
variety and a relatively large number of amicus participants. An example of this 
situation is the Lautsi case of the European Court of Human Rights, in which 33 
entities were allowed to participate as amici.721 
Second, interacting with a number of NGOs and their submissions, 
disseminating the submission to the parties, and coordinating the parties’ responses 
require additional human as well as material resources; thus, the Courts need to weigh 
these considerations. 
Third, the Tribunals can also be rightfully concerned with the claims of 
representation raised by amicus submissions. The channel of amicus briefs can be 
exercised by some parties to put forth their views by other means such as funding 
research and production of amicus briefs by interest groups. This issue is related to the 
much-discussed issue and debate on accountability and transparency of NGOs,722 a 
risk that is higher when the dispute at hand results in significant revenues or other 
material incentives. 
Fourth, the judges must also be aware of the undue pressure that can be 
associated with the submission of amicus briefs by interest groups.723 Wariness of this 
issue was expressed by the ICJ Chief Justice in The Legality of the Threat or Use of 
Nuclear Weapons case. 
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721 Lautsi and others v. Italy, App. No. 30814/06, March 18, 2011, para. 8 
http://www.echr.coe.int/echr/resources/hudoc/lautsi_and_others_v__italy.pdf 
722 DAVID KENNEDY, The International Human Rights Movement: Part of the Problem? 15 Harv. Hum. 
Rts. J. 101 (2002) (summarizing main criticisms advanced against the global human rights movement, 
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723 Wariness of this issue was expressed by the Chief Justice of the International Court of Justice in The 
Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, 1999 ICJ Rep, dissenting opinion 
of Judge Guillaume, para. 2 at 67. 
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Fifth, the issue of whether to admit amici briefs might require some hostility 
from the parties that have standing in the proceedings. The courts, therefore, can 
expect that the issue of admitting NGO briefs might be controversial. The parties to 
the procedure might feel disadvantaged by the possibility that the court will expand its 
exposure to entities other than parties and that non-parties will gain a form of access to 
the court, which was the case when the ECHR admitted its amicus briefs initially. For 
instance, when the WTO Appellate Body decided to invite amicus briefs in the 
Asbestos case, states expressed their discontent with the body’s decision. The States 
even convened an extraordinary meeting of the WTO General Council to voice their 
dissatisfaction with the possibility of the Body being influenced by non-party views.724 
Similarly, in the above-mentioned Trades Union case of the ECtHR, the applicant’s 
Dr. Calcutt expressed his discontent with the fact that a memorial of amicus 
interveners was distributed to the Court. 
2. Implications of Findings and Contributions to Literature 
The study is the first attempt to treat comprehensively the issue of amicus 
curiae participation in international adjudication. The study finds that amicus curiae 
intervention serves a legitimacy- enhancing function for international tribunals. The 
study shows that international tribunals are becoming gradually open to amicus curiae 
participation, including to participation by NGOs. This study also illustrates how the 
European Court of Human Rights acknowledges and engages with the amici’s 
submissions. By getting acquainted with the amicus curiae briefs submitted by various 
petitioners, including states, NGOs, and intergovernmental organizations, the courts 
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receive information about and become aware of their stakeholders’ and public’s 
preferences. 
This  study has most important implications for the scholarship on the 
legitimacy of international tribunals. As it was explained in Chapter II, scholars agree 
that international tribunals suffer from a legitimacy deficit. Moreover, there is a broad 
scholarly consensus that in order to maintain legitimacy international tribunals should 
remain cognizant of the attitudes and preferences of entities subject to their 
lawmaking. By putting forward information about the policy preferences and the 
values of the public, petitioning states, and NGOs, amicus briefs supply the courts 
with the information crucial for its legitimacy.  
The study contributes to scholarship from a number of other perspectives. As 
indicated in Chapter II, scholarship on international judicial decision-making does not 
adequately capture the involvement of amici in international dispute-resolution. While 
most scholars emphasize the roles of judges and applicants in the “triadic” process of 
governance, they overlook the role that amicus interveners have come to play in 
dispute resolution. This study evidences that amicus curiae interveners are frequent 
participants of the international judicial proceedings. It does so by approaching the 
question from a number of perspectives. 
First, the study provides a chronological overview of gradual acceptance of 
NGO amici interventions by international tribunals. Chapter II shows that most active 
international tribunals have moved to accepting NGO amicus briefs. Furthermore, as 
explained in Chapter V on NGO submissions within the Law of the Sea Tribunal, the 
Law of the Sea Tribunal has most recently moved to an informal welcome of amicus 
submissions by NGOs. 
Second, from an empirical perspective, Chapter IV shows that NGOs utilize 
opportunities afforded by the procedural rules and become frequent participants of the 
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judicial dispute-resolution process. The chapter shows that 19 of 21 highly important 
cases in relation to the right to property within the ECtHR involved an amicus 
submission. 
Third, the chapter shows that NGOs do not merely submit their briefs. Their 
submissions are always acknowledged by the Court. The Courts’ willingness to 
acknowledge the NGO briefs is also supported by the fact that, as Chapter V explains, 
ITLOS displayed the brief on its website without having any obligation to do so. 
Moreover, in some cases, as indicated in Chapter IV, the European Court of Human 
Rights responds to amici’s submissions either by agreeing with their views or refuting 
them. 
Fourth, NGO amicus briefs engage the existing parties as well. As we have 
seen within the European Court of Human Rights and the WTO Dispute Resolution 
body, new possibilities for amicus briefs for NGOs generate discussion among parties 
to the proceedings. 
One of the basic contributions of the transnational legal process school has 
been the emphasis that the dichotomy between the domestic and international law 
realms has been eroded.725 As pointed out by Peer Zumbansen, the concept of 
Transnational Law breaks the boundaries “of traditional thinking about inter-state 
relationships by pointing to the myriad forms of border-crossing relations among state 
and non-state actors.”726 As emphasized by Harold Koh, the concept of Transnational 
Legal Process originates in the idea of Transnational Law coined by Phillip Jessup.727 
In his book Transnational Law, Jessup famously emphasized that Transnational Law 
includes “all law which regulates actions or events that transcend national frontiers. 
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Both public and private international law are included, as are other rules which do not 
wholly fit into such standard categories.”728 As Koh indicates, Transnational Legal 
Process questions the traditional boundaries between “the domestic and the 
international, public and private.”729 Chapter IV Section 4 of this study contributes to 
the scholarship on Transnational Legal Process. Through a study of the 
internationalization of amicus curiae procedure from the UK, this section shows that 
international law and rules emerge as a result of a process of borrowing from domestic 
law driven by state as well as non-state actors. As international law is created through 
the process of internationalization of domestic law, the distinction between 
international law and domestic law is blurred. Moreover, as the section shows, the 
process of internationalization is driven both by the state (UK) and a number of 
domestic non-state actors. 
From the perspective of comparative law scholarship on legal transplants, the 
study offers valuable insights as well. Although the concept of legal transplants is 
concerned with the movement of legal ideas and institutions across states, this study 
shows that legal transplants are also internationalized. As illustrated in the case study 
on the internationalization of the amicus curiae procedure, the ECtHR judges adopted 
the procedure from the UK. This particular section evidences that transplantation can 
occur beyond the national levels. Moreover, similar to the scholarship on legal 
transplants, the section underscores the role of private actors, that is, norm-makers and 
their allies, in the process of internationalization of legal institutions. 
Furthermore, the study contributes to the scholarship on non-state actors and 
international norm-making. As indicated in Chapter II, the international relations 
scholarship has expounded on the question of non-state actor participation in 
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international relations. Keck and Sikkink, Tarrow, and Chichowski have explained the 
relationship between international organizations and domestic NGOs. This study 
outlines another aspect of the relationships. As shown in Chapters IV and V, acting as 
Global Law Entrepreneurs, NGOs use opportunities afforded by international 
organizations to advance their agenda while at the same time expanding opportunities 
to further the opportunities for their participation. As the case studies of the NGO 
participation as amici in the European Court of Human Rights and the Law of the Sea 
Tribunal show, first NGOs engage with the existing structures of the respective 
tribunals. However, they do so to increase opportunities for their own participation. 
For instance, they take advantage of the existing procedures to request that tribunals 
expand their rules and allow their views to be heard in the capacity of amici curiae. 
This same trend emerges when NGOs act as claimants, as the Court’s test for 
recognizing “non-governmental organizations” is expanding and more entities are 
recognized as NGOs. 
In addition, the study advances constructivist perspectives, in particular the 
work of Martha Finnemore and Michael Barnett, on international norm-making. 
Chapter IV shows how NGOs create knowledge and mobilize research in order to 
advance “constitutive claims.” These constitutive claims about the reality in Europe 
then allow NGOs to argue that the Court needs to address the new reality with the 
evolving law. 
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